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The purpose of this thesis is to provide the first academic account and analysis of the vast 
changes that took place in English professional football at the top level from 1970 to the 
present day.  It examines the factors that drove those changes both within football and more 
broadly in English society during this period. The primary sources utilised for this study 
include newspapers, reports from government inquiries, football fan magazines, memoirs, 
and oral histories, inter alia. 
 
This thesis is organised into five main chapters, along with an introduction and conclusion.  
In the introduction, the historiography of modern English football is dissected in order to 
contextualise my dissertation in terms of the existing literature.  The first chapter explores 
the theme of football in decline from 1970 to the mid-1980s – diminishing crowds and 
attempts to reverse that trend, poor grounds, and increasing hooliganism.  The second 
chapter examines the seminal event of the Hillsborough disaster, including the attitude of 
the police and press towards fans, the Taylor Report and the rebuilding of football stadia.  
The third looks at the Premiership, examining the reasons for its formation and its impact 
on the game, such as changes in supporter experience.  The fourth chapter assesses the 
internationalisation of the game, in the era of the Bosman Ruling, as players were drawn to 
play in England not only from the continent but from around the world.  The fifth chapter 
examines the advent of foreign ownership of English football clubs, assessing both its 
positive and negative consequences. All of these developments are anchored in a discussion 
of the broader social, economic, and political changes in modern Britain - including 
Thatcherism and the dominance of free-market economics, consumerism, and shifts in 
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In the 1970s, a fan would attend an elite professional game of football in England, paying 
less than £1 to pass through a turnstile and stand on the terraces to watch the team. The 
terrace itself might have a roof, but often it did not, and in this case the supporter would be 
exposed to all the elements the British winter might bring. Little had changed by 1983, bar 
inflationary increases in admission price, and the American journalist Bill Buford describes 
his experience of standing on the terraces at two games in that year, the first a visit to White 
Hart Lane to watch Tottenham Hotspur: 
 
I do remember that we were late and that it took twenty minutes of pushing, grabbing 
squeezing, groaning, inching, striving, wrestling before finally securing our place, a 
tiny expanse of cold concrete step, crushed between a number of lads – how else to 
describe them? – ten years younger than me and five stone heavier whose passion for 
expression seldom went beyond the simple yet effectively direct (and often repeated) 
phrase: ‘you fuckin’ bastard.’1 
 
The second was a visit to Stamford Bridge to watch Chelsea: 
 
I entered … and emerged from the turnstile to find people everywhere, on the steps, 
sitting atop fences, on posts, suspended from bits of architecture … I joined the mob 
pushing its way through for a place from which to watch the match. Except that there 
was no place. There was a movable crush … I couldn’t move left or right, let alone 
turn around and walk back the way I came. There was only one direction: forward. 
For some reason, there was an advantage, an advantage worth defending, in being one 
step ahead of wherever it was that you happened to be. And that was where everybody 
was trying to go.2  
                                                          
1 Bill Buford, Among The Thugs (London: Secker & Warburg, 1991), p.16.  
2 Ibid., pp.17-18.  
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     He summarizes with a sense of incredulity:   
 
It appeared that, in exchange for a few pounds, you received one hour and forty-five 
minutes characterized by the greatest possible exposure to the worst possible weather, 
the greatest number of people in the smallest possible space and the greatest number 
of obstacles – unreliable transport, no parking, an intensely dangerous crush at the 
only exit, a repellent polio pond to pee into … to keep you from ever attending a match 
again. And yet, here they all were, having their Saturday.3 
 
By 1970, most of the players in the team were on a good wage by the standards of the day, 
but their earnings were no higher than those of some of the more affluent fans sat in the 
seats in the main stand. The players on view were usually English, or at least British, and 
many in the home team may have come from the local area. If players moved from one club 
to another they signed for a transfer fee that was usually a five figure number. A top player 
might command a fee in excess of £100,000, but the first £250,000 player was still four 
years in the future.  
 
There were three domestic competitions, namely the League, the FA Cup and the League 
Cup. The League was divided into four divisions – as one might expect, First, Second, 
Third, and Fourth. The FA Cup enjoyed equal ‘parity and esteem’ with the League, but 
arguably the FA Cup final itself carried a greater sense of occasion, being held at Wembley 
on the last day of the domestic season. The FA Cup final was the only domestic game 
broadcast live on television. Fans who wished to see football on television had to be content 
with the two main ‘highlights’ packages on offer – the BBC’s Match of the Day or ITV’s 
The Big Match. The League Cup meanwhile was the third competition and had only been 
                                                          
3 Ibid., p.19.  
9 
 
in existence since the 1960/1961 season, with finals at Wembley only from 1967 onwards. 
The sociologist Gareth Hopkins argues that the League Cup was introduced by the League 
to challenge the position in power of the FA, and therefore had importance from that point 
of view.4 The team that finished top of the League were League Champions and as such 
entered the European Cup. This was a knock-out competition between the champions of 
European countries, culminating in a match between the two finalists that took place just 
after the end of the domestic season. The teams that finished just below the League 
Champions entered the UEFA Cup and the FA Cup winners entered the Cup Winners Cup.  
 
The supporter was usually a man. Women did attend football matches, but they were a small 
minority in what was largely a male preserve. Sports sociologist David Goldblatt, in The 
Game Of Our Lives, states that ‘although there was a female presence in football crowds, 
somewhere between 5 and 10 per cent of the audience, they are almost absent from the 
collective historical memory.’5 The man was almost always white and from a working-class 
background. The cheap admission price meant that football provided regular entertainment 
that was within his financial means. There was also the ‘aggro’. Soccer hooliganism had 
appeared and taken a hold during the course of the 1960s. Groups of young men fought 
each other on the basis of club loyalty, sometimes around the ground or travelling to or 
from the game, but often inside the ground itself. It became a matter of ‘kudos’ on the 
hooligan grapevine for a group of visiting fans to ‘take’ an end. That meant invading an 
area occupied by the home supporters, driving them out and maintaining a hold on the 
                                                          
4 Gareth Hopkins, ‘The Football Association v. The Football League: using the Football League Cup as a 
window for exploration’, Soccer & Society, vol. 13, No. 1, January 2012, pp.19-29.  
5 David Goldblatt, The Game Of Our Lives: the meaning and making of English football, (London: Penguin, 
2014), p.281.  
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territory. This did not happen at every match, and most games passed off peacefully, but it 
was a regular enough occurrence for it to be a matter of concern.  
 
To sum up, then, football in 1970 was working-class, male, and often violent. Forward to 
2017. The fan attending a match now sits because the ground is all-seater. For this reason, 
and because there is a far better standard of organisation, he has a far greater degree of 
comfort than his predecessor decades earlier. It may well be a new stadium, the old one 
having been demolished. If this has not happened and the football ground is on the same 
site, it will be unrecognisable from that which stood there in 1970. It is likely that he will 
have paid for his ticket online in advance, and will have paid anything from £20 to £65 for 
his ticket, depending on the level of football he is watching and where he chooses to sit in 
the stadium. The team he watches could well include a majority of players from overseas, 
from other European nations, or from further afield in South America, Africa, Asia, or 
Oceania. The players will be earning more in one week than he earns in a year, and at the 
highest level considerably more. Those who transfer between clubs do so for tens of 
millions at the elite level, and for at least a six figure sum further down. A four tier league 
structure remains, but the top division is called the Premier League and the divisions below, 
in descending order, are the Championship, League One and League Two. The FA Cup 
seems to be a second priority to the Premier League, and the League Cup is called 
something different (at present it is the EFL Cup). The fan can view live football on any 
day of the week on satellite television, with some Premier League games scheduled for 
Saturday evenings, Monday nights, and Sunday afternoons with staggered kick-off times. 
There are also European Champions League games on Tuesday and Wednesday evenings, 
and Europa League games on Thursday evenings. To view all of this he may pay a 
subscription fee to Sky or BT Sport, or he may choose to watch the game on television in 
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his local pub, as has become popular. The top four teams enter the Champions League. The 
three finishing just below enter the Europa League. There is no Cup Winners Cup.    
 
The Premier League would grow from its inception as a breakaway league into a 
Premiership that was largely predictable due to the disparity in resources between the top 
clubs who were in receipt of money from the Champions League, the middle clubs, and the 
strugglers – effectively three divisions within one. However, in 2015/2016, there would 
come an exception that would prove this rule. In 2014/2015, their first season back in the 
Premiership, Leicester City struggled, spending 140 days at the bottom of the table, until 
an impressive run of seven wins in nine games saw them avoid relegation.6 During the 
summer manager Nigel Pearson was replaced by Claudio Ranieri, the former Chelsea 
manager. Leicester started the new season displaying the good form with which they had 
finished the old one. When Leicester went top of the table in January, they stayed there.7 
The title was finally clinched on 2 May when their nearest rivals, Tottenham Hotspur, only 
managed a 2-2 draw away to Chelsea, making it impossible for them to catch Leicester’s 
point tally. Leicester had started the season as 5000-1 outsiders in the bookmakers.8 What 
made their feat so remarkable was that they had achieved their success with only a fraction 
of the expenditure of their big-name rivals, as the table below shows. As Gordon Rayner 
and Oliver Brown put it in The Daily Telegraph: ‘Leicester City won the Premier League 
with a team of rejects, retreads and nobodies assembled at a cost of … less than a quarter 
                                                          
6 John Percy, ‘Ranieri: I Am So Proud – This Is An Amazing Feeling’, The Daily Telegraph, Sport p. 2.  
7 ‘Title Deeds: How The Foxes’ Tale Unfolded’, The Daily Telegraph, Sport souvenir supplement, pp.2-7.  
8 Daniel Binns, ‘Zeroes To Heroes’, Metro, 3 May 2016.  
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the value of other title challengers.’9 Ranieri achieved success by moulding his players into 
a team rather than a collection of individual stars.  
 
 
       Table 1. Leicester City’s Premiership winning team 2015/2016 
Player Position Signed Selling club Cost  
M. Albrighton Midfield May 2014 Aston Villa Free 
R. De Laet Defender May 2012 Manchester United undiscl. 
D. Drinkwater Midfield Jan 2012 Manchester United undiscl. 
N. Dyer Midfield ------------ Swansea City (loan) --------- 
C. Fuchs Defender Jun 2015 FC Schalke 04 Free 
D. Gray Forward Jan 2016 Birmingham City £3.5m 
R. Huth Defender Jun 2015 Stoke City £3m 
Kante Midfield Aug 2015 SM Caen £5.6m 
A. King Midfield Jan 2007 ------------------ trainee 
R. Mahrez Midfield Jan 2014 Le Havre AC £0.56m 
W. Morgan Defender Jan 2012 Nottingham Forest undiscl. 
S. Okazaki Forward Jul 2015 FSV Mainz 05 £7m 
J. Schlupp Midfield Jul 2010 ------------------- trainee 
K. Schmeichel Goal Jun 2011 Leeds United undiscl. 
D. Simpson Defender Aug 2014 Queen’s Park Rangers undiscl. 
L. Ulloa Forward Jul 2014 Brighton & Hove Albion £8m 
J. Vardy Forward May 2012 Fleetwood Town £1m  
      Source: www.soccerbase.com/team/team.sd?season_id=1527&teamTabs=transfers last  
      accessed 10 May 2016.  
 
It should be noted, however, that Leicester’s achievement was assisted by certain other 
factors. They suffered no long-term injuries to key players and, perhaps most importantly, 
the teams who would normally be expected to do well had a disappointing season, almost 
without exception. Chelsea’s start was so poor they spent the early part of the season nearer 
the bottom of the table than the top of it; Manchester United still seemed to be coming to 
                                                          
9 Gordon Rayner and Oliver Brown, ‘Rhapsody In Blue On Leicester’s Night Fantastic’, The Daily Telegraph, 3 
May 2016.  
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terms with their post-Alex Ferguson era; Liverpool were sufficiently disappointing to feel 
the need to dispense with manager Brendan Rodgers and replace him with Jurgen Klopp. 
None of this, however, should detract from what was a remarkable achievement, but the 
sociologist Stephen Wagg sounds a note of caution about the Premier League in general: 
‘the Premier League is no lovelier for Leicester’s winning of it. It is still and will remain 
the rigged one arm bandit that it always has been.’10  
 
To return to our notional fan, in 2017 it is much more likely that ‘he’ might be a ‘she’. 
There are far more women at football matches than before. Exactly how many is hard to 
quantify, and it is a statistic that will vary from area to area and from club to club. It is 
certainly true that clubs have tried to attract women and families. One of the big successes 
in recent years has been the growth in women’s football, so the popularity of the game is 
manifesting itself in this manner. Ethnically, there has been less change. The number of 
black fans still make up a very small percentage of the overall crowd, even in areas with a 
large black population, and Asian fans are even rarer. As for the ‘aggro’, he will not see 
any. What little there is will take place away from the ground and involve far fewer 
numbers.  
 
It is, therefore, something of an understatement to say that football has been transformed. 
The changes are wide and include most aspects of the game - fan experience, organisational 
format, media coverage, commercialisation, international make-up of the teams, and club 
ownership. The purpose of this thesis is to chart these changes, and consider what factors 
                                                          
10 Stephen Wagg, ‘Under No Illusions’, When Saturday Comes, issue 352, June 2016, pp.20-21.  
14 
 
were driving them, together with the debates regarding the necessity or otherwise of these 
developments.   
 
This is the story of football in England and the changes that have taken place in the game 
from the 1970s to the present. It is a topic that is central to the history of English popular 
culture in the second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, and 
it also speaks to the evolving character of English society in that period. This is not about 
which team won which trophy in which season, except where such facts illustrate a wider 
point, but about the changes in the game’s consumption and experience by supporters, who 
have themselves changed during the period. The topic is contemporary by nature and raises 
a number of issues. These include how the nature of English football has changed and in 
what way these developments have manifested themselves. In turn this also raises the 
question of how and to what extent these changes reflect wider society, and indeed the 
extent to which changes in football have impacted on wider society, in a symbiotic 
relationship. As the nation’s most popular sport, the story of football is significant to 
millions, and reaches beyond them to society as a whole.  It is not a total history. The subject 
of corruption in football has been avoided because it lends little to this particular study, nor 
is it a study of iconic individuals, except where the fame of a particular player is so great it 
impacts on wider societal trends. Likewise, the study is of English football, so there is very 
little reference to the game in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. For reasons of space 
and focus, I have also confined my study to analysis of the game’s elite: the higher levels 




As a new generation of academics promote the idea that sport and its history are worthy of 
study, it is important to consider the literature that currently exists regarding football during 
the period in question. Some of this has been produced by serious-minded journalists and 
carries a polemical edge. The journalist David Conn, in The Football Business, looks at the 
Premiership and condemns its formation as being motivated by the greed of a few directors 
and owners, at the expense of ordinary fans. Its formation, he argues, was also a 
consequence of the growing dominance of a handful of big clubs over the rest. Those clubs 
sought an ever-increasing percentage of the revenue from television broadcasting deals.  
The arrival of satellite broadcasting meant that there was a new competitor, effectively 
breaking the cartel enjoyed by the BBC and ITV. The Premiership breakaway could not 
have happened, Conn argues, without the rivalry between football’s governing bodies. 
When the League produced its proposal for power-sharing, the FA interpreted it as a threat, 
and in response suggested a Premier League under its own authority, separate to that of the 
League. According to Conn, the FA betrayed its own ethos as custodians of the game by 
backing its formation.11 As will be discussed, there is much to commend Conn’s thesis, but 
his focus is limited to the framework of football’s organisational structure and revenues 
from television broadcasters, merchandising, and the cost to supporters. To fully understand 
the changes to English football at the highest level, one needs to take a wider focus.  
 
The sociologist Anthony King, in The End of the Terraces, takes a different view from 
Conn as he maintains that the formation of the Premiership was necessary as football had 
to adapt to new political and economic realities brought about by free-market principles.12 
                                                          
11 David Conn, The Football Business (Edinburgh: Mainstream 2002 reprint), pp.151-152.  
12 Anthony King, The End Of The Terraces: the transformation of English football in the 1990s (Leicester: 
Leicester 2002 revised paperback edition), pp. 67-68.  
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He goes on to argue that ‘the increased revenue and its new redistribution to the top clubs 
in the Premier League has facilitated the transformation of football’ and ‘improved the 
cultural position of the game,’ pointing out that this money has ‘financed the building of 
new stadia and has enabled these clubs to attract top overseas players who have improved 
the standard of the League.’13 Although challenging Conn’s fundamental argument, King 
stays within the same points of reference, namely that of the Premiership and its 
consumption.  
 
Other works, such as those by historians James Walvin and Matthew Taylor, entitled The 
People’s Game and The Association Game respectively, provide a longer narrative and 
analysis of the history of English football since its origins, and as such, are necessarily brief 
when dealing with the more recent period. In his epilogue, Taylor highlights a paradox in 
that football’s boom has also given rise to pessimism over the growing inequalities between 
the top clubs and the rest, the shift from sport to business, which manifests itself in the 
escalation in players’ wages, meaning that top footballers are both celebrated and derided, 
and the view that as a result of the shift from sport to business some traditional fans are 
being excluded.14  
 
John Samuels, professor in business finance, focusses in The Beautiful Game Is Over, not 
on the Premiership but on globalisation and the concentration of power into the hands of 
only those who have a lot of money.15 He argues that this is largely predictable, and is ‘the 
                                                          
13 Ibid., p.68. 
14 Matthew Taylor, The Association Game: a history of British football (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2008), 
pp.426-428. 
15 John Samuels, The Beautiful Game Is Over: the globalisation of football (Brighton: Book Guild, 2008), p.287.  
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result of the globalisation of the football business and the impact of free market forces.’16 
The game is not in good health, he states, because most Premiership games are not of a high 
standard and the performance of the national team is mediocre. Despite this, fans are being 
‘brainwashed’ by the media telling them that the Premier League is the best in the world, 
and that England have a chance of winning international tournaments.17 The game, 
according to Samuels, has become dominated by a handful of clubs, leaving all the others 
with only a miniscule chance of success, while the sport as a whole has drifted away from 
its base in local communities towards being a brand of TV entertainment.18  
 
Goldblatt’s The Game Of Our Lives is incisive and brings together many aspects of the 
modern game, but the tone is sociological rather than historical. The work is organised 
thematically. The chapters commence with the new football economy, likening it to the 
private housing market and speculative property development.19 Other chapters deal with: 
the experience of going to a match, an observational journey around England taking in 
football clubs in relation to their economic, occupational, and cultural surroundings; the 
game as experienced by black players; shortcomings in the game’s governance; and the role 
of women in football and women’s football.  He concludes by examining the glaring 
difference in financial resources – the ‘opulence and squalor’ – between the Premier League 
and the game at the grassroots level of schools and youth football, but he makes the  
observation that the difference within football is trifling when compared to ‘the fabric of 
everyday life’ where the ‘consequences are altogether harsher.’20 Goldblatt presents a broad 
                                                          
16 Ibid., p.1.  
17 Ibid., p.2.  
18 Ibid., p.1, pp. 14-15. 
19 Goldblatt, Game Of Our Lives, p.1.  
20 Ibid., p.302. 
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picture because he incorporates wider sociological observation into certain themes 
currently of interest within English football.  
 
Thus it can be seen that most of the existing works either focus on specific aspects within 
the area of research, or cover a longer, more diffuse, chronological period. They do not 
cover comprehensively the broad topic of social and cultural change in the game between 
1970 and the contemporary era. Certain topics within the thesis have been covered in 
academic journals. Good examples of these are Dilwyn Porter’s article on decline and 
‘declinism’, research by Gary Armstrong on ‘The Blades’, a gang of Sheffield United 
hooligans, and Alan Tomlinson’s work on the rivalry between the FA and the League, to 
name just three.21 Porter also co-wrote, with Scott Newton, Modernization Frustrated: the 
politics of industrial decline in Britain since 1900.22 Articles published in academic journals 
detail certain topics which are very specific within the overall theme, but as such provide 
quality sources to detail these themes or support an argument. The most commonly used 
are Soccer & Society, Sport in History, and the International Journal of the History of Sport. 
The contemporary nature of the subject means that it is a process still under way, rather 
than one that can be boxed into the past. Trends such as increasing revenue from satellite 
television broadcasters, the international movement of players, and the number of clubs in 
foreign ownership, could well continue to develop into the future.   
                                                          
21 Dilwyn Porter, ‘‘’Your Boys Took One Hell Of  A Beating!”: English Football And British Decline, c.1950-
80’, in eds. Adrian Smith and Dilwyn Porter, Sport And National Identity In The Post-War World (London: 
Routledge, 2004), pp. 31-51; Gary Armstrong, ‘False Leeds: The Construction Of Hooligan Confrontations’, in 
eds. Richard Giulianotti and John Williams, Game Without Frontiers: football, identity and modernity, 
(Aldershot: Arena, 1994), pp. 299-325; Alan Tomlinson, ‘North And South: The Rivalry Of The Football 
League And The Football Association’, in eds. John Williams and Stephen Wagg, British Football And Social 
Change: Getting Into Europe (Leicester: Leicester, 1991), pp.25-47.  
22 Scott Newton and Dilwyn Porter, Modernization Frustrated: the politics of industrial decline in Britain since 
1900 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).  
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The purpose of this thesis is to offer the first comprehensive academic analysis of the recent 
transformation of English football. The changes in the game’s organisational format, most 
notably the establishment of the Premiership, need to be considered alongside the 
development of football stadia, and the evolution of the European club competitions. These 
processes need to be considered individually, but they occurred simultaneously, and their 
impact was collective. They paved the way for an influx of foreign players into English 
football in a process of internationalisation which led in turn to a greater number of clubs 
in foreign ownership. Together, they brought about a revolution in the nature of England’s 
most popular sport.  
 
This thesis is therefore about change, and that is the reason for the chronological boundaries 
I have chosen. As the 1970s dawned, the game had changed little in essence since the First 
World War. By 1914 most clubs owned the grounds that would be their home for the rest 
of the century. Once the League expanded from two to four divisions at the start of the 
1920s, the only change was the scrapping of regionalisation in the lower divisions in 1958. 
Attendances may have fluctuated: for example the late 1940s saw bumper crowds followed 
by a slow decline, but in broad terms a fan in 1970 experienced a game that had changed 
little since that witnessed by his grandfather’s generation fifty years earlier. There were two 
important exceptions to this statement. The first concerned the growth of the football pools, 
which became very important in the 1930s, and familiarised millions with the game, even 
if they were not regular football fans. Secondly, media coverage - radio, and then television 
– had begun to influence the game. On top of this, there were other portents of greater 
change, with the abolition of the maximum wage in 1961, the end of the ‘retain and transfer’ 
system, whereby a player could be retained by a club against his wishes, two years later, 
and England hosting – and winning – the World Cup in 1966, which helped increase interest 
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in the game. The following decades would see a revolution in football, driven by internal 
and external factors, and the purpose of this thesis is to examine this seismic shift, and to 
set it in a broader context by considering how changes in football reflected changes in, and 
had an impact on, wider society.  
 
The themes to be examined will be football’s decline and renewal, the rebuilding of stadia 
following the Taylor Report, the changes in organisational format including the creation of 
the Premiership and the Champions League, the greater international movement of players 
following the Bosman Ruling, and the shift to club ownership by wealthy foreign 
businessmen. Running throughout are the associated topics of the evolving media coverage 
of football and the game’s commercialisation. Necessarily the primary sources used for this 
research include newspapers, mainly the broadsheets of The Times, The Daily Telegraph 
and The Guardian and their Sunday equivalents The Sunday Times, The Sunday Telegraph, 
and The Observer. Newspapers are a very helpful source for this topic because they report 
details within hours of a game or an event happening, and therefore relate all the 
information in a contemporary context. At times it has been necessary to include sources 
from the tabloid newspapers. As well as the infamous allegations published in The Sun 
about Liverpool fans a few days after the Hillsborough disaster, which in themselves 
demonstrated adequately the certain prejudices held about football supporters, the use of 
the tabloid press gives us an angle that is direct, outspoken and succinct. Their use also 
broadens the source base. They have been used to relate opinions on television deal 
negotiations, to graphically paint certain incidents of hooliganism, and detail the poor 
treatment of clubs by foreign owners. The fact that many clubs simply did not bother to 
keep information such as accounts or player registrations beyond their legal requirements 
and obligations to the Football Association means that for many years there was an absence 
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of formal club archives. As an example of football clubs’ attitude towards such things, 
Irving Scholar says that when he took over Tottenham Hotspur, ‘in a wander through the 
West Stand I found long side areas that had been left unfinished, and in an unused office 
numerous Spurs trophies and cups stuffed into a cubby-hole.’23 Spurs were not the only 
club with such a lackadaisical attitude. John Williams, in an article on Liverpool, 
commented that ‘archaic administrative and ownership arrangements for football clubs … 
actually characterized much of the first 100 years of professional football in England.’24 
The historian Martin Johnes points out that, ‘most sporting organisations are very “present-
centred” so record keeping is poor or even non-existent, especially amongst smaller clubs. 
Moreover, professional sports organizations can be suspicious of outsiders and reluctant to 
grant access to researchers. Nor do they always value or understand what they do hold and 
many historians have heard tales of clubs throwing away records in tidy-ups or to make 
space.’25 
 
This makes research dependent on newspapers and magazines. In accessing these I have 
used the British Library Newspaper Archive at Colindale, and the British Library 
Newsroom at St. Pancras. The British Library also provided access to editions of certain 
‘fanzines’, such as the national When Saturday Comes, and individual club fanzines The 
Peterborough Effect (Peterborough United), Voice Of The Valley (Charlton Athletic), and 
A Kick Up The Rs (Queen’s Park Rangers). The National Archives at Kew provided details 
of Cabinet discussions regarding outbreaks of hooliganism, and also access to the 
Popplewell Report into the Bradford Fire of 1985. I also conducted interviews to gain oral 
                                                          
23 Irving Scholar, Behind Closed Doors: dreams and nightmares at Spurs (London: Andre Deutsch, 1992), p.45. 
24 John Williams, ‘Walking Alone Together The Liverpool Way: fan culture and ‘clueless’ Yanks’, Soccer & 
Society, vol. 13, No. 3, May 2012, p.430.  
25 Martin Johnes, ‘Archives And Historians Of Sport’, The International Journal of the History of Sport, vol. 32, 
No. 15, 2015, p.1785.   
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history sources. As examples of these, I spoke to the sports consultant Alex Fynn, the 
academic Rogan Taylor, and former hooligan Patrick Slaughter. Autobiographies have also 
provided useful primary source material, such as Greg Dyke’s Inside Story, Dick Knight’s 
Madman, and Irving Scholar’s Behind Closed Doors. Those from players include Stanley 
Matthews’ The Way It Was, John Barnes’ The Autobiography and Garry Nelson’s Left Foot 
Forward.  
 
Footballers’ autobiographies can, however, be problematic for use as a historic source. 
Most of them are ‘ghost-written’, which calls into question whether one is reading the 
player’s opinion or the writer’s. Joyce Woolridge puts it thus: ‘with this in mind, historians 
of football have mainly been concerned with questions of referentiality – whether these 
autobiographies reflect the genuine thoughts of the protagonist or have been attributed to 
him by his amanuensis.’26 She also points out that the footballer’s autobiography sits within 
a literary inheritance of ‘lost souls and their redemption,’ breaking down into 
‘apprenticeship, triumph over adversity and stability and growth.’27 They conform to a set 
pattern which is just like most autobiographies of people from all walks of life. Other 
problems are that a player may use his autobiography to justify his actions at a controversial 
incident. There is nothing wrong with that, but as historians we always need to take into 
account the views of others who were involved and may have a completely different 
interpretation of what happened. He is also writing for a particular audience, be they the 
fans of his club or football supporters in general, and in so doing he may conform to what 
he thinks is expected of him to say. As Matthew Taylor eloquently puts it: ‘in its disregard 
                                                          
26 Joyce Woolridge, ‘These Sporting Lives: football autobiographies 1945-1980’, Sport in History, vol. 28, No. 
4, December 2008, p.622.  
27 Ibid., p.623.  
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for chronology, its selections, omissions, enhancements, and silences, its lack of 
confidentiality, its literary construction, and its very subjectivity, autobiography has … 
come to be regarded as an imperfect source.’28 He does argue, however, that ‘it is high time 
that historians took it seriously as a topic for study in its own right.’29 
 
Regarding the many hooligan memoirs that have been published, the legal scholar Steve 
Redhead, in his article reviewing five of the most prominent ones, comments that a criticism 
of the sociology of fan culture is that it often descends into ‘uncritical journalism, and has 
neglected sociological theory’, creating a widespread ‘false populism.’30 He goes on to say, 
‘they are often formularized and written in deliberately ‘trashy’ formats. Quotations and 
conversations are seemingly made up at will.’31 This is problematic for anyone wishing to 
gain an accurate historical or sociological picture.  
 
Setting autobiography into a broader context, the genre of autobiography has been ‘a 
publishing phenomenon in the latter part of the twentieth and the early years of the twenty-
first centuries.’32 Its growth in football, which began in the late 1980s, has coincided with, 
and has occurred partly because of, the revival in the game’s popularity. It can also be seen 
as part of the game’s realignment as it became less working-class and more middle-class.  
                                                          
28 Matthew Taylor, ‘From Source To Subject: sport, history, and autobiography’, Journal of Sport History, vol. 
35, no. 3, autumn 2008, p.470.   
29 Ibid., p.486.  
30 Steve Redhead, ‘Hit And Tell: a review essay on the soccer hooligan memoir’, Soccer & Society, vol. 5, no. 3, 
Autumn 2004, p.395.  
31 Ibid., p.396.  
32 This was pointed out by Stephen Hopkins in his work on the Protestant working-class in Northern Ireland. 
Stephen Hopkins, ‘A Weapon In The Struggle? Loyalist Paramilitarism And The Politics Of Auto/Biography In 
Contemporary Northern Ireland’, in Mervyn Busteed, Frank Neal and Jonathan Tonge (eds.), Irish Protestant 
Identities (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012).  
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In the first chapter, I will look at the decline football experienced in the 1970s and early 
1980s. The main cause for concern was dwindling crowds, which meant falling income, 
and various attempts to reverse this situation. These efforts were hampered by internal 
strife, both between the big clubs and the small clubs and between the two football 
authorities, and the cumbersome constitution of the FA made agreement on any change 
impossible. There was also the issue of hooliganism that presented the game in a bad light 
and raised policing costs. The situation culminated with the crisis of 1985, which saw three 
major riots and two disasters, a ban from Europe, no football on television, and the lowest 
crowds ever.  
 
The situation started to revive as the 1980s drew to a close. However, the worst disaster 
was still to come. The Hillsborough disaster is covered in the second chapter, with a 
narrative of events, and consideration of the cause and the apportionment of blame for the 
tragedy. The Taylor Report and reports from more recent investigations as sources are 
utilised. The chapter continues with the rebuilding of football grounds as clubs sought to 
implement Taylor’s recommendations. The relocation of some football grounds is 
considered in a wider context, along with the broader cultural shift brought by all-seater 
grounds. The third chapter then examines the formation of the Premiership, and the factors 
that drove the breakaway. These included strife between the two football authorities, and 
the desire of the biggest clubs to gain greater income from any television deals. The chapter 
also considers the legal wrangling between the League and the FA, and the shift in supporter 
experience as the Premiership became closely allied to Sky television. It details the revival 





The fourth chapter looks at the international movement of players following the Bosman 
Ruling. This outlines the reasons why players were attracted from overseas, and the changes 
in training practices that this brought. This included such things as dietary regimes, as 
pioneered by Arsene Wenger at Arsenal. The fifth and final chapter looks at the rise of 
foreign ownership of football clubs especially following Roman Abramovich’s purchase of 
Chelsea. It considers both the positive and negative aspects of the experience of this foreign 
ownership, and analyses the motives behind the acquisition of clubs by billionaires from 
overseas, and the elevation of foreign ownership into a major theme in its own right.  
 
These five chapters follow a chronological sequence, but inevitably there is a certain 
amount of overlap between them as the broad themes impact on each other to a greater or 
lesser degree throughout. The topics of media coverage and commercialisation run in a vein 
throughout this entire study. The processes detailed in the work are also considered in a 
broader context in terms of how they reflected wider changes. Some of these were within 
the field of sport, but others were reflective of major cultural, social, and political 
developments. The growing importance of business in football, for instance, needs to be 
seen in the context of the shift towards the free market economy and individualism as 
promoted by the governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major. In order to do this, it 
is necessary to assess whether change in football can be related to wider trends. As well as 
the broad shift from a community focus to a business focus within the UK, the period has 
seen the growth of a globalised world economy, of which the City of London is an integral 
part. There has also been the strengthening of celebrity culture, fuelled by business and 
media. This is best represented in football by David Beckham. The study of iconic 
26 
 
individuals, however, is not a core element of this thesis, but the subject is broached because 
it reflects wider trends.  There has also been the advent of satellite television broadcasting, 
which has been very important for football. All of these factors have impacted on football, 





                                                    
Football in decline 
 
‘All we’re going by - a good game of football, 
a good punch up and a good piss up, 
that’s all about Millwall’ 
 
- ‘Harry the dog’, BBC Panorama (1977)33 
 
 
Somewhere, in a place called Utopia, is a football stadium 
which is covered all round, is all seated, and has a sheltered 
picnic area. Families go there on a Sunday afternoon with 
their best clothes on and watch the game in reverential silence. 
These are matches in which nothing happens: nobody kicks 
each other or swears … every week the stadium is packed and 
there is no booing [or] fighting … when a goal is scored a polite 
ripple of applause breaks out. This is the Utopia of politicians 
who know virtually nothing about football and still less about 
football fans 
 
- Colin Ward, football fan and author34 
                    
 
   
                                                          
33 Panorama - Millwall 1977.avi, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vKoYjOGOzXQ, youtube, last accessed, 
16 March 2016.  
34 Colin Ward, Steaming In: journal of a football fan (London: Sportspages, 1990 reprint), p.6.  
28 
 
Introduction: decline and perceptions of decline  
 
The period covered by this opening chapter was one that saw mounting problems for 
English football, both at international level and in the domestic game. As far as the national 
team was concerned, there was a decline in achievements on the pitch following the World 
Cup victory in 1966. In the domestic game, the era saw declining attendances, which in turn 
led to dwindling revenues for football clubs who struggled to make ends meet with falling 
income but mounting wage bills. There was also the problem of hooliganism. There was no 
clear solution to these problems and the domestic game became bogged down by internal 
strife between the two governing bodies, the interests of individual clubs and broader 
strategies, and between the handful of big clubs and the smaller clubs which made up the 
majority of the League. All of this was played out against a backdrop of national problems 
as the outlook for football mirrored a sense of decline in the country.  
 
In 1970, England as World Cup holders began the defence of their trophy. The finals, which 
were held in Mexico, saw England in the same group as Brazil, the eventual winners. 
England lost 1-0 to Brazil but finished second in their group and progressed to the quarter-
finals, where they surrendered a two goal lead to lose 3-2 to West Germany. The England 
team included the core of the team that had won the World Cup four years earlier 
strengthened by some excellent new players.35 The team that defended the trophy in 1970 
was arguably better than that which famously won it in 1966, and Matthew Taylor states 
that ‘for a short time, certainly, England did possess one of the strongest sides in world 
football’.36  
                                                          
35 Chris Nawrat and Steve Hutchings, The Sunday Times Illustrated History of Football, (London: Hamlyn, 
1995 reprint), pp.160-161.  
36 Matthew Taylor, Association Game, p.291.  
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The success of 1966 has, however, been interpreted in different ways. On the one hand, it   
provided a welcome boost and could be related to notions of modernisation and economic 
renewal, incorporating technological change and innovation as espoused by Harold 
Wilson’s Labour Government. On the other, short-term success, in football and in politics, 
served to cover up the lack of significant structural change. English football was 
temporarily elevated to supreme status, but beneath this façade was a league system that 
was dated and cumbersome, coaching methods that were out of kilter with the rest of the 
world, and there was too much reliance on English virtues of speed, strength, and 
character.37 In short, England’s victory obscured problems within the game and therefore 
made failure in the future more likely as English football was encouraged to stick 
stubbornly to its own game. This view revealed a level of isolationism which concerned no 
less a man than Sir Stanley Matthews, who wrote ‘the people who ran our game regarded 
anything new with suspicion … the hierarchy in English football clung on to the old 
methods, still believing we were the football masters of the world … they had their heads 
in the sand’.38  
  
The FA with its apparent air of superiority were clearly behind the times. They were slow 
to realise the growing importance of Europe. To set it into a broader context, the post-war 
travel boom, which was assisted by people having more leisure time available, had led to 
travel firms offering cheap package deals to working class British families. Holiday 
destinations extended to European resorts as a result.39 Also, on 1 January 1973, Edward 
Heath’s Conservative Government took Britain into the European Economic Community 
                                                          
37 Ibid. p.290.  
38 Stanley Matthews, The Way It Was: my autobiography (London: Headline, 2001 paperback edition), p.336.  
39 http://www.thomascook.com/about-us/thomas-cook-history, last accessed 24 May 2016.  
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(later the European Union). Therefore people began to think more in terms of a European 
context, rather than simply a British one. Steadily, albeit very slowly, Europe was drawing 
closer together. The FA with its air of detachment was not adapting to the times.  
 
England’s success in winning the World Cup had also raised expectations, which made 
subsequent disappointments harder to bear. The cultural historian Neil Ewen pointed out 
that the victory of 1966 ‘represents a key marker of ambivalence in English football history: 
a victory to be savoured and celebrated as the pinnacle of achievement, for sure, but at the 
same time a reminder of England’s lack of success since.’40 King points out that the poor 
performance of the England team is down to ‘a highly distinct decentralized, liberal, anti-
authoritarian regulatory culture.’41 Failure to qualify for the World Cup finals in both 1974 
and 1978 served as evidence that insularity was damaging England’s prospects. This lack 
of success can also be seen in the context of a wider perception of decline in terms of the 
way British people were starting to see themselves. The political theorist Andrew Gamble 
identifies a ‘hundred years decline’ which began in about 1880.42 From the late 1940s 
onwards the decolonisation of the British Empire had left the feeling that Britain was now 
a fading power. As Dean Acheson famously commented in his West Point speech on 5 
December 1962, Britain had ‘lost an empire and not yet found a role’.43 This sense of 
identity crisis was compounded by the worsening economic situation. After Harold 
Macmillan’s famous comment in 1957 that ‘most of our people have never had it so good’, 
there was continuity from MacMillan to Wilson – the two Harolds - because they both 
                                                          
40 Neil Ewen, ‘John Terry And The Predicament Of Englishness: ambivalence and nostalgia in the Premier 
League era’, Sport in History, vol. 33, no. 4, December 2013, p.469.  
41 Anthony King, ‘Why England Fails’, Sport in Society, vol. 17, no. 2, 2014, p. 251.  
42 Andrew Gamble, Britain In Decline (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985 [1st edition 1981]), pp. 3-44.  
43 www.academicroom/article/dean-acheson-and-special-relationship-west-pint-speech-december-1962 last 
accessed 4 June 2016. 
31 
 
oversaw inflation pushed by rising wages. In the 1960s Wilson’s government had to battle 
to contain the economic crisis this was causing. The early 1970s saw industrial strife with 
miners’ strikes, power cuts, a three-day week imposed on British industry, civil unrest in 
Northern Ireland, and terrorist attacks by the IRA.44 All of these contributed towards a 
feeling of doom and despondency, and it can be seen that by the mid-1970s the sense of 
decline in football ran in tandem with the wider downward trend. As Dilwyn Porter put it, 
‘English people who lived through or were born into the post-war era became accustomed 
to the idea that they belonged to an old country that had seen better days’.45 He goes on to 
point out that this view permeated discussions on football: 
 
Much of the discussion relating to football seemed to give currency to the idea that to 
be English in the third quarter of the twentieth century was to belong to a once great 
nation that was incapable of living up to its past or competing effectively with its 
principal rivals. In this way, it will be suggested, English football and those who 
reported on it or interpreted it for public consumption, contributed to the prolonged 
angst about British decline and to the sense of crisis that it engendered.46  
 
Declining Attendances and Attempts to Recover Lost Income  
After enjoying booming attendances in the immediate post-war years, the total number of 
people attending Football League games shrunk from a record 41,271,414 during the 
1948/1949 season to just 16,488,577 during the 1985/1986 season – a reduction of over 
sixty per cent.47  
 
                                                          
44 Peter Clarke, Hope And Glory: Britain 1900-1990 (London: Penguin, 1997 edition), pp. 333-341.  
45 Porter, ‘Your Boys Took One Hell Of A Beating!’:, in eds. Smith and Porter, Sport And National Identity, 
p.32. 
46 Ibid. p.35.  
47 Eds. Glenda Rollin and Jack Rollin, Sky Sports Football Yearbook 2008-2009 (London: Headline, 2008), 
p.593. See Fig. 1 on p.5.  
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       Table 2. Football League attendances 1948/1949 to 1985/1986 







1948/49 17,914,667 11,353,237 6,998,429 5,005,081 41,271,414 
1949/50 17,278,625 11,694,158 7,104,155 4,440,927 40,517,865 
1950/51 16,679,454 10,780,580 7,367,884 4,757,109 39,584,967 
1951/52 16,110,322 11,066,189 6,958,927 4,880,428 39,015,866 
1952/53 16,050,278 9,686,654 6,704,299 4,708.735 37,194,966 
1953/54 16,154,915 9,510,053 6,311,508 4,198,114 36,174,590 
1954/55 15,087,221 8,988,794 5,996,017 4,051,071 34,133,103 
1955/56 14,108,961 9,080,002 5,692,479 4,269,367 33,150,809 
1956/57 13,803,037 8,718,162 5,622,189 4,601,017 32,744,405 
1957/58 14,468,652 8,663,712 6,097,183 4,332,661 33,562,208 
1958 – regional Third Divisions abolished. New Third and Fourth Divisions 
Season First  Second  Third  Fourth  Total  
1958/59 14,727,691 8,641,997 5,946,600 4,276,697 33,610,985 
1959/60 14,391,227 8,399,627 5,739,707 4,008,050 32,538,611 
1960/61 12,926,948 7,033,936 4,784,256 3,874,614 28,619,754 
1961/62 12,061,194 7,453,089 5,199,106 3,266,513 27,979,902 
1962/63 12,490,239 7,792,770 5,341,362 3,261,481 28,885,852 
1963/64 12,486,626 7,594,158 5,419,157 3,035,081 28,535,022 
1964/65 12,708,752 6,984,104 4,436,245 3,512,067 27,641,168 
1965/66 12,480,644 6,914,757 4,779,150 3,032,429 27,206,980 
1966/67 14,242,957 7,253,819 4,421,172 2,984,648 28,902,596 
1967/68 15,289,410 7,450,410 4,013,087 3,354,391 30,107,298 
1968/69 14,584,851 7,382,390 4,339,656 3,075,275 29,382,172 
1969/70 14,868,754 7,581,728 4,223,761 2,926,729 29,600,972 
1970/71 13,954,337 7,098,265 4,377,213 2,764,331 28,194,146 
1971/72 14,484,603 6,769,308 4,697,392 2,749,426 28,700,729 
1972/73 13,998,154 5,631,730 3,737,252 2,081,506 25,448,652 
1973/74 13,070,991 6,326,108 3,421,624 2,163,480 24,982,203 
1974/75 12,613,178 6,955,970 4,086,145 1,992,684 25,577,977 
1975/76 13,089,861 5,798,405 3,948,449 2,059,338 24,896,053 
1976/77 13,647,585 6,250,597 4,152,218 2,132,400 26,182,800 
1977/78 13,255,677 6,474,763 3,332,042 2,330,390 25,392,872 
1978/79 12,704,549 6,153,223 3,374,558 2,308,297 24,540,627 
1979/80 12,163,002 6,112,025 3,999,328 2,349,620 24,623,975 
1980/81 11,392,894 5,175,442 3,637,854 1,701,579 21,907,569 
1981/82 10,420,793 4,750,463 2,836,915 1,998,790 20,006,961 
1982/83   9,295,613 4,974,937 2,943,568 1,552,040 18,766,158 
1983/84  8,711,448 5,359,757 2,729,942 1,557,484 18,358,631 
1984/85  9,761,404 4,030,823 2,667,008 1,390,600 17,849,835 
1985/86 9,037,854 3,551,968 2,490,481 1,408,274 16,488,577 
       Source: Eds. Rollin and Rollin, Sky Sports Football Yearbook 2008-2009, p.593.  
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In an age when almost all of any club’s income came from the fan paying on the turnstile, 
the serious implications of this are obvious. However, within this trend there are two points 
that need to be made. Firstly, the decline was not uniform because after England’s World 
Cup success of 1966 attendances increased towards the end of the decade only to resume 
the downward trend in the early 1970s. Secondly, the decline was not evenly spread across 
the divisions. It was the smaller clubs in the Third and Fourth Divisions that bore the brunt. 
Between 1960 and 1974 First Division games saw a decline of eleven per cent, Second 
Division games saw a decline of twenty-seven per cent, Third Division games forty-two 
per cent, and Fourth Division games forty-nine per cent.48 Therefore it can be seen that in 
addition to an overall decline there was a drift from small town clubs to big city ones. John 
Bale points out that following the abolition of the maximum wage in 1961 the clubs in large 
cities with their bigger crowds bringing larger revenues could meet the newly increasing 
wage demands and attract better players. This trend occurred at the same time as wider 
changes such as increased motor car ownership and the construction of dual carriageways 
and motorways. Those wishing to attend football matches could circumvent smaller local 
clubs and head to the cities to watch bigger clubs with famous players. Using Lancashire 
as an example, in a trend well under way by 1970, there was an overall decline in football 
attendance but of these the proportion of those attending the big clubs rose dramatically.49 
The economist Peter J. Sloane points out that ‘the opening of a new motorway in Lancashire 
in 1973 coincided with a significant change in the pattern of attendances at soccer matches 
among the 10 Lancashire Football League clubs’. Thus it can be seen that while crowds 
                                                          
48 King, End Of The Terraces, p.38.  
49 John Bale, Sports Geography (London: E. & F.N. Spon, 1989), pp.93-96.  
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reduced slowly at Everton, Liverpool, and Manchester United, they slumped alarmingly at 
Bury, Rochdale, and Southport.50   
 
There were a number of attempts to reverse this decline and to bridge the financial gap that 
it caused. As early as 1963 the Football League had introduced the ‘Pattern for Football’ in 
an attempt to streamline the League and increase public interest. Its proposal of reorganising 
the League into five divisions of twenty clubs each with four promoted and relegated at the 
end of each season and moving the League Cup to the beginning of the season in a bid to 
increase the number of meaningful games was rejected by the clubs.51 The Political and 
Economic Planning (PEP) Report of 1966 highlighted poor ground facilities and the 
absence of market research and the rudimentary nature of advertising and public relations. 
The Chester Report of 1968 continued in a similar vein and was dismissed.52 As the Sunday 
Times Illustrated History of Football puts it, ‘the Government commissioned Norman 
Chester and a group of football experts to produce a report on the future of English football. 
Not surprisingly, its visionary recommendations were largely ignored by the League and 
the FA’.53 This was probably because change would be hard to implement in practical terms 
and there would be opposition from the League clubs. Thus it can be seen that before 1970 
there was an awareness among some of the need to introduce the changes that would bring 
crowds back and raise revenue but any proposals ran into problems when agreement from 
the League clubs was sought, either due to stubbornness or insufficient visible incentives.  
 
                                                          
50 Peter J. Sloane, Sport In The Market?: the economic causes and consequences of ‘the Packer revolution’ 
(London: IEA, 1980), p.27.  
51 Taylor, Association Game, pp.269-270.  
52 Ibid., p.266, p.270.  
53 Nawrat and Hutchings, Illustrated History, p.145.  
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This pattern continued. The Commission on Industrial Relations Report (1974) met with a 
similar response but the problems facing football were getting worse rather than going 
away. On 11 August 1980 the Secretaries, Coaches, and Managers Association published 
‘Soccer – The Fight For Survival. A Blueprint For The Future’. Two days of talks were 
held in October between the football authorities and the club chairmen and an extraordinary 
general meeting was planned for the following February. By this time, many of the 
proposals had been rejected, such as reducing the size of the top two divisions and 
regionalising the Third and Fourth, along with reducing the size of the majority needed to 
take decisions. Some progress was made in that clubs agreed to award three points for a 
win, a decision clearly aimed at making games more entertaining in a bid to win back 
crowds. This came into effect from 1981/1982 onwards. They also decided to allow a 
limited number of games on a Friday evening or a Sunday. However, the bulk of the report 
was dismissed as, unsurprisingly, chairmen were more concerned with the interests of their 
own club than what was good for the game as a whole.54 The journalists of the day made 
their feelings clear. Harry Solomon commented in the Sunday Times after another 
disappointing result for England, ‘if there is any possibility of further change taking place, 
I suggest three main lines should be followed: re-organisation of the league system, 
improved facilities for spectators, and stricter control of play’.55 Stuart Jones stated in The 
Times: 
 
The Football League yesterday decided to reject major surgery and recommend 
instead a minor operation. The management committee produced a 12-point plan that 
leaves the first and second divisions intact, rearranges the anatomy of the third and 
fourth divisions, and prescribes a healthy kick upstairs for clubs outside the League. 
Top players will therefore continue to be involved in between 60 and 70 matches, the 
England manager will go on dealing with internationals who are tired or injured or 
                                                          
54 Nawrat and Hutchings, Illustrated History, p.236.  
55 Harry Solomon, ‘How To Save Soccer’, Sunday Times, 14 June 1981.  
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both and gates will carry on falling as the pressure of fixture congestion continues to 
inhibit the pacemakers. For the thinnest of financial excuses, the heart of the matter 
has been ignored.’56 
 
The plan to rearrange the Third and Fourth Divisions was deemed in an editorial as ‘a 
sensible suggestion, as far as it goes. But it is totally irrelevant to the real crisis which faces 
English football, both at national and international level.’57 
 
The end result of these proposals and discussions was the decision to hold an enquiry into 
the structure of the League’s competitions. This was led by Sir Norman Chester, whose 
talents lay in the field of public service and administration. Chester had produced the 1968 
Report that had met with little positive response. This special committee of enquiry had the 
task of reviewing the structure of the League Championship and Cup competitions and to 
‘make recommendations as to its future viability’.58 Donald Saunders, in The Daily 
Telegraph, commented drily, ’Sir Norman Chester has been given the thankless task of 
trying to guide League football out of its present economic difficulties, which might never 
have arisen had his eminently sensible report been accepted 14 years ago’.59 Any changes 
to the League structure needed the approval of a three-quarters majority and David Lacey, 
in The Guardian, pointed out that ‘most clubs are so hard-pressed financially that they 
simply cannot countenance any changes which would reduce their fixture lists’.60 This was 
the main reason why the clubs seemed so resistant to change.  
 
                                                          
56 Stuart Jones, ‘League Want To Shake Up Lower Divisions’, The Times, 26 September 1981.  
57 ‘Too Much Football’, The Times, 26 September 1981.  
58 Donald Saunders, ‘League Recall Chester To Make Another Report’, Daily Telegraph, 19 October 1982.   
59 Ibid.  
60 David Lacey, ‘League Go Back To Chester’, The Guardian, 19 October 1982.  
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The Report was completed in March 1983 and it included proposals to reduce the size of 
the First Division by increasing the size of the Second and amalgamating the Third and 
Fourth Divisions into four regional sections. It also proposed to change the League’s 
constitution so only a three-fifths majority was needed for change instead of three-quarters. 
One proposal which had serious implications for the future was the plan to allow home 
clubs to keep all gate receipts.61 This was a move which clearly benefitted the big clubs at 
the expense of the small ones, and Conn describes it as ‘the first step towards the bigger 
clubs’ total financial dominance over the smaller clubs.’62 It was at this time that there was 
the first serious threat of a breakaway. The growing power of a handful of big clubs, 
strengthened in the knowledge that they drew an increasing proportion of attendances and 
potential television viewers, would eventually result in the formation of the Premier 
League, which will be discussed in more detail in later chapters.  
 
Another important change introduced by the Report was the proposal to allow the clubs 
most frequently shown on television to keep a larger share of the money. This also 
benefitted the big clubs. John Smith, the Liverpool chairman, was one of the members of 
the committee that produced the Report and he attached particular importance to the 
proposals regarding the redistribution of gate receipts and income from television 
appearances. He commented, ‘this is the first time, in the League’s history, that there has 
been a departure from the principle of equal distribution’.63  
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The clubs in the Third and Fourth Divisions were unhappy with many of the proposals. Dr. 
Clifford Grossmark, Gillingham chairman and representative for the bottom two divisions, 
said bitterly, ‘they are trying to impose things on us against our will, trying to take away 
some of our hard-won power and trying to drive us into oblivion. But we will not let them 
get away with it. We told the Chester Committee that we didn’t want regionalised leagues, 
but they are trying to push them through anyway.’64 
 
On 26 April the League chairmen met and rejected most of the Report. All of the proposals 
regarding restructuring were dismissed almost unanimously. As Stuart Jones put it in The 
Times, ‘it seems that sense, for the fifth time in the last two decades, has been overwhelmed 
by the alarming weight of the chairman’s self-interest’.65 As a sop to the big clubs who had 
threatened to break away and form a ‘Super League’ the proposal that home clubs should 
keep all gate receipts and those covered most frequently on television should receive a 
larger share of the proceeds was agreed on. It was also agreed to reduce the majority vote 
needed to implement change, not from three-quarters to three-fifths but down to two-thirds, 
subject to the agreement of the League’s annual general meeting.66  
 
Having rejected most of the Report, the League saw attendances continue to decline. The 
loss of revenue that this caused could be partly addressed by raising admission prices, and 
this happened, but there was a limit to how much prices could be increased, especially 
bearing in mind that the reduction was most severe in the lowest divisions, where crowds 
were already being lost to the big clubs, as has been described. The only other possibility 
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was to raise money by other means and this brought forward the issue of sponsorship. 
Opportunities to raise revenue by advertising and sponsorship had been largely ignored 
until the late 1970s, and, bar the traditional advertising hoardings around the pitch and the 
odd advert in the match programme, such opportunities had largely been under-exploited.  
 
It was non-League Kettering Town who, as early as 1976, pioneered sponsorship on shirts. 
The plan was simple. A business could have their logo displayed on the front of the players’ 
shirts with the result that the club would receive an agreed sum and the business would get 
the high-profile advertising that this brought. The deal negotiated between Kettering Town 
and Kettering Tyres was worth £2,500. Former Wolverhampton Wanderers player and 
Kettering chief executive Derek Dougan later wrote, ‘I was gratified to be able to report 
such a successful commercial move on behalf of the club.’67 He went on to sum up the 
mood of the times:  
 
I knew how sports in other countries had benefitted from sponsorship schemes, while 
deep-seated puritanism and suspicion had prevented similar schemes being embraced 
in Britain. Diehards were still insisting that commerce and sport should not mix, that 
if sport became dependent on commercial involvements it would lose its 
independence. My own view was that if it remained aloof and tried to ‘go it alone’ it 
would lose more than its independence. It would lose its lifeblood.68  
 
At Kettering, Dougan introduced shirt-sponsorship tastefully, so the players did not appear 
to be running sandwichboard men and the deal would not be accompanied by anything that 
would dominate or distract from the normal activities of the ground. However, the FA were 
unimpressed. Dougan and club chairman John Nash were summoned to a disciplinary 
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hearing. Dougan points out that the FA rules did not specifically state that a sponsor’s name 
could not be worn on a shirt. Even so, the FA ordered them not to do it again.69 ‘What 
angered me’, recalled Dougan, ‘was that here were the top people in the FA unable or 
unwilling to grasp the fact that little clubs had to help themselves. They did not understand 
that they as leaders of a big ‘international club’ ought to assist, not hinder, the small fry 
who belonged to it.’70 
 
Kettering Town’s experience did not prevent the idea catching on. The following year 
Queen’s Park Rangers followed suit, and by the end of the decade shirt sponsorship had 
become a major issue. So successful were the deals that in 1981 Arsenal announced a three-
year deal with JVC, the electronics manufacturer, for £500,000. Liverpool and Manchester 
United gained similar sized deals with their respective sponsors and other clubs secured 
their own smaller deals.71   
 
The sums involved would continue to increase. In 2000 Manchester United, for example, 
would sign a deal with the mobile phone giant Vodafone worth £30 million over four 
seasons.72 Sponsorship seemed set to expand more widely to include other things when 
Coventry City planned a deal with Talbot, the motor car manufacturer, in 1980 for 
£250,000, which would have resulted in the club changing its name to ‘Coventry-Talbot’. 
The FA stepped in, however, and scuppered the plan.73 
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Table 3.  Premiership club shirt sponsorship deals during 1999/2000 





Arsenal Sega £3.3 1999/2000 
Aston Villa LDV £0.8 1998/1999 
Bradford City JCT600 £0.3 1998/1999 
Chelsea Autoglass £1.1 1997/1998 
Coventry City Subaru-Isuzu £0.7 1997/1998 
Derby County ED5 £0.7 1997/1998 
Everton One 2 One £0.7 1997/1998 
Leeds United Packard Bell £2.0 1996/1997 
Leicester City Walkers Crisps £0.5 1999/2000 
Liverpool Carlsberg £1.0 1998/1999 
Manchester United Sharp £1.3 1996/1997 
Middlesbrough BT Cellnet £0.3 1995/1996 
Newcastle United Newcastle Breweries £1.0 1999/2000 
Sheffield Wednesday Sanderson £0.5 1994/1995 
Southampton Friends Provident £0.5    1999/2000 
Sunderland Reg Vardy £0.5 1999/2000 
Tottenham Hotspur Holsten £1.3 1999/2000 
Watford Phones 4 U £0.5 1999/2000 
West Ham United Dr. Martens £1.0 1998/1999 
Wimbledon Tiny £0.3 1999/2000 
      Source: Alan Nixon, ‘United Get Shirt Shrift’, Daily Mirror, 12 February 2000. 
 
 
Sponsorship remained a thorny issue. Any club appearing on television was not allowed to 
display a sponsor’s name or logo.74 The background behind the opposition to shirt 
sponsorship was based on traditional notions that sport and commerce should not mix, and 
the view that gate money was the only appropriate source of revenue for a Football League 
club.75 In this context, gate money had to be protected from other sources that could come 
in and influence the game. There was also the potential for new forms of revenue to focus 
mainly on the big clubs to the detriment of the smaller ones, and therefore threaten the 
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League as a corporate body.76 Sceptics feared that sponsors would only be interested in 
televised coverage and therefore only wish to make deals with the clubs that appeared on 
television most frequently. The sponsors’ clamour for television coverage also impacted on 
the concern that already existed about television’s potential damage to attendances, because 
it reinforced the view that lost income was not being adequately replaced by revenue from 
sponsorship.77  
 
But sponsorship was here to stay, and despite the arguments surrounding whether or not 
teams would be allowed to display their sponsors’ logos on television, the idea soon 
expanded to be taken up by competitions. In 1982 the League signed a £2 million deal over 
four years with the National Dairy Council resulting in the League Cup becoming the Milk 
Cup.78 This would be the first of seven name changes undergone by the competition over 
the next thirty years as a result of different sponsorship deals, and some would argue that 
this has been a contributory factor in diminishing the importance of the competition.79 The 
Football League would acquire its own sponsor, the Japanese camera and business 
equipment company Canon UK Ltd., in a three-year deal worth £3.2 million. The deal 
commenced in 1983/1984 and the Football League became the Canon League as a result.80 
 
Regarding shirt sponsorship and its appearance on television, the FA and the Football 
League were eventually forced to capitulate. In 1983, the big clubs threatened to sign an 
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independent television contract away from the Football League, if the League did not 
approve shirt sponsorship. Bearing in mind that almost all of the television revenue was 
based on the attraction of these clubs, the League conceded that shirt advertising would be 
allowed ‘to the extent of 16 square inches for each name or logo, which can be of any shape; 
no letter may be higher than two inches’.81 Once this had been established, and sponsors 
knew their brand would be displayed on television, the sums secured by clubs in 
sponsorship deals continued to grow. Arsenal’s deal with JVC has been referred to above. 
By the end of the millennium they had secured a deal with Sega for a figure more than six 
times the amount, and other clubs enjoyed similar growth in their sponsorship deals.82 
 
Tottenham Hotspur pioneered another way of raising revenue. Irving Scholar, who gained 
control of the club towards the end of 1982, has revealed that ‘at the time of the takeover 
there was some trepidation about the financial state of the company, and it transpired that 
we had inherited the biggest debt in football: over £5.5 million.’83 This was a huge sum at 
the time and Scholar faced the massive task of getting the club back on a sound financial 
footing. He continues: 
 
The answer, when it came, was blindingly simple. Why not float Tottenham Hotspur 
on the Stock Exchange? … The Exchange had every type of company from ball-
bearing manufacturers to insurance, and the leisure sector was a particular favourite 
for investors. At that time in the early Eighties the financial markets were quite 
buoyant … and there seemed to be a lot of new money in the City. I believed that some 
of it must be prepared to come into football.84 
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Thus, on 13 October 1983, Tottenham Hotspur became the first English football club to be 
launched in the City. The venture was successful in that it did what it was intended to do as 
Tottenham’s debts were wiped out.85 As Scholar says: 
 
In pure financial terms it was a success. The shares were over-subscribed three and a 
half times, and the £5 million we were seeking was in the bank … but although the 
shares, which were sold at £1 each, started trading at £1.08, a number of professionals 
who expected a quick killing sold off immediately, and forced the price down to 
around 90p. Three and a half years would go by before the shares rose above the issue 
price.86 
 
This was because the short-term success of the launch was followed by the long-term 
problems it brought. The City put pressure on Spurs to become a broadly based leisure 
company to attract investors, whereas Scholar regarded the club’s assets as more important 
than its dividend payouts.87 Also, the possibility of failing to reach the profit forecast in the 
first year resulted in the players’ share of television income from UEFA Cup games being 
withheld, which sparked internal strife involving the Professional Footballers Association 
(PFA) at the highest level.88 As a result of Tottenham’s experience, it would be six years 
before another club – Millwall – became a PLC.89 The floating of a football club on the 
stock market raised issues regarding who the club was primarily answerable to. Was it the 
fans who turned up to watch the team week in and week out, or its shareholders in the 
business world of the City, who invested but whose only motive was profit? The match 
results of any club listed as a PLC had wider implications in that a run of good results could 
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boost investment but a sequence of bad results could cause a club’s share price to slump, 
thus adding extra pressure on the manager and the players.  
 
The Spurs flotation also needs to be seen in a broader context because the 1980s would 
gradually see a much closer relationship developing between football and business than had 
previously been the case. In 1982 the FA rescinded the regulation limiting shareholders’ 
dividends to 7.5 per cent. This rule had been designed to protect clubs from exploitative 
owners who were concerned only with a club’s profits, and it demonstrated that the football 
authorities saw the clubs as organisations that existed for the benefit of the public rather 
than as profit-making commodities.90 However, with football facing increasingly severe 
financial difficulties it was a rule which deterred some of those successful entrepreneurs 
who could help clubs in dire straits. The rule’s removal also meant that money could be 
made from clubs and this paved the way for a new wave of directors who had a completely 
different ethos to those previously in charge. As well as Scholar at Tottenham, there was 
David Dein at Arsenal, Ken Bates at Chelsea, and Martin Edwards at Manchester United. 
The mood of benevolent paternalism where the local businessman ran a football club for 
the good of the community was disappearing to be replaced by something that was 
altogether different. As King puts it, ’the pursuit of profit through the commodification of 
football was the distinguishing feature of the new directors and marked them out from their 
predecessors.’91 These men rejected the traditional view of a football club being run as a 
public utility, and instead saw it primarily as a business.92 
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This is an area where changes in football mirrored greatly the developments that were 
taking place in wider society. The free market philosophy of Margaret Thatcher’s 
Government was being applied to public utilities and in areas of the public sector hitherto 
untouched by the cut and thrust of business. This approach may have failed to penetrate the 
FA’s headquarters at Lancaster Gate, but it can be seen that individual football clubs were 
starting to change and the ‘new directors’ taking charge at some of the top ones were simply 
a product of the times. This represented an important shift. Where once football clubs had 
been community-based sporting institutions, they were becoming businesses where the 
main aim was to make profit.  
 
The role of television and the impact of negotiations on broadcasting deals 
In 1964, the BBC launched its own weekly highlights programme Match of the Day. Four 
years later ITV followed with its own regional highlights programmes. These programmes 
formed the staple diet of football coverage throughout the 1970s.93 The presence of regular 
football highlights programmes on television had the positive effect that the sport was 
promoted and even the casual observer could become familiar with the most successful 
teams and the names of the best players. However, it also had the negative effect that less 
committed fans might be content to stay at home in the comfort of their living rooms rather 
than brave wet and windy terraces on a cold winter’s afternoon. As we have seen above, 
attendances provided virtually all of football’s income and there was already concern about 
those attendances diminishing. These circumstances would form the basis for tough 
negotiations on broadcasting rights as football sought compensation for what it saw as 
television’s role in falling gates.  
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Television brought with it a new phenomenon: the football player as a celebrity. The first 
example of this kind was George Best, the Manchester United and Northern Ireland player. 
Firstly, his ability was exceptional. As the sports sociologist Alan Bairner comments, Best 
‘was a footballing genius. Even the most blinkered fans of other English clubs would find 
it difficult to deny that Best was one of the most talented performers of all time.’94 There 
had of course been famous footballers before – Johnny Haynes and Stanley Matthews 
spring to mind immediately – but George Best was a new phenomenon in that he was the 
first football star. The new level of media interest brought by television combined with 
increased wages led to new heights of public attention and adoration. Best went to discos 
and dressed like a mod, giving him an appeal that was seen as fashionable. Best’s popularity 
coincided with wider social trends. As well as the growth of television, there was a young 
generation with interests that were different to their parents. They had disposable income 
that could be spent on the latest fashions and on pop music. Thus Best’s fame emerged 
within a new and growing type of popular culture. He incorporated the worlds of fashion, 
pop music, sport, and show business.95 As an example, his dazzling performance against 
Benfica in Lisbon in 1965 as Manchester United won 5-1 earned him the nickname 'El 
Beatle'.96 By 1970 most British households had a television, and thus it can be seen that 
football had appeared in the nation’s living rooms, and the footballer as a star created by 
television had arrived.  
 
The sums paid to football in return for broadcasting rights, however, were meagre. This 
was because the BBC and ITV operated what amounted to an informal cartel. As evidence 
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of this, Scholar asked Greg Dyke, the chairman of ITV Sport, ‘what I want to know is, is 
there a cartel between the BBC and ITV?’ Dyke replied ‘yes, there has been a cartel in 
existence’.97 Dyke recalls the same conversation, which took place at the first meeting 
between the heads of ITV Sport and the chairmen of the big football clubs: ‘Irving Scholar 
describes the turning point at this first meeting as the moment I admitted that I thought that 
there had been a cartel between ITV and BBC to keep the price paid for televised football 
artificially low’.98 
 
With coverage of the domestic game limited to packaged highlights, the only live football 
on television was the FA Cup final, the Charity Shield, and some England international 
games. Television companies sought to broadcast League games live and the football 
authorities continued to be wary of the potential damage that live televised football might 
have on attendances. In February 1983 an offer of £5.3 million to broadcast games for two 
seasons was unanimously rejected by the chairmen of the Football League clubs.99 When 
the sides met again in April the BBC and ITV refused to increase their offer but indicated 
that they would be prepared to reconsider their position on the previously non-negotiable 
ban on shirt advertising. A concession in this area would greatly benefit the big clubs 
because they could increase their sponsorship revenues substantially if they could display 
logos on television. In the meantime, Telejector, a video company who proposed to screen 
live games in pubs, were awaiting the outcome, and Arsenal, Liverpool, Manchester United, 
and Tottenham Hotspur threatened to do their own deal if no agreement was reached with 
television.100  
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Eventually, on 15 July, agreement was reached. The negotiations were described by John 
Bromley, head of the Independent Television Sports Committee, as ‘probably the longest 
and toughest negotiations in the history of British sport’.101 For the first time ever, there 
would be live coverage of League football. Ten First Division games would be broadcast 
per season for two seasons, five live on Friday nights by the BBC, five live on Sunday 
afternoons by ITV. Television would not pay a penny more than the original offer, but had 
granted the concession that shirt advertising was to be permitted, providing logos were 
limited in size.102 This agreement paved the way for the future in a number of ways. Firstly, 
shirt sponsorship was accepted and would go on to be normal practice. Secondly, live 
televised football, especially on Sunday afternoons, began and would in time become part 
of British culture. Thirdly, the big clubs’ threat of doing their own television deal would 
occur a number of times and one day pave the way for the Premier League.  From this point 
onwards the subjects of television broadcasting deals and the threat of a breakaway league 
would be closely linked. The origins of the game we know today can largely be traced back 
to this deal.  
 
The fact that a deal had been reached without football receiving more than the original offer 
brought this stern rebuke from Terry McNeill in News Of The World:  
 
The chairmen have been outsmarted by Jonathan Martin of the BBC and John Bromley 
of ITV, who have got exactly what they want without offering a penny more. They 
merely threatened to keep the game off the box, and the League caved in as we knew 
they would because of the £3 million deal they were negotiating with sponsors Canon. 
What sort of brains can condone flogging 10 live games a season the day before or 
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after a full League programme when the game is losing at least a million fans a year? 
103 
 
Scholar summarised adequately the concern about live football 
 
I was personally very nervous about live television, because I felt sure that it was going 
to have a marked effect on gates. Why should people pay substantial amounts of 
money and endure the hassles that going to a match entails, when they could sit in the 
comfort of their own armchair at home and watch the match effectively for free, as 
they had already paid their licence fee? 104  
 
It was Scholar’s club, Tottenham Hotspur, which, in October, hosted the first ever League 
game to be broadcast live when they faced Nottingham Forest.  
 
Subsequently, when the original deal was due to expire the television companies offered an 
increased amount but wished to expand live coverage from five games each to eight games 
each per season.105 This offer formed the basis for heated negotiations at the Great Western 
Hotel in Paddington on 14 February 1985. The joint ITV and BBC offer was for a four-year 
deal commencing at £3.8 million in the first season, and then rising by 6 per cent in the 
second year, 6 per cent in the third year, and then by 8 per cent in the fourth year, for 
broadcasting rights to sixteen League games, both Milk Cup semi-finals, and the Milk Cup 
final, together with an option for regional live games. The offer was rejected on the basis 
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that no more than ten live games a season should be sold, and that football was under-selling 
itself.106  
 
By the end of the season no agreement had been reached and football was in a state of crisis 
following three major incidents of crowd trouble and disasters at Bradford and Heysel. The 
crisis of 1985 will be related in more detail below. According to King, ‘some of the failure 
to agree terms was due to the fact that the television companies did not want to cover 
football in the same year as the disasters, since they did not want to be associated with a 
sport whose public image was so thoroughly tarnished.’107 The sides met in August and 
again failed to reach agreement. According to Graham Kelly, the League Secretary, the 
difficulty was not money but the split between live broadcast and recorded highlights and 
the level of television exposure.108 
 
Therefore the 1985/1986 season got under way with no football on television whatsoever. 
Talks held during the autumn again failed to reach agreement,109 but in December a 
settlement was finally reached on a £1.3 million deal for BBC and ITV to share six live 
matches, the Milk Cup semi-finals and the Milk Cup final and recorded highlights from a 
maximum of twenty other games. This arrangement commenced in January 1986 and ran 
until the end of the season.110  
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By that stage, football's popularity and reputation had sunk to its lowest point. In a broader 
sense, football seemed out of kilter with the political drift of the times. Football clubs were 
community-based institutions that had been run in a spirit that was benevolent and 
paternalistic, and for forty years this mood had been within the framework of a broad post-
war consensus. Such notions did not sit well with the business ethos that was gaining 
prominence at the time. Conn puts it with characteristic directness: ‘football had no place. 
There was no economically productive purpose to it.’111 
 
In the meantime, the subject of a possible breakaway was aired again. The big clubs were 
now without European football due to the ban following the disaster at Heysel (see below 
p.73), and there was no television deal, which meant no money from live broadcasts or 
highlights, and this also affected opportunities for sponsorship income. In September 1985 
representatives of the so-called ‘Big Five’ – Arsenal, Everton, Liverpool, Manchester 
United, and Tottenham Hotspur – together with representatives from Manchester City, 
Newcastle United, and Southampton, met secretly in Manchester to discuss the possibility 
of ‘withdrawing from the League and persuading other crowd-pulling clubs to join them in  
reforming directly under the FA.’112 One top club official was reported as saying, ‘the mind 
boggles at the marketing possibilities of a small group. We have no option but to do it, and 
there is no better time. It is not a question of greed. Unless we do it, we may all go down.’113 
The Football League Management Committee responded by asking the club chairmen to 
reconsider implementing the Chester Report, which they had rejected two-and-a-half years 
earlier.114 Unsurprisingly, any moves towards a breakaway were opposed by the clubs in 
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the Third and Fourth Divisions. They were also opposed by the Professional Footballers’ 
Association.115  
 
With the big clubs desperate to make up the shortfall in revenue due to the loss of European 
games and television income, the PFA and the lower division clubs were fearful of being 
cut adrift by any potential breakaway, because it raised the possibility of some clubs going 
out of business and some lower division players having to go part-time. Gordon Taylor, the 
secretary of the PFA, claimed that the union would block any move, through the courts if 
necessary.116 He also pointed out that any changes would need the backing of the PFA 
membership, and that would not be forthcoming. Ian Jones, the Doncaster Rovers chairman 
and representative for the Third and Fourth Division clubs on the management committee, 
stated that the clubs he represented should make their own decision as to whether or not 
they went part-time and that nothing should be imposed on them.117 The fact that the issue 
was being discussed at all indicates the financial plight facing football. Declining 
attendances had long been a worry, but dwindling gate money was exacerbated by the lack 
of revenue due to the European ban and the TV dispute, causing the top clubs to seek 
desperate measures. The small clubs, who stood to lose even more if the breakaway went 
ahead, were desperately hanging on to what they had. This dire situation would not have 
developed without the tragedy at Heysel.   
 
A compromise was eventually reached when it was suggested that the First Division be 
reduced from twenty-two to twenty clubs over two seasons. This was to be achieved by 
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relegating three clubs, but only promoting two from the Second Division, with a series of 
play-off matches between the club finishing fourth from bottom in the First Division and 
those finishing third, fourth, and fifth in the Second Division. The winners of the play-offs 
would play in the First Division. If the play-offs proved to be successful it was suggested 
that they become a permanent fixture at the end of each season. This was decided with the 
help of an agreement to redistribute wealth from sponsors and television. The First Division 
clubs would receive fifty per cent, the Second Division clubs twenty-five per cent, and the 
Third and Fourth Division clubs would receive twenty-five per cent between them.118 These 
proposals formed part of a ‘Ten Point Plan’, together with the decision to reduce the levy 
on gates for redistribution across the League down from 4 per cent to 3 per cent, and to 
reform the League Management Committee.119 The Plan was endorsed at the League’s 
Annual General Meeting held at Heathrow in April 1986, and would become known as the 
‘Heathrow Agreement’. 120   
 
The new television deal struck in the summer of 1986 was worth £6.2 million to televise 
fourteen live games per season, the latter to be shared equally between the BBC and ITV, 
together with the two semi-finals and the final of what was now the Littlewoods Challenge 
Cup. There would also be recorded highlights from League and Littlewoods Challenge Cup 
games. The sum was less than before, but this was because of ‘the Football League’s 
weakened bargaining position [following the events of 1985] and their need to attract new 
sponsors’.121 
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By the time this deal neared its expiry in 1988 satellite broadcasting had arrived, and there 
was a new bidder in the shape of British Satellite Broadcasting (BSB). This new arrival 
made its intentions clear by offering a deal said to be worth £200 million for ten years and 
proposing the formation of a new joint company incorporating itself and the two football 
authorities.122 Dyke, on behalf of ITV Sport, later reported, ‘I decided my job was to try to 
derail the process and pinch these live football rights from BSB.’123 Together with Trevor 
East, the Deputy Head of Sport at Thames Television, he approached the Big Five and 
offered them a minimum of £1 million a year each for the exclusive right to broadcast their 
home games. This was far more than they had received in the past. The Football League 
remained at liberty to sell the rights for the remaining clubs, but without the Big Five 
included, those rights would be worth much less.124 Then the Big Five recruited five more 
clubs – Aston Villa, Newcastle United, Nottingham Forest, Sheffield Wednesday, and West 
Ham United – to form the ‘Big Ten of 1988’. While these clubs conducted their own talks 
with ITV, the Football League Management Committee voted in favour of the package 
offered by BSB, who were now allied to the BBC, worth a guaranteed minimum of £11 
million a year. The Committee also proposed new regulations to limit the danger of the 
League breaking up. In the meantime, Dyke offered a deal from the ITV companies worth 
£52 million over four years.125 He puts subsequent events thus: ‘threatened with a rebellion 
by the top ten clubs in the First Division, the Football League folded and opened 
negotiations with ITV.’126 
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The next twist in the saga was that the BBC and BSB decided to withdraw their bid, 
criticising the way in which the big clubs had gone about their negotiations. Although the 
threat of a breakaway was thwarted, those clubs had remained committed to ITV, provoking 
Bob Hunter, the NOW Channel Managing Director, to complain on behalf of BBC/BSB 
about ‘the attitude of a few of the First Division to go for a short-term gain’127 and that ‘the 
Football League has been caught up in a last-ditch attempt by the ITV companies to play 
King Canute and try to hold back the introduction of new TV services.’128  
 
Dyke got his way and the ITV deal eventually agreed by the Football League was for four 
years at £11 million per season, rising with inflation, to be divided between the clubs. It 
was also agreed that distribution should be skewed even further in favour of the First 
Division clubs, who would now receive 75 per cent of the cash. The Second Division clubs 
would receive 12.5 per cent, and the remaining 12.5 per cent would be shared between the 
Third and Fourth Division clubs.129  
 
Although BSB’s bid failed it was important in that it brought an end to the unofficial cartel 
that had existed between the BBC and ITV up to this point. The 1988 negotiations were 
even more important as far as the future of the League was concerned. As King puts it, ‘the 
importance of the 1988 television deal lies in the fact that its outcome was informed by the 
growing dominance of the Big Five and reinforced that dominance, improving the Big 
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Five’s political economic position yet further and thereby precipitating the eventual move 
to the Premier League.’130 
 
Hooliganism  
While the periodic negotiations for television broadcasting rights increasingly threatened 
the unity of the League against a backdrop of declining attendances, football had other 
major problems. The subject of hooliganism has been researched by Eric Dunning, Patrick 
Murphy, and John Williams of the Sir Norman Chester Football Research Centre at 
Leicester University. They dispel the myth that hooliganism was a product of the 1960s by 
giving evidence to show that ‘misconduct and disorderliness by spectators were regular 
accompaniments of United Kingdom soccer in the two decades before the First World 
War.’131 Between the wars, football grounds came to be seen as ‘orderly and respectable 
places that were relatively safe’,132 thus indicating a decline in disorderliness. After the 
Second World War attendances reached unprecedented levels, as we have seen, but despite 
the bumper crowds there were very few incidents that gave rise to concern. The problem 
then re-emerged later on. Taylor describes their findings as ‘a U-shaped curve, with 
considerable violence before the First World War, which then fell between the wars and in 
the immediate post-war years before a steady rise from the mid-1950s and a more rapid 
increase after the mid-1960s.’133 However, the ‘Leicester school’ have received criticism 
for adapting their findings simply to fit the views of Norbert Elias in that the fall and rise 
of hooliganism matches trends in a broader and longer-term ‘civilising process’ punctuated 
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by ‘decivilising spurts’. Elias’s figurational sociology has itself been criticised for failing 
to provide a genuine theory, offering merely a ‘medley of untestable and descriptive 
generalisations.’134 
 
The point needs to be made that when football violence re-emerged, although the 
phenomenon was not new, it was new to contemporaries. It was also much worse. As 
Walvin points out: ‘what happened from the 1960s onwards was utterly different in 
substance and scale from anything the game had experienced before. To argue otherwise is 
to misconstrue both the present and the past.’135 In the late 1950s, and even more so in the 
late 1960s, there were few fans alive who could remember the game before 1914. It was 
also in a completely new context. That context was in relation to growing concern about  
the behaviour of working-class youth due to the emergence of the ‘teddy boys’ and later on 
the ‘mods’ and the ‘rockers’. It was also related to gloom about Britain’s declining position 
in the world, a point underlined in football by Hungary’s famous 6-3 victory over England 
at Wembley in 1953, and in international politics by the Suez crisis of 1956.136 Early on, 
the ‘overall tone in which the disorderliness of football spectators was reported was 
reassuring and the language far from alarmist’.137 During the 1960s this changed and 
football hooliganism began to be seen as a major social problem in its own right. It was 
during this decade that the regular televising of football began, as we have seen, and in the 
build up to hosting the 1966 World Cup finals, the English football authorities, faced with 
declining crowds, became increasingly concerned about the image of the game. From this 
point onwards it became a ‘self-perpetuating social problem with the actions of the youths 
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and (mainly) young men who were centrally involved and the media and official reactions 
to what they did feeding each other in a vicious spiral.’138 Given this shift in emphasis by 
the media, identifying an exact date for the re-emergence of football violence is difficult. 
As early as 1956 Everton fans caused a lot of damage to a train returning to Liverpool from 
Manchester after watching their team play Manchester City. Both Everton and Liverpool 
fans were involved in train-wrecking exploits during the 1960s in what probably constituted 
‘the first emergence of football hooliganism as a regular phenomenon in one of its 
recognisably modern forms.’139 In December 1963 Everton faced Rangers in an unofficial 
‘championship of Britain’ match, and the fighting outside the ground was, according to 
Dunning, Murphy, and Williams, ‘the first time in England after the Second World War 
that a confrontation between fan groups was widely reported.’140 Dick Knight, who went 
on to become chairman of Brighton and Hove Albion, relates an incident he witnessed at a 
game between West Ham United and Everton in 1963:  
 
It was one of the first examples of football hooliganism. West Ham got a disputed 
penalty near the end of a fifth round FA Cup tie against Everton and an Evertonian kid 
ran on from behind the other goal. He had a banner that he brandished like a spear and 
ran the length of the pitch towards the referee, naked to the waist. Eventually the 
stewards and police caught him and he went off to the cheers of the Everton fans, and 
the next day his picture was all over the Sunday papers, effectively glorifying him. 
Other kids started to copy him, the media reported it, and the whole thing became the 
catalyst for hooliganism, which began to spread like wildfire over the next two or three 
years.141 
 
Dunning et al state that during the 1966/1967 season, the ‘ends’ became established. Young 
men and groups of lads from local estates and suburbs congregated on an area of terracing 
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and new forms of singing and chanting emerged at around this time and this had the effect 
of dissuading older supporters from standing among them. From this point on ‘the favoured 
positions – on the ‘home’ terraces slightly above and behind the goal – increasingly became 
the preserve of those young fans who were identified by the media and the game’s 
administrators as the chief perpetrators of football hooliganism.’142 Colin Ward, in one of 
the first autobiographies of its kind, describes the phenomenon: ‘every football ground had 
a popular end, and home fans would try to prevent rival fans entering it. If some did get 
through, then a punch-up usually ensued. Thus a new phrase entered the hooligans’ 
vocabulary: “taking an end”. If you got in and held your ground, you had “taken” the 
end.’143 
 
Cass Pennant was a member of the gang of West Ham United fans known as the Inter City 
Firm. He describes the experience for an away fan ‘taking an end’: 
 
The plods [police] think we’re home fans, which is cool. Up the concrete stairs leading 
from the side of their covered end … you come in from the side … a roar goes up and 
it’s kicking off behind the goal right in the middle of their end. The home lot have 
either spotted us first or our main faces have kicked off, knowing the rest of us are on 
the way … these are terrifying minutes … if ever that part of the ground is successfully 
invaded and run by visiting fans, it’s regarded as the ultimate defeat for home fans … 
it means suffering total humiliation. 144  
 
The response of the police and the football clubs to the rising violence was to introduce 
segregation. If rival fans were going to fight it made sense to keep them apart. A barrier 
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could be created either by using police officers or erecting a fence. However, the police 
were misguided because this failed to provide any noticeable improvement and had a 
number of unintended consequences. Firstly, it marked home and away areas with greater 
clarity than the hooligans or other young fans could have managed; secondly, it helped 
reinforce the hooligans’ solidarity; thirdly, it provided a challenge in that it almost invited 
violation by those wishing to fight; fourthly, the increased numbers of police required to 
enforce segregation had the effect of making fans seek confrontation with rival fans either 
outside or in places away from the grounds altogether, such as at railway stations.145 
 
Violent behaviour was not confined to domestic games. English clubs who went abroad to 
play in the European competitions were followed by some who inflicted their activities 
overseas. As examples of this, Manchester United fans rioted in Ostend in 1974; Tottenham 
Hotspur fans were involved in major disturbances in Rotterdam during their UEFA Cup tie 
with Feyenoord, both outside and inside the stadium; following the 1975 European Cup 
final, when Leeds United lost to Bayern Munich, Leeds fans fought on the streets of Paris, 
leading to UEFA banning Leeds from European competition for four seasons; and crowd 
disturbances in Saint-Etienne in 1977 led to Manchester United being expelled from the 
European Cup-Winners’ Cup.146  
 
As far as fashion is concerned, in the late 1960s the skinhead style became popular among 
football hooligans, and with it the ‘traditional concerns of the rough working class – their 
violent masculinity, their community loyalty and collective solidarity, their violent 
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opposition to outsiders and any males who looked ‘odd’’.147 However, fashions changed as 
time progressed. Hunter Davies spent the 1971/1972 season with Tottenham Hotspur and 
his observations were published in The Glory Game. He noted: 
 
As a species, they used to be called skinheads, and still are by the press, but that term 
was already about a year out of date. Almost all of them had long hair and many could 
have passed for hippies, except for their big heavy boots … they called themselves 
Smooths, if they called themselves anything. There was none of the uniformity of the 
previous season, when they all had Doc Martin [sic] boots and dark blue Crombie 
overcoats and very short hair, though there were remnants of the old style here and 
there.148 
 
Tottenham’s first game during the 1971/1972 season was away to Wolverhampton 
Wanderers. Before the game Davies was on the pitch with the players near the players’ 
tunnel, when ‘three cops appeared from the ground, dragging a Spurs supporter, his face 
streaming with blood. There was still an hour to go but the fighting had already started 
between the rival supporters.’149 
 
As the 1970s advanced, so did racism. The views of the Far Right crept into youth culture 
during the skinhead revival in the punk era and in turn, fed into the culture and hooliganism. 
Pennant states:  
 
when the skinhead revival returned to the terraces in the late Seventies, with its sinister 
Far Right connections, the new racists immediately targeted the emergence of the 
professional black football player … the sight of National Front and British Movement 
members standing outside the ground handing out their filth-peddling newspapers, like 
Bulldog, gave the press all the ammunition they needed [to present the East End in a 
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bad light]. The interior of the ground, particularly the Lower West Side, was the focal 
point for ‘Sieg Heil!’ chanting. This was also the area from which bananas, aimed at 
black players on rival teams, were chucked.150  
 
Nick Hornby, in Fever Pitch, describes his disgust at the reaction of a section of 
Liverpool fans to the appearance of John Barnes in their team: 
 
we could see quite clearly, as the teams warmed up before the kick-off, that banana 
after banana was being hurled from the away supporters’ enclosure. The bananas were 
designed to announce …that there was a monkey on the pitch; and as the Liverpool 
fans have never bothered to bring bananas to previous Arsenal matches, even though 
we have always had at least one black player in the side since the turn of the decade, 
one can only presume that John Barnes was the monkey to whom they were referring 
… those who have seen John Barnes, this beautiful, elegant man, play football, or give 
an interview, or even simply walk out on to a pitch, and have stood next to the 
grunting, overweight orang-utans who do things like throw bananas and make monkey 
noises, will appreciate the dazzling irony of all this.151 
 
 
As evidence that racism emerged among young football fans in the late 1970s, Pennant, a 
black man himself, states that, despite their notoriety in other areas, the members of the 
Inter City Firm were not racist. He states his dislike of mixing racism or any other political 
viewpoint with football, remembering that ‘the only thing that mattered was your loyalty to 
West Ham; the only colours that mattered were claret and blue; the only rule that mattered 
was you don’t fucking run.’152  
 
Greater organisation by the police and by the clubs in their attempts to prevent violence led 
to higher levels of strategy and planning by those fans who wished to continue to fight. It 
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was in this context that organised gangs started to emerge. To cite some examples, as well 
as the Inter City Firm, there were the Service Crew at Leeds United, the Bushwackers at 
Millwall, the Gooners at Arsenal, and the Headhunters at Chelsea.153 However, research by 
Gary Armstrong into the activities of the Blades, a gang of Sheffield United fans, found 
less organisation but more fluidity based around groups of friends and acquaintances.154 
 
A BBC Panorama documentary programme broadcast in 1977 reported on hooligan 
activity by Millwall fans. They found three main groups, named ‘The Half-Way Line’, 
‘Treatment’, and ‘F Troop’. The ‘Half-Way Line’ were the youngest. They were aged about 
twelve or thirteen and the name came from where they stood in the ground, a fact that also 
suggests too much emphasis can be placed on the importance of ‘ends’. The BBC report 
observed: ‘when it comes to aggro, they imitate their elders.’ Of ‘Treatment’ the report 
says: ‘although one of Millwall’s heavy mobs, Treatment don’t pick fights, but are always 
there when they happen.’ ‘F Troop’, on the other hand, were described as the ‘real nutters’. 
They ‘go looking for fights and are seldom disappointed.’ As an example of one of ‘F 
Troop’s’ activities, footage focussed on one Saturday when Millwall were playing away to 
Sunderland. ‘Treatment’ made the long trip up to the game, but ‘F Troop’, instead of 
travelling to the match, went to Charlton Athletic’s game against Tottenham Hotspur to 
fight Spurs fans, and ‘give them a taste of what they’ll get when they come down here [to 
Millwall’s ground].’155 ‘Treatment’ were very distinctive because they wore surgical 
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masks. These came from one of their number who worked as a hospital porter.156 Here, 
then, we can see a clear hierarchy within the subculture around one club.  
 
Who were the hooligans? What were their backgrounds? The first question is easier to 
answer than the second. They were invariably male, and usually in their late teens or early 
twenties. As far as background is concerned, research by Dunning, Murphy and Williams 
found that the overwhelming majority of football hooligans worked in manual occupations, 
and of those less than a fifth were skilled. They concluded that most football hooligans 
came from the lower levels of the working-class, but those who were unemployed were in 
the minority.157  
 
Colin Ward offers an explanation as to why young men became hooligans: ‘there are certain 
events and experiences that make everyday, mundane existence seem tolerable and 
worthwhile. For thousands of football fans, myself included, it was the terraces. It became 
our life, for some the sole reason for existence.’158 Patrick Slaughter is a Leeds United fan 
and former hooligan. He said, ‘it’s just great fun … you’re a kid, you’re running around 
and the sirens are going and the glass is going through. Every so often, you get into a bit of 
this and a bit of that. It’s just like mad, and you get back into the pub or on the train, gassing 
[talking about what had happened].’159 Thus it is fair to say that, for people like Slaughter, 
hooligan activity brought excitement and relieved the boredom of everyday life. To them, 
it was a way of letting off steam.  
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Slaughter also gave an indication of the occupational background of those Leeds fans he 
knew who were involved: ‘in Yorkshire when the miner’s strike’s going on, 
unemployment’s absolutely massive … hardly any of us had any jobs; if you had a job it 
was some sort of government scheme where you got paid £20 a week’.160 In that case, how 
did they fund their activities?:  
 
shoplifting. We were absolutely brilliant at shoplifting … we started off in Manchester 
or Liverpool, because at the time designer wear, all everyone wanted to buy, was very 
hard to get. It’s not like these days. So we’d go to Manchester, go to Liverpool, go to 
London, then we started getting more adventurous – Cologne, Paris, Milan – and we’d 
just ransack Armani shops, Valentino shops, then bring the gear back and sell it on 
match days before the match in the pubs.161 
 
So it is clear that some hooligans on low incomes funded their football by criminal activity. 
But not all were poor, and some did not fit this stereotype or assumption, as is revealed by 
the police undercover operation into the Chelsea Headhunters, which resulted in the arrest 
of a number of alleged ringleaders. Among them were Steve Hickmott and Terry Last. It is 
hard to imagine anyone less like a hooligan than Last. He was short, slim, and worked as a 
filing clerk with a law firm. His other activities included bird watching and playing chess.162 
It can be seen that among the hooligans there were a minority who did respectable jobs and 
earned good salaries, whose background was clearly more middle-class than working-class, 
but even so they still wanted the excitement on offer. The class, occupation and financial 
resources of these young men is also a subject that would have varied from area to area, 
and therefore from club to club.  
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The greater levels of policing and better police organisation that were needed to deal with 
the problem gave rise to a change in fashion. By the mid-1980s the skinhead and the long-
haired fashions of the 1970s had given way to the ’casual’ appearance.  Gone were the 
shaved heads, bovver boots, and donkey jackets, to be replaced by expensive sweaters with 
designer labels, neat shoes, and jewellery. This suggested that hooligans came not from 
deprived backgrounds, but from a semi-affluent environment. However, this view 
overlooks the fact that some fans attached enough importance to their football-related 
activities to forego other pleasures, and as stated above, some of their income came from 
the ‘hidden economy’ of petty crime.163 
 
The subject of hooliganism has been set into a broader context by the historian Arthur 
Marwick: 
What was happening was that the old reference points by which individuals and groups 
measured their behaviour, by which their behaviour was constrained, had drastically 
changed. Society had been more unified under policies that deliberately sought to 
avoid unemployment and to sustain social benefits, policies which recognised the 
place of trade unions in society, and policies that upheld tolerance and civilized 
behaviour as important values. Football hooligans at home saw themselves as fighting 
for their own particular community; football hooligans abroad, ironically, saw 
themselves as demonstrating British might. All this was, however distortedly, in 
keeping with the values of the aggressive market-place and the Falklands War. There 
were no longer national communal values to which all but the most desperate and 
alienated subscribed. Loyalty was now to the individual peer group.164 
 
Over two decades the hooligan phenomenon in its modern form metamorphosed from 
uncoordinated and disparate incidents of violence or vandalism in its early days to become 
something that was altogether more organised and formidable. Firstly, segregation had the 
effect of polarising hostility. Secondly, fans involved in hooligan activities adapted their 
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routines and fashions, sometimes consolidating into gangs, in order to thwart attempts by 
the police and the football authorities to detect and stop them. Then certain events towards 
the end of the 1984/1985 season elevated the problem to the level of a national news item, 
and then on to one of international crisis. It is to this we turn next.  
 
The crisis of 1985  
On 4 March Chelsea faced Sunderland in the second leg of the Milk Cup semi-final. The 
first leg at Roker Park had resulted in a 2-0 win for Sunderland, which meant that in their 
home leg at Stamford Bridge, Chelsea had to win by three clear goals to guarantee progress 
to the final at Wembley. However, midway through the second half, Sunderland’s Clive 
Walker equalised to make the score 2-2, effectively putting the tie beyond Chelsea. This 
prompted an outbreak of violence from many of the Chelsea fans, leading to one news 
reporter commenting that it was ‘one of British football’s blackest nights.’165 Tony Brown 
is a Chelsea fan who was at the game. He recalls that there was already some bad blood 
from the first leg: 
 
I also went to the first leg at Roker Park, our coaches were parked on the sea front and, 
by the time we got back to them after the game, most had their windows smashed in. 
There had been trouble at the away game, although there were upwards of 7,000 
Chelsea who had travelled up to the North East … after the game, fed up with having 
lost … and being kept in, the Chelsea fans broke open one of the exit gates and charged 
out looking for any Sunderland fans they could find. Thankfully, I just made my way 
back to the coaches and avoided the trouble. I heard later from lads who had gone 
looking for Sunderland fans that they attacked a couple of pubs with Sunderland fans 
barricaded inside. As I recall there were stories in the press the next day about a few 
Chelsea fans being beaten up and hospitalised and this may have increased the tensions 
and possible revenge-seeking on the night of the return fixture.166 
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Of the second leg at Stamford Bridge he says: 
 
Before the game Chelsea had tried to attack the Sunderland fans who were being 
marched to the ground from where their coaches were parked, police horses managed 
to keep the rival fans apart (with difficulty!) … there were a few Sunderland fans in 
the West Stand … but there was no segregation as such from the rest of the stand 
which was all Chelsea and a few of them got a slap when Sunderland scored. There 
had been a number of incidents during the game where both sets of supporters had 
exchanged missiles (coins and broken concrete from the terrace) but, arguably the 
incident that stands out was when Clive Walker (then playing for Sunderland) broke 
through on goal. One Chelsea supporter made it on to the pitch being chased by at 
least four police officers. A mounted officer then rode onto the pitch to apprehend the 
fan and, if my memory isn’t mistaken, you had the sight of Clive Walker through on 
goal, five people and a mounted officer all on the pitch at the same time (as well as 
the rest of the players!). Walker scored which led to more Chelsea fans getting on the 
pitch with charges made by mounted police to try to clear the pitch. There was even a 
horse on the pitch when Sunderland scored their third. At the end of the game more 
Chelsea invaded the pitch and charged up to the Sunderland fans penned in the North 
Stand terraces, cue more missiles, police charges, the wooden parts of the benches 
ripped up to make missiles to throw at the police, Sunderland trying to break out of 
their section, all in all just pure mayhem!167 
 
Video footage shows fans running across the pitch, one of them brandishing a chair, and on 
the far side seats were ripped out and hurled at police. It took mounted police to clear the 
pitch. In all, there were 104 arrests and forty were injured, including twenty police 
officers.168 Ted Croker, the FA Secretary, was at the game and commented on the news that 
he felt sorry for the clubs, and regarding the hooligans he said ‘they call themselves 
supporters but they are the last people the clubs want’.169  
 
                                                          
167 Ibid. 
168 ITN News 5.45pm, 5 March 1985, youtube, www.youtube.com [last accessed 3 November 2014] 
169 Ibid.  
70 
 
Only nine days later, on 13 March, Luton Town hosted Millwall for an FA Cup quarter-
final match. The game was held up for twenty-five minutes as Millwall fans ripped up seats 
to use as missiles, invaded the pitch and battled with around 200 police officers. The game 
resumed and Luton won 1-0 but there were similar scenes after the final whistle, both at the 
ground and in the town. Descriptions of these were published in graphic detail in the Daily 
Mirror:  
 
Hundreds of soccer savages ran riot at an FA Cup tie last night. They halted the match 
then rampaged through a town in some of the worst football violence Britain has ever 
seen. Thirty-one policemen were injured in the clashes at the match between Luton 
and Millwall … after the game the thugs charged through the town smashing the 
windows of shops and houses … before the kick-off hundreds of Millwall supporters 
smashed down turnstiles to get into the ground … they scaled eight-foot fences at the 
end of the packed Luton ground to attack rival fans. Then they charged across the 
pitch, trampling over advertising hoardings and ripping up seats in the stands.170 
 
 
Lee Cook is a Millwall fan and former hooligan who was at the game. He told me that 
alcohol was a large factor in the fans’ behaviour:  
 
It’s ten thousand drunken lunatics there, really. They [the police] didn’t expect it. They 
expected about five thousand and ten thousand turned up. You could pay anywhere in 
the ground, plus it was a night game. We all had the day off, so we were on the piss 
from eleven o’clock all the way through, like seven or eight o’clock at night, all 
steaming, ain’t we? About ten thousand drunks there, and all, that didn’t help much. 
The police were outnumbered, police couldn’t cope with nothing [sic], inside the 
ground, outside the ground.171  
 
An anonymous Millwall fan recalls: 
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By 5.00pm pubs and newsagents around the town were having their windows smashed 
as the police struggled to cope. The firm just ransacked the bars and shops in the town 
centre, and looted them … we were herded into [the ground] about an hour before 
kick-off. It was already getting really packed … ten minutes later, the home fans 
started goading us … hundreds of us scaled the fences in front of the stand and rushed 
down the pitch towards the Luton supporters ... we made a serious run at them. They 
made a serious run away from us. A hail of bottles, cans, nails and coins saw them 
fleeing up the terraces … now it was getting dangerous. More spilled on to the pitch 
behind the goal and we ran into the Bobbers Stand where a group of Luton were. Again 
they ran.172 
 
Of the events during the match, the same fan recalls: ‘after only 14 minutes, the game was 
halted as we began to riot again. After 15 minutes, we invaded the pitch. We were having 
running battles with the police. This went on for almost half an hour before calm was 
restored.’173 There was trouble again after the game: ‘we made for the Bobbers Stand again 
and started to rip out seats as fences were torn down. The seats were thrown onto the pitch 
at the police. They fell back, regrouped, then charged in waves, batons drawn … the back 
and forth continued for some time.’174 
 
The Luton v. Millwall match was televised live. This magnified the impact of the scenes 
described. As Nawrat and Hutchings comment, ‘nearly all of the television audience had 
probably never seen anything like it before.’175 One person clearly not impressed was Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher. She summoned representatives from the football authorities to 
a meeting at Downing Street to discuss the problem. It was at this meeting that Croker came 
out with his infamous remark that ‘these people are society’s problem and we don’t want 
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your hooligans at our sport.’176 Such complacency was unlikely to lead to any progress with 
a premier already dubbed the ‘Iron Lady’, and she and her government soon passed a bill 
banning the sale of alcohol in football grounds and set about devising a national identity 
card scheme for football supporters.177 As far as Luton Town were concerned, they 
responded by banning away fans from their Kenilworth Road ground.178 
 
On the final day of the season, Birmingham City were playing at home to Leeds United. 
Slaughter was at the game. He recalls:  
 
Arsenal are going to Villa … so we’ve had it with Arsenal straight away … we’re now 
about 1,000-handed … it’s all going off everywhere, then Birmingham, the Zulus, 
would come round the corner and then we just fought all the way down to St. Andrews. 
Then outside St. Andrews there’s a big dusty car park. Somebody’s discovered a 
football so we got 500-a-side in each, playing football, waiting for the Zulus to walk 
through. Every time the Zulus walked through, we’re straight into them. It’s just 
getting madder and madder and madder, then it’s time to go in. Basically, we’re 
straight through, appear to be taking the wall down … so there’s no conventional 
Leeds fans … but they’re all scarfers. We’re wearing shirts, all casuals. We’re at the 
front, they’re at the back … there’s a snack shed, terrified, wrongly positioned, gets 
ransacked. All the scarfers are throwing pies, crisps … so the game starts. I think one 
Birmingham fan went on the pitch, and our lot have gone straight over, then the police 
come on. I remember, it’s absolutely classic, it came over the PA system, the 
announcer, ‘can the police who are looking at the Leeds fans, please turn behind. You 
are now being attacked by the Birmingham fans.’ So they’re looking behind and the 
Birmingham fans are coming straight on, and it’s all going off … then the older Leeds 
fans suddenly decided ‘we can’t accept this rubbish’ … the scarfers, wearing colours 
and that, they start singing, ‘you’re the scum of Elland Road’, which is bizarre because 
they were the ones who started the whole thing [trouble at Leeds games in the 1960s] 
so we’ve gone back in and we’ve started a fight with them! And then Birmingham 
come back on the pitch, we’ve gone back on the pitch and we all start fighting … just 
a mad, crazy day.179  
                                                          
176 Ibid.  
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Patrick Slaughter, interview with the author, London, 12 April 2015. The word ‘scarfers’ refers to a slightly 
older generation of football fans who wore their club’s colours, such as scarfs. The ‘casuals’ of the mid-1980s 




Nick Lowles and Andy Nicholls describe the same episode in their work on hooliganism:  
 
Hundreds of Leeds fans poured onto the pitch. As police, including sixteen mounted 
officers, tried to chase visiting fans back, they faces a hail of bricks, bottles, planks of 
wood. Then, from behind them, Birmingham fans streamed forward, hoping to clash 
with their Leeds rivals. A dozen red distress flares were fired into police lines as home 
fans from two other stands joined the fray.180 
 
There is video footage of the ground after the final whistle. Birmingham supporters 
repeatedly try to invade the pitch in an attempt to get at their rivals and are driven back by 
mounted police each time. The aim of the police is to keep the rival fans apart. At the 
opposite end of the ground, the Leeds fans remain on the terrace but both sets of fans are 
hurling missiles at the police and the thin blue line of police in front of the visiting fans has 
to stand well back because of this. A voice on the tannoy repeatedly asks the home 
supporters to leave the ground and go home, but to no avail. Towards the end of the footage 
it can be seen that all the advertisement hoardings lining the pitch at the Birmingham end 
of the ground have disappeared, many of them torn up and used as missiles. 181 The extent 
of the violence can be seen in the statistics. There were ninety-six police officers injured, 
along with more than eighty spectators and 125 arrests.182 
 
Fifteen-year-old Ian Hambridge was attending his first football match. He had gone to the 
game with three friends. Half an hour after the final whistle a wall collapsed due to pressure 
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on it from the Leeds fans.183 Masonry fell on to parked cars and injured some supporters. 
One of those injured was Hambridge. He was rushed to hospital but died the following day. 
His distraught mother said: ‘I feel guilty because I gave Ian the money to go to the match. 
He just wanted a day out with his friends.’184 The tragedy in the West Midlands, however, 
was overshadowed by the disaster that had unfolded simultaneously in West Yorkshire.  
 
Bradford City had secured promotion to the Second Division. For the last game of the 
season they were playing at home against Lincoln City. Thousands of supporters and locals 
packed in to their Valley Parade ground to enjoy the carnival atmosphere and celebrate the 
team’s achievement. Just before half-time, with Bradford leading 1-0, a fire appeared in the 
main stand running along the side of the pitch. On the video footage, the commentator says, 
‘there appears to be a fire in the stand. That looks very nasty.’ It spread with great speed. 
The players left the pitch and supporters rushed to leave the stand, clambering out over the 
front. After only a minute half the pitch was engulfed in smoke and after three minutes the 
entire stand was ablaze, thick plumes of black smoke ascending hundreds of feet into the 
Yorkshire sky. Towards the end of the footage a man rushed out from the stand, his clothes 
on fire. The commentator exclaimed, ‘Look at that! The poor man. This is human tragedy.’ 
Police and other supporters rushed to his aid and put the flames out. The commentator 
summarized, ‘ten minutes ago we were looking at a football game. Now I see a sad and 
tragic sight.’185  
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In all, fifty-six died as a result of the Bradford fire and hundreds of others needed treatment 
for burns. If the recent events at Chelsea, Luton, and Birmingham had highlighted the 
scourge of hooliganism, then the fire at Bradford underlined the dilapidated state of many 
football grounds. As Nawrat and Hutchings put it, ‘if hooliganism was the most visible blot 
on football’s tattered reputation, the state of our stadiums was the other. Many were 
antiquated, decaying and unsafe.’186 The government commissioned Justice Oliver 
Popplewell to lead an inquiry into the fire.  
 
There is a postscript to the Bradford Fire. Martin Fletcher was a 12-year-old boy who 
survived the blaze but lost his brother, father, uncle and grandfather in the disaster. In 2015, 
just before the thirtieth anniversary of the tragedy, he published 56: the story of the 
Bradford Fire. In it he challenges the established view that the fire was started accidentally 
by a carelessly discarded match or a cigarette end. He points to the short space of time 
between the disaster and the inquiry opening, which was just thirteen working days after 
the forensic search of the site was completed. In addition, he notes the haste with which the 
inquiry was finished (just five and a half working days) and Popplewell’s determination not 
to apportion blame to any one person, maintaining that the issue of criminal negligence was 
not in his remit. 187 There is further concern regarding Bradford City chairman Stafford 
Heginbotham. This includes his denial, proved untrue, that the club had ever received a 
letter from West Yorkshire County Council raising concern about combustible material 
under the stand, and various other lies, contradictions and inconsistencies that remained 
unchallenged.188 Most alarming of all is the fact that in the eighteen years between 1967 
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and 1985, there had been fires at the premises of at least nine companies owned or co-
owned by Heginbotham. Fletcher comments, ‘could any man really be as unlucky as 
Heginbotham had been?’189 In the process the Bradford chairman had picked up £2.74 
million in insurance claims (£27 million in 2015 terms).190  
 
Given the speed with which the inquiry was begun and completed, the possibility of 
government collusion to avoid criminal proceedings against Heginbotham could be 
suggested. It is more likely, however, that the government, led by a prime minister who did 
not like football in the first place, had become thoroughly exasperated with the problems 
that the game was creating. The insistence that there would be one inquiry to cover the 
events at Bradford and Birmingham, though they were completely different in nature, is 
evidence of this. They were in no mood to spend more time and public money than the 
minimum they could get away with.  
 
The fact that there would be only one inquiry merged the issues of safety and control into 
one, which had the effect of advancing the disciplinarian argument. Regarding the two 
issues of safety and control, King comments: 
 
There can be no doubt that the two issues are closely interrelated at a football ground, 
as a poorly controlled or violent crowd is necessarily dangerous and, therefore, a threat 
to public safety. Yet, as the fire at Bradford demonstrated, the issues could be quite 
separate, where a perfectly well-behaved crowd might be in a situation of danger 
because of the negligent management of the ground.191 
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The authoritarian nature of the inquiry also fitted in with the context of the times. Public 
order and the enforcement of the law had become the subject of debate between the main 
political parties, fed not only by trouble at football matches but also by the recent year-long 
miners’ strike with its much-publicized confrontations between the police and striking 
miners.192 
 
Then, on 29 May, Liverpool faced Juventus in the final of the European Cup. For seven of 
the previous eight seasons the European Cup had been won by an English team, and on four 
of those occasions it had been Liverpool.193 Hoping to see their team continue this 
dominance, Liverpool fans made their way to Brussels for the game, which was to be played 
in the Heysel stadium. As two authorities put it, ‘just as we were about to enjoy the summit 
of European football the game reached its nadir.’194 According to the Daily Express, trouble 
started in the afternoon when a jewellers’ shop was smashed up and looted, and then there 
was a running battle between English fans and the police.195 Once inside the stadium, 
trouble began with bottles, flagpoles, and bricks flying between the rival groups of 
supporters. When the riot police tried to intervene, they too came under a barrage of 
missiles.196 There was an issue regarding segregation, as there was only a nine foot wire 
mesh fence. Liverpool fan Peter Keatley said, ‘it was only flimsy wire fencing. I wouldn’t 
put that sort of thing up in my back garden. It just went down under the sheer weight of 
people.’197 Also, many Italian fans had easily acquired tickets for the Z section of terracing, 
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which was supposedly neutral. It was into this area that Liverpool fans, in the X and Y 
sections of terracing, charged.198 The first charge was at around 6.30pm, but it was the third 
charge that was to prove fatal. As Italian fans rushed to safety, an old wall collapsed and 
fans were either crushed or stampeded in the ensuing panic.199 
 
The final death toll was thirty-nine, with hundreds of others injured. The issue of 
hooliganism was now at a level of international crisis. Amid universal calls for some form 
of ban, FA chairman Bert Millichip together with FA Secretary Ted Croker flew back from 
Mexico, where they had been on tour with England, for an emergency meeting with the 
Prime Minister at Downing Street. Millichip was ready to persuade the FA to impose its 
own ban rather than wait for UEFA to do it. He said, ‘it could be that we decide not to take 
part in European football at any level … the scale of this tragedy in Belgium is so depressing 
it is beyond belief. I feel entirely helpless and completely frustrated as to what action can 
be taken, if indeed the game of football can survive at all.’200 The FA withdrew all English 
clubs from European competition for a year, but this was clearly seen as inadequate by 
UEFA, who imposed an indefinite ban, with a three-year additional ban on Liverpool when 
other English clubs were re-admitted.201    
 
The point needs to be made, however, that the Heysel stadium was woefully inadequate for 
a match of such importance. In the corner of Z terrace there were two adjacent walls which 
did not allow fans to exit safely. There was no ticket control and one of the circumstances 
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that led to the disaster was the ease with which Juventus fans acquired tickets for this 
section. Belgian police had clearly not researched English hooligan behaviour patterns and 
as a result were unprepared for trouble before the game. Fans entering the ground were not 
searched for weapons or alcohol, and many were drunk, and some fans who had entered the 
stadium were able to pass their tickets out through the fence to those waiting to enter.202 
Thus it can be seen that all the ingredients for a disaster were present before any trouble 
occurred.  
 
The impact of Heysel was magnified further by the fact that it did not come in isolation. In 
just three months between the beginning of March and the end of May 1985 there had been 
three major outbreaks of crowd violence and two disasters involving English football fans. 
(This is counting the events in Brussels as a disaster - it could of course also be counted as 
another major outbreak of crowd violence). As the 1985/1986 season got under way, 
English clubs were banned from European competition, a dispute with the television 
companies meant that there was no live televised football whatsoever, and attendances 
reached an all-time low, although this last point was in line with the prevailing downward 
trend rather than an automatic reaction to these events. Even so, it is clear that English 
football was in a very bad state. Walvin puts the decline succinctly: ‘in the mid-1960s 
football was the national game; by the mid-1980s it had become a national problem.’203 He 
also puts it into a broader context:  
When the national game stumbled into the new 1985-6 season it did so in a miasma of 
political and economic confusion. The game itself had become a political football, 
punted hither and yon by indeterminate – and often undisciplined – teams of 
politicians and critics. Inevitably, former spectators stayed away in growing numbers; 
economic crisis hovered over the game. To make matters worse the mental insularity 
                                                          
202 Ibid., p.268.  
203 Walvin, Only Game, p.150.  
80 
 
… was now compounded by the enforced isolation from the rest of the footballing 
world.204 
 
The seeds of revival are sown   
Central to the government’s plan to deal with the hooligan crisis was an identity card 
scheme. This was one of the proposals of the Popplewell Report, which, according to King, 
had a disciplinary tone largely due to the context in which it was compiled.205 That context 
was Thatcherism and the ideological commitment to a strong central state.206 The 
government ruled that all clubs should have such a scheme in place covering the majority 
of their home support from the beginning of the 1987/1988 season.207 This was to be a step 
on the way to a national identity card scheme, under which every supporter would have to 
possess a card which would be presented on entry to a football ground. In theory, with this 
system in place, anyone convicted of a football-related offence could easily be excluded. 
Marwick sets the identity card issue into a broader context: ‘As was its way, the 
Government had identified an enemy … indiscriminate action was being aimed at everyone 
interested in football, detached followers of the game as well as fanatical followers of the 
club.’208 
 
However, the proposal was fraught with problems and brought together a wide range of 
opposition to it. Firstly, there was the cost. Should football clubs, many of whom were 
struggling financially already, be made to pay for something which was being imposed on 
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them against their will by the government? Secondly, there was the problem of practicality. 
It was easy to envisage a football ground at 2.50pm on a Saturday afternoon with supporters 
being delayed at the turnstiles because they now had to produce a membership card as well 
as their money for entry or a ticket. Tempers would be likely to flare and in these 
circumstances the existence of the scheme could create the type of problems it had been set 
up to prevent. Thirdly, would it actually work? Those whom the scheme was set up to 
exclude would soon find a way round it. Any convicted hooligan could find a friend to lend 
him their card, and it would take a diligent turnstile operator, in the semi-darkness of the 
turnstile and with a long line of people anxious to enter, to notice that the details on the card 
did not match that of the holder.  
 
In response to the proposed scheme, and with other problems facing football supporters in 
the post-Heysel climate, the Football Supporters’ Association was formed. Founded in 
Liverpool, the FSA became the ‘independent and autonomous voice of the grassroots 
supporter.’209 It soon had the effect of getting the voice of the fans heard by the football 
authorities and the government, and, in tandem with this, improving the image of the 
football supporter. The absence of constraint gave it more relevance than the National 
Federation of Football Supporters Clubs, which had always in effect been controlled by the 
clubs.210 The establishment of the FSA was the start of an era of greater fan democracy, as 
committed supporters mobilised to oppose the identity card scheme. At various clubs, 
groups of fans formed Independent Supporters’ Associations, and they provided a voice of 
protest for grievances at club level, such as campaigning for the removal of an unpopular 
manager or opposing excessive admission price increases. In the early 1990s, the ISAs at 
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Arsenal and West Ham United defeated the hated ‘bond schemes’, whereby supporters were 
asked to buy expensive bonds to guarantee their own season tickets for future seasons. The 
clubs planned to use these advance payments to fund the building of new stands.211 
 
The breadth of opposition to the identity card scheme was pointed out by Charlton Athletic 
supporter Rick Everitt in 1989, who noted that: ‘the campaign against the scheme is now 
hotting up, with all-party MPs, the FA, League, FSA, Police Federation, and 81 League 
clubs ranged against the government.’212 Reporting on a meeting of the London branch of 
the FSA, Everitt related that, ‘the FSA had been unable to find a Tory MP willing to defend 
the scheme at the meeting, a fact which speaks volumes about the plan’s credibility.’213 
Under the proposals as they stood, a football ground rather than a football club would be 
licensed, but this created confusion where two clubs shared a ground, because both clubs 
would need a license (at the time Charlton were in a groundshare with Crystal Palace). The 
license could be revoked if a club failed to get people in on time. Given the capacity of 
computer systems to ‘crash’ at crucial moments, a club could find itself in trouble through 
no fault of its own, and Everitt pointed out that clubs would also be ‘legally responsible for 
failures of public transport, a thoroughly bizarre state of affairs.’214 As far as individual fans 
were concerned, he went on to point out, ‘it would be a criminal offence to try and enter a 
ground with an invalid card. However, given the likelihood of operator error, and 
software/hardware failure, many innocent fans can look forward to feeling the long arm of 
the law on their collar.’215   
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In proposing the identity card scheme, and then showing dogged determination to stick to 
it in the face of all opposition, the Thatcher government achieved what no ‘firm’ or ‘crew’ 
could ever have done – they politicised football supporters. There was now a common 
enemy. Running in tandem with fan politicisation, and partly because of it, was the growth 
and development of the ‘fanzine’. The publication of fans’ magazines became possible due 
to advances in technology. By the latter half of the 1980s some fans had access to a 
computer and a photocopier. This enabled the print and issue of the earliest editions. The 
magazine When Saturday Comes (WSC) was the brainchild of Andy Lyons and Mike 
Ticher, who had met when working at a record shop in Kensington, West London. It first 
appeared in March 1986 and the early issues were primitive: ‘articles were typed with little 
or no regard for column width, headlines were letrasetted or worse, and photos plundered 
from books, with everything undergoing several reductions on the photocopier to make it 
fit, after a fashion. It wasn’t deliberately amateurish, just amateur.’216 There were only 100 
copies of the first issue and a cover price of 15p. After a positive review in The Guardian, 
fifty letters arrives at WSC the next day and a similar number the following day. Ticher 
later recalled, ‘we hadn’t even made any plans for a second issue, but the response to the 
first one made it unavoidable.’217 The magazine continued to grow, helped crucially by the 
backing of Sportspages, a sports bookshop in Charing Cross Road, London. By the fourth 
issue in September 1986, the magazine had expanded to sixteen pages, and a print run of 
1,700.218 Simultaneous to the growth of When Saturday Comes, there were other national 
fanzines, and fans of various clubs up and down the country started to produce their own 
magazines. A more detailed examination of these will follow in the next chapter.  
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The politicisation of football supporters and the advances in technology that gave them a 
voice through the fanzine movement brought out into the open a type of fan that had been 
unnoticed during the years when all the focus was on hooliganism. Again, this development 
paralleled wider social and cultural changes among young people. The first visible 
manifestation of this trend inside football grounds occurred when Manchester City fans 
started to bring giant inflatable bananas to games. Fans of other clubs soon followed suit 
with their own equivalents. This was buffoonery, but at least it was harmless. At Goldblatt 
puts it:  
 
In a final coda to a decade of turbulent change, incidences of trouble declined after 
Heysel. The arrival of acid house, warehouse parties and ecstasy in the late Thatcherite 
summer of love saw the firms and the casuals mutate into baggy-trousered, loved-up 
fools – a crossover with the more pacific culture of dance music reinforced by New 
Order, masters of the thoughtful electronic chill-out [who would be] performing the 
official England song for Italia ’90 with John Barnes.219  
 
Against this backdrop, attendances started to rise. From the meagre 16.5 million who 
attended Football League games at its lowest point in 1985/1986, the figure rose to 17.4 
million the following season, and up to 18 million the season after. The figure for 
1989/1990 had risen to 19.4 million.220 Part of the reason for this growth in interest was the 
play-offs as a vehicle of promotion between the leagues. In this system, four teams qualify 
by final League position. They are paired off for the semi-finals, again according to final 
League position. These are played over two legs, and the two aggregate winners go through 
to meet in the final. The team victorious in the final plays in the higher division the 
following season.  As stated earlier, they were brought in as a fair means of reducing the 
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size of the First Division in two stages from twenty-two to twenty clubs, and commenced 
at the end of the 1986/1987 season.221 It was already decided that if they were to prove 
successful they would stay. They did prove successful as they served to increase the number 
of meaningful games towards the end of the season, as a greater number of clubs still had 
a chance of promotion. Moreover, they generated interest and money in themselves through 
ticket sales and television coverage.   
 
In the meantime the government proposed the national membership scheme as part of the 
Football Spectators’ Bill. It was formally announced on 6 July 1988, to be proposed as part 
of the White Paper in the autumn. 222 Despite the amount of widespread opposition to it, the 
government seemed determined to press ahead. King points out that the scheme ‘put 
Thatcher’s focus on the control of the individual into practice.’223 However, there would be 
one unforeseen event which would not only scupper the bill, but completely change the 
nature of football spectating forever. It is to that episode that this thesis will now turn.  
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Chapter Two   
 
Hillsborough and its aftermath 
We thought we were ninety minutes from Wembley. 
It turned out we were five minutes from Hell 
 
-  Brian Clough, Nottingham Forest manager224 
 
Twenty-one years have passed but I can hardly bring myself to 
write or say its name – Hillsborough haunts me still 
 
-  Kenny Dalglish, Liverpool manager225 
 
Those were the days, my friend, we took the Stretford End 
-  Now it’s a theatre of dreams 
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Introduction: the significance of Hillsborough 
At 3.06pm, less than seven minutes into the game, referee Ray Lewis led the players off the 
pitch. The teams were Liverpool and Nottingham Forest, the match an FA Cup semi-final, 
the venue Hillsborough. The name is now synonymous with the worst English football 
disaster of all time. The events of that afternoon – 15 April 1989 – and its aftermath draw 
our attention to the attitude of the police and the authorities towards football fans, the way 
in which certain sections of the press portrayed those fans, and the general view of the 
government towards football fans in the days of the Thatcher administration. A tragedy on 
one afternoon in Sheffield would mark a pivotal change in the way in which professional 
football was watched and consumed, and in turn bring a sea change in the attitude of the 
established authorities towards football spectators. Indeed, the Hillsborough disaster not 
only marked a major milestone, but became perhaps the most important single event driving 
the changes in English football.  
 
The Hillsborough disaster had a greater impact than any previous football catastrophe, not 
because it was the worst, although statistically it was, but because of the context in which 
it occurred. Firstly, public reaction was unprecedented, largely due to BBC’s Grandstand 
programme reporting live from the ground, and the vivid newspaper accounts in the days 
that followed. This reaction was displayed in a public outpouring of grief rarely associated 
with football, as Hillsborough and Liverpool’s ground, known as Anfield, became 
makeshift shrines decked with flowers and football memorabilia laid by grieving fans and 
others who came to pay their respects. Secondly, the tragedy at Hillsborough also came in 
the wake of the football disasters at Bradford and Heysel, and a number of famous tragedies 
in the public and transport services during the latter half of the 1980s. Thirdly, the reaction 
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of the government towards football supporters was different, focussing on matters of safety 
rather than on attempts at the control and containment of fans that followed the events of 
1985. The reaction to the events at Hillsborough was therefore different to that after the 
Ibrox disaster in Glasgow in 1971, where sixty-six died at the end of a game between 
Rangers and Celtic. Despite a government inquiry resulting in the Wheatley Report, there 
would be more deaths due to inadequacies and poor organisation at British football grounds 
in years to come. Fourthly, and most importantly, the nature of the Taylor Report that 
followed Hillsborough was both far-reaching and encompassing, not only addressing safety 
and security at football grounds, but calling into question the nature of club-fan relations 
and the game’s governance.227  
 
The amount of literature regarding Hillsborough is surprisingly sparse. Phil Scraton 
published Hillsborough: The Truth (1999), which has been hailed as the definitive, unique 
account of the disaster in which he also examines the legal arguments, the key evidence, 
and demonstrates the inadequacy of the law and the limited breadth of judicial discretion 
when applied to the case. He also co-wrote, together with Ann Jemphrey and Sheila 
Coleman, No Last Rights: The Denial of Justice and the Promotion of Myth in the Aftermath 
of the Hillsborough Disaster.228 Here the interpretation of events is adequately expressed 
in the title. Some of the football personalities present at the time have written about their 
memories and experience of the tragedy and its aftermath. Liverpool manager Kenny 
Dalglish devoted a chapter to it in My Liverpool Home,229 and coverage was provided by 
Liverpool players John Barnes, in John Barnes: the autobiography,230 and Peter Beardsley, 
                                                          
227 Matthew Taylor, Association Game, pp. 338-340.  
228 Phil Scraton, Ann Jemphrey and Sheila Coleman, No Last Rights: the denial of justice and the promotion of 
myth in the aftermath of the Hillsborough disaster (Liverpool: Liverpool City Council, 1995). 
229 Dalglish, Liverpool Home, pp. 218–229.  
230 John Barnes, The Autobiography (London: Headline, 1999), pp. 160-177.  
89 
 
in My Life Story.231 Nottingham Forest manager Brian Clough also talked about 
Hillsborough in Clough: the autobiography.232 Aside from these, one is left with just a few 
pages in a number of secondary sources on the broader history of football. Matthew Taylor 
outlines his view on why the disaster had such a profound impact, and Anthony King sets 
the tragedy in its contemporary context of the disciplinary arguments of the Thatcher 
regime in its later years, pointing out that it was only the Taylor Report which scuppered 
the unpopular Football Spectators’ Bill.233 
 
Having summarised the sources available, we must consider the changes recommended by 
the Taylor Report.  The most important of these was the conversion of football grounds to 
all-seater stadia. Yet this transformation from decrepit grounds with crumbling terraces to 
plush ‘state of the art’ stadiums needs to be seen in the broad context of change throughout 
sport and leisure as a whole as the industry marketed itself to a more fashion-conscious 
consumer society. The rebuilding of football grounds would occur simultaneously with the 
founding of the Premiership and the arrival of vast sums from satellite television 
broadcasters in lucrative deals. These changes would combine to transform the face of 
English football. Thus, while the Taylor Report was important, its implementation was 
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The Hillsborough disaster  
Sheffield Wednesday’s Hillsborough stadium lies in Owlerton, about two and a half miles 
north-west from Sheffield city centre.234 The name Hillsborough is the name of a 
neighbouring park and of the parliamentary constituency in which the stadium sits. In the 
post-war years the stadium regularly hosted FA Cup semi-finals and was selected to host 
World Cup matches in 1966, thereafter boasting its status as a ‘jewel in the crown of the 
football world’.235 The stadium was considered to be as safe as any in existence in England 
in the late 1980s: ‘nor does Hillsborough suffer any of the problems associated with older, 
less spacious grounds’.236 Sheffield-born sports reporter Paul Thompson wrote in the 
Sheffield Star the Monday after the disaster, ‘Oh no … not Hillsborough. Wednesday and 
their supporters are trying to come to terms with the fact that football’s worse [sic] tragedy 
has occurred where anybody would have least expected it’.237 However, flaws at the 
Leppings Lane end of the ground became apparent in 1981 at an FA Cup semi-final between 
Tottenham Hotspur and Wolverhampton Wanderers. On that occasion there were no 
fatalities but thirty-eight people were injured in a crush on what was then an open terrace.238 
There were no FA Cup semi-finals played at Hillsborough for six years after this, until 1987 
when Hillsborough hosted the semi-final between Coventry City and Leeds United.239 
 
As the 1988/1989 season neared its end, Liverpool could look back on two decades in which 
they had won the League Championship ten times, the FA Cup twice, the League Cup four 
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times, the European Cup four times, and the UEFA Cup twice. Nottingham Forest’s 
achievements were less longstanding but also impressive. Under manager Brian Clough, 
Forest had, in the first season after winning promotion from the Second Division, won the 
League Championship and gone on to win the European Cup two seasons in succession. 
They had also won the League Cup three times.240 As things stood, Liverpool could repeat 
their feat of three seasons earlier, when they achieved a League Championship and FA Cup 
‘double’ and become the first club to ‘do the double’ twice. As far as Nottingham Forest 
were concerned, the FA Cup was the one trophy that had eluded Clough and his team. The 
FA Cup semi-final between the two thus seemed nicely paired. Would it be Forest, in 
pursuit of that elusive trophy, or Liverpool, potentially on course for a second ‘double’, 
who walked out on to the Wembley turf a few weeks hence? 
 
With these thoughts in mind, the two sets of fans made the short journey up the M1 or the 
trek across the Pennines respectively; ‘the last thing on anyone’s mind was danger, [it was] 
a beautiful spring morning’.241 The decision to allocate Liverpool fans the West Stand at 
the Leppings Lane end of the ground made geographical sense – most Liverpool fans would 
be arriving from the West – but no practical sense because Liverpool fans were greater in 
number and this was the smaller end of the ground. This was the first of the logistical and 
planning errors that would lead to the loss of ninety-six lives. Liverpool had complained 
about being given the smaller end, but according to the police the decision was to do with  
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Map 1. The Leppings Lane end of Hillsborough  
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This map shows clearly the layout of the Leppings Lane end. A crush built up outside the 
outer wall, defined by the black line, Gate C was opened to relieve that crush and fans, 
without any guidance to do otherwise, flowed through the tunnel beneath the West Stand 
and into the already packed Central Pens. Source: The Daily Telegraph, 17 April 1989.   
 
crowd control, aimed at preventing the fans from meeting.242 While semi-final crowds are 
usually well-behaved and such games are often played in a carnival atmosphere, the police 
                                                          








‘had no interest in letting the two sets of supporters meet on the streets’.243 Thus it can be 
seen that from the start the emphasis was on control, rather than on safety, though of course 
the police argument was that control equals safety.  
  
At Leppings Lane, six sets of wrought iron double gates led towards twenty-three turnstiles, 
admitting fans to the terrace, the West Stand, and the North Stand. In total there was space 
for 24,256 spectators. The rest of the ground, which had the capacity for a further 29,800, 
was fed by sixty turnstiles, more than twice the number. Also, the tightly confined area 
between the iron gates and the turnstiles was potentially dangerous when there was a 
capacity crowd, such as for an FA Cup semi-final. Fans heading for the terracing at the 
front of the stand passed through seven of the turnstiles, leading to an inner concourse that 
faced a tunnel dropping down a steep gradient, on to the terrace. It was easy to assume that 
this was the only entrance to the terraces, but in fact it led only to the two central pens, 
which were numbered pen 3 and pen 4.244 
 
These shortcomings in design would not have mattered if the game had been properly 
policed. It should be pointed out that the same two teams had played at Hillsborough in an 
FA Cup semi-final the previous season and the game had passed without incident. However, 
the match commander in charge of policing the 1988 semi-final, the experienced Chief 
Superintendent Brian Mole, had been moved to other duties and the job had been given to 
Chief Superintendent David Duckenfield, a mere novice by comparison.245 
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Without adequate directions to make their way to the pens at either end of the terrace, where 
there was still plenty of space, fans poured into the two central pens, causing overcrowding 
and crushing. Taylor, in his Interim Report, states that ‘more fans came through the tunnel 
to the favoured area behind the goal. By 2.50pm these pens were already full to a degree 
which caused serious discomfort to many well used to enduring pressure on terraces.’246 
 
As the game approached, a similar crush built up at the turnstiles just outside among fans 
eager to enter the ground. Taylor continues: 
 
Meanwhile the crowd grew at the Leppings Lane entrance. As more arrived at the back 
the crush at the front grew worse. … Arrivals at the back exceeded deliveries through 
the turnstiles, so the build-up increased … it was clear the crowd could not pass 
through the turnstiles by 3pm. Police Constable Buxton radioed … to control asking 
that kick-off be postponed. The suggestion was acknowledged but rejected.247  
 
Superintendent Roger Marshall, although loathe to do so because it contravened basic 
police policy, decided to request that the exit gates be opened to relieve the crush. He 
radioed control but got no reply. He tried a second time, but to no avail. The third time he 
radioed, he added that if the gates were not opened, someone was going to be killed. In the 
control room sat Duckenfield and Superintendent Bernard Murray. Duckenfield had still 
not made a decision. Murray asked him, ‘are you going to open the gates?’ Duckenfield 
gave the order and Sergeant Michael Goddard radioed to Marshall ‘open the gates’.248 Gate 
C, one of the large blue gates through which fans normally leave the ground at the end of a 
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match, was duly opened to relieve the pressure. South Yorkshire’s Chief Constable Peter 
Wright later claimed at a press conference that his officers had ordered the gate to be opened 
‘as an emergency measure when the late arrival of 3,000 – 4,000 fans outside the ground 
had threatened a danger to life’. A gateman, who insisted on staying anonymous, said: ‘the 
police opened the big gates because they thought someone might get crushed. There were 
several thousand people flooding through. The police said that if they hadn’t opened the 
gate someone might have got killed. It was a free-for-all. There were thousands coming in 
… it’s my opinion that opening those gates caused the tragedy.’249  
 
Once through the large gates these fans, without anyone to direct them otherwise, flowed 
‘like molten lava’ towards the already packed central pens.250 One Liverpool fan, Kevin 
Chappell from Stockport, said ‘it was right that there was still plenty of room at our end 
when the gate was opened, but the space was to the left and right on the open terracing. 
Instead of opening the side gates, the police opened the gate in the middle where there was 
no room at all’.251 
 
This was confirmed by Dr. Glyn Phillips from East Kilbride, who said: ‘the police allowed 
the fans to fill the middle terracing section to the point that they were crammed in like 
sardines and yet the two outside portions of the terracing were left virtually empty. I stood 
and watched police allowing this to happen. It got to a point where they just lost control 
completely and lads were pushed against the fence right down by the pitch.’252The influx 
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from gate C came through the tunnel with great momentum, assisted by the 1 in 6 gradient. 
Fans spoke of ‘being swept through, feet off the ground … the new arrivals found 
themselves pushed forward and the pressure became intense’.253 
 
At 2.54pm the two teams ran out onto the pitch. As usual, the excitement this caused led to 
a surge in the crowd. In pen 3 many were ‘acutely uncomfortable and some were in 
distress’.254 The 2012 Report of the Hillsborough Independent Panel states, ‘as the teams 
ran onto the pitch for the 3pm kick-off, the crowd cheered but already in the central pens 
people were screaming. Others fell silent, already unconscious.’255 
 
The pressure caused the perimeter gate at the front to spring open, but this was quickly shut 
by a police officer, only to spring open again. ‘Fans screamed at police on the perimeter 
track to open the small gate in each pen onto the pitch … as fans tried to climb the 
overhanging perimeter fence, officers on the track pushed them back into the crowd’.256 
Then at the perimeter gate of pen 4, an officer, now alert to the problem, opened the gate to 
allow fans to climb through and make their way to the side pens where there was still plenty 
of room. An officer at the perimeter gate of pen 3 now realised the crisis and radioed for 
permission to open the gate. As before, however, the senior police command seemed 
paralysed and proved unable to respond to the rapidly deteriorating situation. The officer 
received no reply, so he took the decision himself to open it.257 
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The game kicked off, but to escape the crush some fans attempted to climb over the radial 
fences out of pens 3 and 4 into pens 2 or 5. Others tried to clamber over the perimeter fence 
at the front, but were pushed back by those officers who still feared a pitch invasion. At 
3.04pm a shot from Liverpool’s Peter Beardsley struck the crossbar. There was a roar from 
the Liverpool fans and a surge forward. This was common among all football fans at a 
moment of excitement, such as the chance of a goal being scored. In pen 3, however, the 
force was so great that it twisted and broke two spans of a crush barrier with the result that 
those behind it were propelled forwards. Many fell and the involuntary rush of those behind 
pushed them down. The force of this crushing spread and distributed so that at the front of 
the pen fans were pressed even harder up against the perimeter fence and the low wall 
beneath it. In pen 4 no barrier was broken, but those at the front were crushed in similar 
fashion. Behind them, the pressure was so great a barrier bowed.258 
 
Superintendent Roger Greenwood, the Ground Commander, who was not fully aware of 
the seriousness of the situation, thought it still ‘retrievable’ if those at the rear moved back. 
He stood on the wall beneath the fence and signalled with both hands to those behind to 
move back. Other officers joined him to do the same. But the fact was that the crush was 
so great that even fans willing to comply were unable to do so. After these fruitless gestures, 
he tried to radio for the match to be stopped. He received no reply so he gesticulated with 
his arms to the control box. Duckenfield sent Murray down to enact the agreed emergency 
procedure, which was to request to the linesman that the game be stopped. Before this could 
happen, Greenwood ran onto the pitch and asked the referee to stop the game. It was 
3.06pm.259 
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At the front of pens 3 and 4 there was a horrendous blockage of bodies, especially by the 
gates. The dead, the dying, and the desperate became interwoven as those still with 
sufficient strength tried to clamber over those submerged in this human pile to escape 
through the gates and on to the pitch. By this time police officers and other fans were there 
to help haul them up and over. The steps to the gates became so congested with bodies, live 
and dead, that each had to be prised from the pile by police. At the side of the pens other 
fans continued to climb out and into pens 2 and 5, while at the back fans in the West Stand 
reached down to haul some of those trapped in pens 3 and 4 upwards to safety.260  
 
Police officers had been summoned from elsewhere in the ground in response to what was 
thought to be a threat to public order. What they found was ‘a horrific scene of carnage and 
many officers were shocked into impotence by what they saw … it was truly gruesome. 
The victims were blue, cyanotic, incontinent; their mouths open, vomiting; their eyes 
staring.’261 A pile of dead bodies grew outside gate 3 and on the pitch the injured were laid 
down so attempts could be made to revive them. After the players had left the pitch, the 
area that had been the penalty area and out to the touchline beneath the South Stand saw 
small distraught clusters of fans surrounding the worst of the casualties, as rescue workers 
tried to administer the ‘kiss of life’, while other victims were carried away on makeshift 
stretchers made from advertising hoardings that had been torn down to use for the 
purpose.262 
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One grieving father told how he fought in vain to save the lives of his two teenage 
daughters. Trevor Hicks, and his wife, Jenny, had taken Sarah, 19, and Victoria, 15, to the 
match. Sarah had turned 19 the previous Monday and the trip to Sheffield was her birthday 
treat. Hicks relates the story: 
 
the girls and I got into the ground at around 2pm. They were in a different section to 
me. They were there in good time which meant that they were down the front and that 
was the problem. I could see that where the girls were was getting very crowded. I 
shouted to one of the senior officers that people were being crushed. I didn’t get a very 
polite answer. The officer was dismissive of me. I saw Victoria being passed over the 
heads of people and over the fence and on to the pitch. I managed to get onto the pitch 
and there were Sarah and Victoria lying there.263 
 
Both girls had been given mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. He tried to revive Victoria in an 
ambulance, but to no avail. The story of the Hicks family was one of the many human 
tragedies played out that afternoon. The dismissive attitude of the senior police officer was 
indicative of the failure of the police to take supporters’ concerns seriously. Hicks also 
commented, ‘I think the police were so busy trying to prevent a pitch invasion that they 
didn’t see what was happening.’264 
 
At a press conference after the event Chief Constable Peter Wright tried to distance the 
police from any responsibility for the tragedy. When talking about the order to open the 
large gate, he commented ‘at this moment there is nothing to suggest to me that the opening 
of the gate and the surge were not two separate incidents. There is nothing that I know that 
would show a connection between the two’.265 
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However, Liverpool fans did not see it this way. Their accounts gave two possible versions: 
either the police underestimated the number of people pressing to enter the stadium, or they 
unlocked the wrong gate to admit them.266 There was clearly a discrepancy between police 
versions and fans’ accounts of what really happened. The police use of the phrase ‘surge’ 
in this context was misleading in itself. It was more like a ‘vice which had been tightening 
for nearly half an hour’.267 
 
In attendance at the game were Graham Kelly and Glen Kirton from the FA. Together with 
Sheffield Wednesday’s club secretary Graham Mackrell they went to the control box 
shortly after 3.15pm. There Chief Superintendent Duckenfield told them that Liverpool fans 
had forced the gate.268 As described, this was clearly untrue because Duckenfield had 
himself ordered the gate to be opened, after he had been asked three times to do so by 
Marshall on the radio. Duckenfield’s lie was both blatant and deliberate. The result of this 
was that Kelly repeated it, unwittingly and in good faith, to the media. Soon it was broadcast 
around the world that an appalling tragedy was happening and that Liverpool fans were to 
blame.269 Many observers carried the memory of Heysel, four years earlier, in their minds. 
The involvement of Liverpool in both episodes made for an easy elision between the two 
disasters – and reinforced the idea that a specific set of fans were the problem.  
 
Over the next few hours, bodies would be cleared from the pitch and the gymnasium was 
used as a temporary mortuary. It was in there that the coroner, Dr. Stefan Popper, took the 
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unprecedented step of authorising the taking of blood alcohol samples, and the recording 
of blood alcohol levels, from all of the deceased, including children. There was no medical 
or legal justification for this, a procedure normally reserved for drivers of trains or coaches, 
or pilots of aircraft. No previous disaster had resulted in this intrusive action towards its 
victims. The decision to take these samples and record the levels showed crass insensitivity 
and revealed certain prejudices and assumptions about football supporters. It also indicated 
that senior police officers had claimed that there were instances of drunkenness among 
fans.270 As far as alcohol consumption was concerned, of the seventy-nine victims tested, 
fifty-eight had consumed either no alcohol or an amount that was negligible, fifteen had 
consumed more than 80 milligrams per cent (the legal drink-drive limit), and only six had 
consumed in excess of 120 milligrams per cent.271 The 2012 report by the Hillsborough 
Independent Panel would later point out that ‘the implicit and explicit use of a blood alcohol 
level of 80mg/100ml as a marker was unjustified. This level has relevance to the rapid 
response times of individuals in charge of motor vehicles, but none to people attending a 
leisure event.’272 
 
Alcohol was not a factor in the disaster. Taylor made this clear in his Interim Report: ‘I am 
satisfied on the evidence … that the great majority were not drunk or even the worse for 
drink … in my view some officers, seeking to rationalise their loss of control, overestimated 
the drunken element in the crowd.’273 The Report by the Hillsborough Independent Panel 
would go further: ‘there was no evidence to support the proposition that alcohol played any 
part in the genesis of the disaster and it is regrettable that those in positions of responsibility 
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created and promoted a portrayal of drunkenness as contributing to the occurrence of the 
disaster and the ensuing loss of life without substantiating evidence.’274   
 
The following day the front page of many Sunday papers showed horrific photographs of 
fans’ faces, some unconscious, some screaming, crushed against the perimeter fence, one 
of the many fences that had been erected in football grounds all over the country to prevent 
pitch invasions. Meanwhile, the death toll kept rising. Figures of ninety-three, then ninety-
four dead were reported, before eventually settling at ninety-five. Another fan, Tony Bland, 
was left in a persistent vegetative state as a result of being crushed.275 He could not think, 
speak, hear, or feel. His parents, Allan and Barbara Bland, pursued a lengthy court battle 
for Tony to be allowed to die in dignity. The High Court and then the Appeal Court ruled 
it lawful for Airedale NHS Trust to stop feeding their son, and the House of Lords gave 
their final ruling in February 1993 allowing feeding, hydration, and medication to be 
stopped.276 Tony Bland passed away peacefully on 3 March 1993 at Airedale General 
Hospital in Keighley, West Yorkshire, with his parents at his bedside, taking the final death 
toll of the Hillsborough disaster to ninety-six.277     
 
The youngest victim was Jon-Paul Gilhooley, who was ten years old. He was the cousin of 
Steven Gerrard, who went on to become a famous Liverpool player and captain of the team. 
Gerrard has fond memories of his cousin:  
I was nearly nine when Hillsborough took Jon-Paul from us. We were separated by a 
year and a bit in age but united in a passion for football. Jon-Paul adored Liverpool 
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with the same fervour that fills me whenever I pull on that red shirt. We were so alike. 
Similar Merseyside estates, similar interests. Jon-Paul joined in the kickabouts on the 
street outside my house in Huyton on the edge of Liverpool, proudly wearing his 
Liverpool strip. The club meant the world to Jon-Paul.278 
 
While police accounts of the tragedy differed from what fans saw, one of the tabloid 
newspapers offered a particularly lurid account. On Wednesday 19 April, The Sun, under 
the headline ‘The Truth’ and sub headlines stating that ‘some fans picked the pockets of 
victims’, ‘some fans urinated on the brave cops’, and ‘some fans beat up PC giving life 
kiss’, claimed that: ‘drunken Liverpool fans viciously attacked rescue workers as they tried 
to revive victims of the Hillsborough soccer disaster … police officers, firemen, and 
ambulance crew, were punched, kicked, and urinated upon by a hooligan element in the 
crowd. Some thugs rifled the pockets of injured fans as they were stretched out unconscious 
on the pitch.’279 
 
This journalism received a stern rebuke from Taylor. He stated that, ‘not a single witness 
was called before the Inquiry to support any of those allegations although every opportunity 
was afforded for any of the represented parties to have any witness called whom they 
wished … those who made them, and those who disseminated them, would have done better 
to hold their peace.’280 
 
What interests us here is the portrayal of football supporters. As the 1980s drew to a terrible 
close, The Sun was able to present football fans in such a light. In this way, it reflected the 
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preconceived notions about football fans clung to by the police and the authorities. During 
the years in which hooligans had been a problem there was a tendency by some to class all 
supporters as such and one can easily see this prejudice influencing such an article. Such 
coverage also played a role in sustaining this prejudice.  
 
A series of mini-inquests into the deaths were held in Sheffield town hall. The issue of 
blood alcohol levels played a prominent part.281 This confirmed the worst fears of the 
bereaved families because it fuelled the obsession with drunkenness evident in some of the 
tabloid newspapers. The inquests resumed in generic fashion on 19 November 1990 in 
Sheffield town hall. They ran to 28 March 1991 and took evidence from 230 witnesses. 
Immediately the coroner dropped a bombshell in announcing that no evidence would be 
heard concerning events after 3.15pm. His reasoning was that ‘those who died received the 
injuries that caused their death before 3.15pm, even if they lived beyond that time. His logic 
was that in each case there was no ‘intervening act’ (novus actus interveniens) that 
contributed to death.’282  
 
The families’ counsel, Tim King, argued that there had been no ‘investigation directed to 
the global organisation of what happened immediately after they [the dying and the injured] 
were brought off the terraces’ and ‘to ignore … concerns as to the adequacy of the attentions 
and the rescue efforts after 3.15’ amounted to failing to ‘investigate what could well have 
been a major reason for why somebody died and did not survive’.283 Therefore any evidence 
after that time, such as the times that ambulances arrived and the adequacy or otherwise of 
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emergency provision, was inadmissible. This meant that those who died did so irrespective 
of the amount of medical attention received or denied, and that those who survived also did 
so regardless of such attention. For this reason Scraton describes the cut-off time as ‘a 
defiant logic which defied reason’.284 The Report of the Hillsborough Independent Panel 
concluded that:  
 
the generic stage of the inquests, concerned exclusively with ‘how’ people died, was 
predicated on the assumption that the cause of death was common to all. What 
happened beyond 3.15pm … was considered inconsequential unless it could be 
demonstrated that another significant act contributed to an individual’s death … this 
reasoning eliminated examination of the emergency response, of the facilities, 
equipment or expertise available in such an emergency and of the proposition from 
eye witnesses that some who died could have been saved.285 
 
 
This meant that those concerned with rescue and administering medical treatment would 
not be called on to give evidence and that there would be no consideration of the 
circumstances surrounding each individual death, so the families would be unable to raise 
any questions left unanswered by the mini-inquests. Worst of all, it meant that victims were 
judged to have died inevitably ‘regardless of the treatment they received or deficiencies in 
planning which might have saved lives’.286  
 
The error in imposing the 3.15pm cut-off time was underlined by the case of survivor Eddie 
Spearitt. Spearitt, whose son Adam died in the disaster, collapsed at 3.06pm and was 
admitted to Northern General Hospital at 5pm, having no recollection of what had passed 
in the two hours between his collapse and admission to hospital. Spearitt was crushed, lost 
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consciousness, received no treatment for nearly two hours, and yet survived.287 His survival 
raises the possibility that some of those who died might have lived if they had been rescued 
earlier and given the right care and necessary treatment. The case of Eddie Spearitt ‘drove 
a horse and cart through the coroner’s decision to impose a 3.15pm cut-off on evidence 
heard by the inquest jury’.288 
 
Having suffered tragic loss, the bereaved families had also had to endure lies by the chief 
police officer, the unprecedented and intrusive decision by the coroner to take blood alcohol 
samples from their loved ones, and gross misrepresentation and distortion of the truth in 
sections of the tabloid press. Now they had to face bureaucracy.  The campaign to clear the 
names of the deceased and to get someone to take some responsibility for what had 
happened would continue for more than two decades. In the meantime, the key vehicle of 
the official response to Hillsborough was the Taylor Report.  
 
The Taylor Report and rebuilding football stadia  
On 17 April, the first working day after the disaster, it was announced that there would be 
an Inquiry. This would be led by the Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Taylor. The findings of this 
inquiry were detailed in an Interim Report, published in August 1989, and a Final Report, 
published in January 1990. The Interim Report was concerned mainly with exactly what 
happened on the day and has been quoted extensively above. The Final Report focussed 
more on recommendations for the future of the game and concerned itself with measures 
aimed at preventing a repeat of such a tragedy.  
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In giving evidence to the inquiry, Duckenfield was cross-examined by Mr. Benet Hytner 
QC regarding his lie about the gate. The cross-examination went as follows: 
 
Q. What I want to ask you is why in deciding to suppress the truth you also decided to 
tell a lie about the supporters, about the Liverpool fans. Why couldn’t you have simply 
said you did not know what happened?  
A. In the crisis of the moment, sir, with all those pressures that are so evident, I can’t 
give an honest answer other than the stress of the situation. 
Q. You realise do you, that that lie for which you cannot give an explanation, has 
caused widespread slandering of the fans not only here but also in Europe?  
A. My intention in my action, sir, was not to cause any distress. 
Q. Well, in that case, this is my last question, since that was not your intention, would 
you now take the opportunity of publicly exonerating the fans? 
A. Publicly exonerating the Liverpool supporters, sir? 
Q. Yes? 
A. For what exactly? 
Q. For the overcrowding behind the goal at the Leppings Lane end which caused 95 
deaths? 
A. I am in some difficulty with that answer, sir. I would apologise for any reference 
with Liverpool supporters as a whole.  
Q. Mr. Duckenfield, let me make it plain … I am asking you publicly to exonerate the 
fans for the overcrowding in pens 3 and 4 which caused 95 deaths. 
A. Yes, I publicly apologise, sir, for the inference that people caused those deaths.289 
 
Here we see a definite reluctance to exonerate Liverpool supporters and even when 
Duckenfield is pushed into doing so, he refers to ‘people’ rather than specifically to 
‘Liverpool supporters’.  
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The recommendations of the Final Report turned out to be broad and insightful. Taylor said 
of football: 
 
what is required is the vision and imagination to achieve a new ethos for football. 
Grounds should be upgraded. Attitudes should be more welcoming. The aim should 
be to provide more modern and comfortable accommodation, better and more varied 
facilities, more consultation with the supporters and more positive leadership. If such 
a policy is implemented it will not only improve safety. There will also be an 
improvement in behaviour, making crowd control easier.290  
 
Taylor went on to say that ‘there is no panacea which will achieve total safety and cure all 
problems of behaviour and crowd control. But I am satisfied that seating does more to 
achieve those objectives than any other single measure.’291 
 
His final recommendations started with the paragraphs that would change the spectator 
experience of English football forever: ‘The Secretary of State should ensure that spectators 
are admitted only to seated accommodation.’292 This was to apply from the start of the 
1993/1994 season at high-risk matches, from the start of 1994/1995 for all First Division 
and Second Division matches, and from the start of 1999/2000 at all other grounds.293 This 
last point would be waived by the FA and some grounds in the League’s bottom two 
divisions would retain standing areas well into the new millennium. Nevertheless, at the 
vast majority of grounds, and certainly all the major ones, the transformation of the fan 
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experience from standing at old football grounds to sitting in new football stadia got under 
way.  
 
A balanced assessment of the Taylor Report is given in When Saturday Comes. The article 
states that: ‘the report is a fair summary of many of the facts about safety at football grounds 
… Taylor exhibits what appears to be a good grasp of the sad state of the game.’294 It does, 
however, go on to say, ‘after Chapter One the report is a mixed bag. It is good at laying out 
evidence and arguments but the logical progression from assessment of fact and 
proscription of solution is sloppy and ill conceived.’295 Taylor was also woefully short with 
his estimate regarding cost, as will be detailed further below.  
 
The first experiment with all-seater stadia actually predated the Hillsborough disaster by 
eight years. In 1981, Coventry City converted their Highfield Road ground to seating only, 
with spectators paying for this on the day a minimum £5, which was more than twice the 
average admission price at the time. Attendances slumped, fans protested, and a sign 
addressed to chairman Jimmy Hill appeared, saying ‘COME ON, JIM. YOU SIT DOWN 
IF YOU WANT. WE DON’T! GIVE US THE OPTION, PLEASE.296 In 1983, the club 
reverted to allowing standing room for 2,000.297 The same was tried at Queen’s Park 
Rangers’ Loftus Road ground with similar results.298 One of the arguments against all-
seating was that attempts to introduce it in England had met with resistance from fans.299 
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However, the Hillsborough disaster now created the political will to force through major 
changes.  
 
One very important issue, however, was the cost of rebuilding. The bulk of funding for 
ground improvements had to come from the football clubs themselves.300 Further revenues 
could be raised by the clubs from sponsorship and advertising and from television 
broadcasting rights. Taylor commented that television companies ‘should be expected to 
pay a substantial price’ and that ‘the football authorities should ensure that this valuable 
source of revenue is directed towards improving stadia as a high priority’.301 The cost of 
providing covered seating had been investigated by the FA and their consultants produced 
a rough estimate (which of course had to be seen as being subject to inflation and other 
factors) of £30 million to install seating  throughout all the grounds, and a further £100 
million to provide cover for all those areas.302 In order to raise additional funds, Taylor 
suggested the possibility of the FA persuading the Pool Promoters Association to increase 
their contribution to the game, through a reduction in Pool Betting Tax, and that capital 
allowances should be able to be claimed against tax in respect of ground improvements.303  
 
The chancellor at the time was John Major, who would later become prime minister. He 
wanted to help football. He tells us: 
 
After an inquiry, Lord Justice Taylor had recommended some very expensive safety 
measures which only the top clubs could comfortably afford. I decided to cut Pools 
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Duty by 2.5 per cent for five years, provided the £100 million reduction in taxation 
was passed to the Football Trust for ground improvements. I wished to promote safety 
as well as more comfortable, less dilapidated grounds to attract families and deter 
hooligans.304 
 
Taylor has been criticised because his suggested methods of raising the necessary revenue 
were insufficient.305 He was also woefully short when using the FA’s figures to assess the 
amount itself. Between 1991 and 1999, £844 million would be spent by Premiership and 
League clubs on improving their grounds and facilities.306 Even allowing for inflation, the 
fact that the figure is six and a half times greater than that provided by Taylor indicates that 
he hugely underestimated the amount. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that most of the 
cost of this shortfall would be passed on to the ordinary fan, because the 1990s would see 
a massive increase in the cost of match tickets.  
  
Faced with the requirement to implement the Report, football clubs faced two main choices, 
either to rebuild their existing grounds, or to relocate to new sites and start afresh. In time, 
the rebuilt grounds would become unrecognisable from those that had stood largely 
unchanged for generations. The new grounds that were built were often on ‘out-of-town’ 
sites, away from urban centres. This was for two main reasons: firstly increased car 
ownership meant that fans could access these new sites more easily, and secondly, the high 
cost of land in town and city centres made it more economical to build new stadia some 
way out. Some clubs, with the help of local authorities, would move in an almost seamless 
transition, but for others the move would be much more problematic. In the case of Brighton 
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and Hove Albion, fourteen years would pass between the last game at the Goldstone Ground 
and the first game in the American Express Community Stadium. 
 
The first League club to relocate in modern times was Scunthorpe United, who, after eighty-
nine years at the Old Show Ground, moved to Glanford Park in August 1988. Fan opinion 
on Scunthorpe’s new home varied widely. The following comment appeared in a four page 
insert in the Darlington fanzine Mission Impossible: ‘I hate Scunthorpe. I hate their 
characterless concrete stadium’.307 However, a Peterborough United fan was more positive:  
 
To be fair, for a Third or Fourth division outfit the ground and facilities are great. The 
playing surface is excellent, the away terraces gave a good view, the bogs [sic] are 
clean and the catering is average. The ground is covered on all four sides and has 
executive boxes incorporated in the main stand. Both stands are compact to say the 
least and although the home and away ends look identical, the home end may be 
slightly bigger. These facts alone make it far better than most of the god forsaken [sic] 
holes that infest the lower divisions.308 
 
Vic Duke quotes this view from a Maidstone United fan: ‘and so a trip to a purpose-built 
fridge, in the middle of nowhere, in search of an away win! I won’t say too much about 
Scunthorpe United’s ‘purpose built stadium’; just put a roof on it and it would make a 
perfect superstore! But this is the future, like it or lump it’.309 With this fan’s obvious dislike 
of the ground, there is a sense of inevitability that similar stadiums will go up in the near 
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future. Thus it can be seen from these few examples that there was a wide difference of 
opinion among away fans regarding Glanford Park.   
 
During the next four years, two more clubs would relocate – Walsall (1990) and Chester 
City (1992) – and their old grounds, named Fellows Park and Sealand Road respectively, 
would, like Scunthorpe United’s old ground, be sold for the construction of supermarkets. 
This was what Duke termed ‘the supermarket imperative.’310 The wider social changes 
driving this phenomenon were, according to Duke, the growth in consumerism among those 
in employment and the substantial profits in the retail sector that this encouraged. This led 
to competition between supermarket chains for large plots of urban land.311 As some 
football clubs decided to build new grounds following the publication of Taylor’s Final 
Report the drives for supermarket construction and for football club relocation assisted each 
other.  
 
The next club to relocate to a new stadium was Millwall. Unlike the previous three 
examples the old ground was not sold for supermarket development but for housing 
construction. With the full backing of Lewisham Council, Millwall moved from The Den 
in Cold Blow Lane to a new site only about a quarter of a mile to the North. Millwall’s new 
ground has passed into common parlance as ‘The New Den’ to avoid confusion with the 
old one, but the respective grounds are listed in the Football Yearbook as ‘The Den, Cold 
Blow Lane’, and ‘The Den, Bermondsey’.312 Indeed, the seats in the South Stand, which is 
the home end of the new ground, are coloured to read ‘The Den’. This gives a sense of 
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continuity between old and new. The ground sits close to an incinerator, and between two 
of the four railway lines that converge before the approach to London Bridge. It is an area 
of ‘new housing estates, warehousing, and industrial estates’.313 However, the Football 
Fan’s Guide spoke highly of the ground itself: ‘the New Den is a striking new £16 million 
stadium, with excellent facilities for home and away supporters alike. The view from 
virtually every seat is first class and most visitors come away well impressed’.314 However, 
a different view of The New Den is offered by footballer and author Garry Nelson, who 
described it as being ‘computer-designed, state-of-the-art and, hence, characterless … its 
undeviating four-square symmetry lacks a human dimension, that sense of the past’315 
 
It would be unfair to single out The New Den alone, however, because Nelson’s criticisms 
could apply to almost all of the post-Taylor stadiums that would be built over the next few 
years (see Fig, 5 on p.109). Most of the stadiums lack character and individuality. That 
sense of local charm that existed at the old grounds has been lost. It would be possible to 
stand on the pitch at one of the new grounds and look around, and, aside from the club 
name, nickname, or initials, that are sometimes incorporated into the design of the banks of 
seats, you could be anywhere in the country. The writer Andrew Ward and the sports 
sociologist John Williams noted that ‘fans were concerned about production-line stadiums 
which added to clone-town feelings. Some fans saw them as part of an English trend 
towards placelessness’.316   
 
                                                          
313 Janet Williams and Mark Johnson, Football Fan’s Guide (London: CollinsWillow, 1996 edition), p.161.  
314 Ibid.  
315 Garry Nelson, Left Foot Forward (London: Headline, 1996 paperback edition), pp.321-322.  
316 Andrew Ward and John Williams, Football Nation: sixty years of the beautiful game (London: Bloomsbury, 
2010 paperback edition), p.309.  
115 
 
           Table 4. League Football Club relocations  
Football Club 
 
Old Ground New Ground Year  
Scunthorpe United Old Show Ground Glanford Park 1988 
Walsall Fellows Park Bescot Stadium 1990 
Chester City Sealand Road Deva Stadium 1992* 
Millwall The Den The ‘New’ Den 1993 
Northampton Town County Ground Sixfields Stadium 1994 
Huddersfield Town Leeds Road Alfred McAlpine 
Stadium 
1994 
Middlesbrough Ayresome Park Riverside Stadium  1995 
Derby County Baseball Ground Pride Park  1997 
Sunderland Roker Park Stadium of Light 1997 
Bolton Wanderers Burnden Park Reebok Stadium 1997 
Stoke City Victoria Ground Britannia Stadium 1997 
Reading Elm Park Madejski Stadium 1998 
Southampton The Dell St. Mary Stadium 2001 
Hull City Boothferry Park Kingston Communications 
Stadium 
2002 
Leicester City Filbert Street Walkers Stadium 2002 
Manchester City Maine Road City of Manchester 
Stadium  
2003 
Coventry City Highfield Road Ricoh Arena** 2005 
Swansea City Vetch Field Liberty Stadium 2005 
Arsenal Highbury Emirates Stadium 2006 
Doncaster Rovers Belle Vue Keepmoat Stadium 2007 
Shrewsbury Town Gay Meadow New Stadium  2007 
Milton Keynes Dons National Hockey 
Stadium 
Stadium: mk 2007 
Colchester United Layer Road Weston Homes 
Community Stadium  
2008 
Cardiff City Ninian Park Cardiff City Stadium 2009 
Chesterfield Saltergate B2net Stadium 2010 
Brighton and Hove 
Albion 
Goldstone Ground American Express 
Community Stadium 
2011*** 
Rotherham United Millmoor New York Stadium 2012**** 
Original names of new stadiums given. Some names would later change in sponsorship deals. 
Table includes only those clubs who were in the Premier League or Football League at the time of 
the move.  
*Chester City entered a groundshare at Macclesfield Town’s Moss Rose ground 1990-1992  
**Coventry City entered a groundshare with Northampton Town between 2013 and 2015 due to a 
dispute with the owners of the Ricoh Arena  
***Brighton and Hove Albion entered a groundshare at Gillingham’s Priestfield Stadium for two 
seasons and then played at Withdean, an athletics stadium in Brighton, 1999-2011.  
**** Rotherham United entered a groundshare for four years at the Don Valley Stadium in 
Sheffield 
Source: www.footballgroundguide.com last accessed 17 January 2014, and eds. Rollin and Rollin, 
Football Yearbook 2008-2009.   
116 
 
       Table 5. Stadium sponsors  
Sponsor Club Original/previous 




Brighton and Hove 
Albion 
 
Britannia Stoke City   
Emirates Arsenal  
Greenhaus  Shrewsbury Town New Meadow,  
then the Prostar Stadium 
Ipro Derby County Pride Park 
John Smith’s Huddersfield Town Alfred MacAlpine 
Stadium, then the 
Galpharm Stadium 
KC  Hull City Kingston 
Communications 
Stadium  
King Power Leicester City Walkers Stadium  
Liberty Swansea City  
Macron Bolton Wanderers Reebok Stadium 
Proact Chesterfield b2net Stadium  
Ricoh Coventry City   
Weston 
Homes 
Colchester United  
       Source: www.footballgroundguide.com last accessed 17 January 2014, and various club websites.  
 
Football clubs soon realised that one important source of revenue could be stadium 
sponsorship. Therefore at some clubs lucrative deals have been struck for naming rights. 
This means that Highbury, Burnden Park, and Highfield Road, were replaced by the 
Emirates Stadium, the Reebok Stadium, and the Ricoh Arena, at Arsenal, Bolton 
Wanderers, and Coventry City respectively. This encapsulates the shift from local ties to 
big business that has been experienced throughout football generally. Stadium sponsorship 
deals also raise the possibility that some grounds will change their names as new deals are 
struck. This has already happened. For example, Huddersfield Town’s ‘Alfred McAlpine’ 
Stadium became the Galpharm Stadium and then the John Smith’s Stadium, Manchester 
City’s ‘City of Manchester’ Stadium became the Etihad Stadium, and Derby County’s Pride 
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Park became the Ipro Stadium.317 There is also the possibility of stadiums changing name 
as a result of corporate deals involving the sponsor that are unrelated to football. This 
happened to Chesterfield’s stadium due to the acquisition of b2net by Proact, and to Hull 
City’s when Kingston Communications became part of a larger KC group. 
 
The Fans’ Experience – Football’s New Respectability?  
What about the atmosphere? The first point to be made is that many football fans felt a deep 
affection for the old grounds, or even the part of terracing or stand where they spectated 
from. This was acknowledged by Taylor: ‘the first [argument to retain a proportion of 
standing room] is an emotional one, based on a desire to retain the traditional culture 
derived from the close contact of the terraces. “My grandfather stood here; my father stood 
here with me; why shouldn’t I stand here with my son?” is a commonly expressed view.318 
He continues: 
to many young men, the camaraderie of singing together, jumping up and down, 
responding in unison to the naming of the players, their emergence on to the pitch, the 
scoring of a goal, an unpopular decision – all of these are an integral part of enjoying 
the match. They like to be part of an amorphous seething crowd and do not wish to 
have each his own place in a seat.319 
 
Thus it can be seen, and certainly Taylor claimed, that many fans had an affinity for the 
terraces and a strong attachment to the grounds that they attended, sometimes with their 
families for generations. Some football grounds had stands or areas of terracing, usually 
behind one of the goals, that became famous for passionate vocal support and sheer noise 
– Arsenal fans had the North Bank at Highbury, Liverpool fans the (Spion) Kop at Anfield, 
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and Manchester United fans the Stretford End at Old Trafford. Other less famous clubs had 
their own equivalents. At the start of a match the players would emerge from the tunnel to 
be hit by a wall of noise. The sound generated was what was known as ‘the atmosphere’ 
and many old grounds had it in abundance.  
 
Huddersfield Town fan Steve Wilson reminisces about his club’s old ground: 
 
Leeds Road was typically run-down … the smallest and most distinctive stand was to 
be found next to Leeds Road itself. The Cowshed. So called because of the barrel-
shaped iron roof above the terrace, threatening to crumble and fall for as long as I 
stood underneath it, and probably before. The Cowshed was the beating heart of the 
ground on match days. Despite being rarely full, the sound felt deafening.320 
 
He describes the last game there: ‘The Cowshed was full and for 90 minutes the place 
looked like it was supposed to. Decrepit and decaying, but the home of my modest 
dreams.’321 
 
Because of the piecemeal way in which football grounds had been constructed, they each 
had their own unique characteristics. Some had stands or areas of terracing named after an 
adjacent road or a local benefactor, and advertisement hoardings around the pitch 
sometimes promoted the products of local businesses. These factors served to give each 
ground a flavour and feel that was local to its area. The sociologist Ian Taylor made the 
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point that the football ground was an ‘emblem of locality’.322 As the geographer John Bale 
put it, ‘it is difficult to find anything other than the national sport which so readily provides 
a sense of place-pride. No other regularised ritual exists to project a place-name to a national 
audience each week.’323 This was particularly important in cities such as Sheffield and 
Liverpool where the decline of manufacturing and industry in the 1980s left a void. A focus 
on the local football team and its ground could go some way to filling that void and restoring 
a sense of civic pride.  
 
Immediately after the disaster at Hillsborough, fans of Liverpool and Nottingham Forest, 
along with the fans of host club Sheffield Wednesday, and Liverpool’s neighbours and 
rivals Everton, came to pay their respects. As mentioned earlier, both Hillsborough and 
Anfield took on the role of temporary shrines as many fans came to lay flowers, wreaths, 
and football memorabilia such as scarves, rosettes, and football programmes.324 A similar 
thing would happen at West Ham United’s Upton Park ground in 1993 following the death 
of West Ham and England legend Bobby Moore after he lost his battle with cancer, and at 
Chelsea’s Stamford Bridge ground in 1996 after the death of Chelsea director Matthew 
Harding.325 In this context, the football ground could take on an almost religious 
significance and become a ‘sacred place’.326 
 
                                                          
322 Ian Taylor, ‘English Football in the 1990s: taking Hillsborough seriously?’, in eds. Williams and Wagg, 
British Football, p.5.  
323 John Bale, ‘Playing At Home: British Football and a sense of place’, in eds. Williams and Wagg, British 
Football, pp.135-136.  
324 Ian Taylor, ‘English Football in the 1990s: taking Hillsborough seriously?’ in eds. Wiliams and Wagg, 
British Football, p.4.  
325 Matthew Taylor, Association Game, p.351.  
326 Ibid.  
120 
 
Taylor had claimed that: ‘watching the more boisterous and demonstrative sections at all-
seater grounds I have noted no absence of concerted singing, chanting, clapping, or 
gesticulating in unison. The communal spirit is still there and finds ready expression’.327 
However, Taylor has been proved wrong on this point. With the exception of games where 
passions are running high, such as at a local derby or a crucial match, the new stadiums are 
noticeably quieter than the old football grounds were. Nelson compared Millwall’s old 
ground to The New Den: ‘I always quite enjoyed playing there [The Den]. The hostility of 
the home fans may have been total – but at least they were creating an atmosphere you 
could react to and play off.’328 By contrast: ‘[The New Den is] impersonal, it’s a stadium 
people can forget themselves in … perhaps it is The New Den’s lack of character … that is 
responsible for the disastrously low gates Millwall have experienced this season 
[1994/1995]’.329 Nelson is not alone in this observation. Matthew Bazell describes going to 
an FA Cup tie between Arsenal and Cardiff City: 
 
When you arrive late at football matches nowadays, it can feel like you’re a latecomer 
to the theatre or the cinema. The row of people that you ask to get up from their seats 
look unhappy to have been disturbed during the performance. Once in my seat, I 
noticed two fans a couple of rows in front of me having a conversation about the game. 
They were virtually whispering and it didn’t sound anything more than a typical 
discussion on how the game was going. So why were they whispering? Perhaps 
because the modern football crowd is so quiet that they didn’t want the surrounding 




Ed Horton, in his observations on the changes in football, comments: 
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Many observers have noticed that the crowd is getting quieter. The chanting is less 
frequent, less wholehearted. At some grounds, the fans have even started to demand 
that clubs create new ‘singing areas’. The very fact that they need to ask for them 
speaks for itself. All-seater stadia are among the reasons for the silence of the crowd. 
Certainly compulsory seating cramps the lungs, it dissipates the collective feeling of 
the crowd, it prevents its coalescence … at Old Trafford supporters have been thrown 
out for having the temerity to stand up for a while and sing.331  
 
Conn describes being late for a game there: ‘I’m waiting now for the first roars … so far 
there’s nothing … even down Matt Busby Way … to right under the bowels of the main 
stand, not a sound. There are 55,000 people sitting on the other side of the wall and you 
could hear a programme drop’.332 Admittedly, Old Trafford is a rebuilt ground rather than 
a new one, but the criticism is still valid because the claim applies to all-seater stadia, 
whether it happens to be an old ground rebuilt or a new ground.  
 
Many of Manchester United’s own supporters were not happy about this lack of sound. A 
group called the Independent Manchester United Supporters Association complained about, 
among other things, the sterile atmosphere ‘in the wake of the ground’s redevelopment and 
transformation into what was, in effect, a giant, heavily policed open-air TV studio where 
supporters were expected to behave as though they were an invited studio audience’.333 This 
criticism is aimed at broader topics than the simple fact of sitting, such as commercialisation 
and media presentation, but here the seated crowd is presented as an integral part of what 
was a new experience.   
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Another concern was the financial cost to fans of having to pay to sit rather than stand. 
Taylor observed that: ‘spectators do not want to pay and, it is argued, many could not pay 
the substantially higher price of a seat as against the cost of standing’.334 He acknowledged 
that clubs may well wish to charge more for seats but commented ‘it should be possible to 
plan a price structure which suits the cheapest seats to the pockets of those presently paying 
to stand. At Ibrox [Rangers’ ground], for example, seating is £6, standing £4 – not a 
prohibitive price or differential’.335 However, as clubs implemented the Report it soon 
became apparent that this suggestion was unrealistic for two main reasons: firstly, the cost 
of rebuilding, which Taylor had grossly underestimated; secondly, spectators having to sit 
meant that fewer could be admitted than if they were standing. Therefore the 
recommendation to plan a reasonable price structure was ignored, with the result that the 
1990s, which from 1993 onwards was a time of low inflation and economic growth, saw a 
massive hike in the price of match tickets and admission fees. Between 1989 and 1999, the 
average price of an adult ticket rose from £4.03 to £17.42, an increase of 331 per cent. 
During the same period the rate of inflation in the economy measured by the retail price 
index rose by 54.8 per cent.336 The following table shows the increase in admission prices 
covering the six seasons between 1989/1990, the season after the Hillsborough disaster, and 
1994/1995, and covers the clubs in the Premier League during the 1994/1995 season.  
 
The two clubs with the biggest percentage increase were those that enjoyed the most success 
during the period, which suggests that they used that fact to pass the cost on to their fans. 
Manchester United, who won the title for both of the Premiership’s first two seasons, more  
                                                          
334 HMSO, Taylor Final Report, p.13.  
335 Ibid.  
336 These are the figures quoted by the Football Task Force, more of which in chapter 4. Richard Faulkner, ‘The 
Legacy Of The Football Task Force’, Soccer & Society, vol. 1, No. 3, 2000, p.40.  
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Table 6. Increases in admission prices at clubs who were in the Premier  











Arsenal 6.71 11.92 77.6 
Aston Villa 5.39 9.72 80.3 
Blackburn Rovers 3.64 10.15 178.8 
Chelsea 7.30 13.48 84.7 
Coventry City 5.72 9.25 61.7 
Crystal Palace 6.15 12.50 103.3 
Everton 4.79 9.71 102.7 
Ipswich Town 4.05 9.03 122.9 
Leeds United 4.27 9.07 112.4 
Leicester City 4.35 10.08 131.7 
Liverpool 5.41 10.89 101.3 
Manchester City 3.94 7.87 99.7 
Manchester United 4.71 16.06 240.9 
Newcastle United 4.50 12.48 177.3 
Norwich City 5.26 9.41 78.9 
Nottingham Forest 5.18 9.10 75.7 
Queen’s Park Rangers 5.82 9.39 61.3 
Sheffield Wednesday 4.50 9.17 103.8 
Southampton 4.97 11.95 140.4 
Tottenham Hotspur 6.55 14.25 117.5 
West Ham United 6.15 11.26 83.1 
Wimbledon 5.77 9.08 57.3 
 
Source: King, End Of The Terraces, p.135. King lists as his sources The Football Trust, Digest of Football 
Statistics 1990/91, London (1991), p.28 and The Football Trust, Digest of Football Statistics 1994/95, London 
(1996), p.30. I checked the British Library. I found the 1991 edition, but they do not have the 1996 edition. 
The figures for 1989/1990 are incorrectly listed by King as being for 1988/1989, but otherwise they are 
correct. In the circumstances I am relying on his accuracy for the 1994/1995 figures. King’s table shows 29 
clubs, and purports to show the clubs who played in the top division during the seasons in question. However, 
Notts County are not included although they were in the First Division for 1991/1992, and Bolton Wanderers 
are included, although they were not in the top division for any season during the period. For this reason I 
streamlined my list to show only the 22 clubs who were in the Premier League in 1994/1995.  
 
than trebled their average admission price. Blackburn Rovers nearly trebled theirs, 
coinciding with their rise from obscurity to Premiership champions. Close behind 
Blackburn were Newcastle United, whose large increase is partly explained by the fact that 
they were promoted to the Premiership at the end of 1992/1993 and finished as high as third 
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at the first time of asking.  Taking the clubs as a whole, of the twenty-two clubs listed 
twelve more than doubled their average admission price during the period.  
 
This inflation continued into the new millennium. In 2002/2003, tickets to watch Arsenal 
ranged from £23.50 to £43.50 and in 2003/2004 from £26 to £48.337 In 2002/2003 Chelsea, 
along with some other Premiership clubs, categorised their prices according to the quality 
of opposition. A Category A match (i.e. against the best opposition), ranged from £35 to 
£55. The following season they operated three categories. Games against Arsenal, 
Liverpool, Manchester United, and Tottenham Hotspur were all Category AA, and ticket 
prices for those games ranged from £43 to £67.338 Alan Fisher, sociologist and Tottenham 
Hotspur supporter, argued: ‘the price alienates the traditional support at football. Football’s 
never been purely and completely a working-class sport, but it was a working man’s game, 
and I think that over a period of time the high prices have meant that people cannot go and 
see the game and now, a generation on, we’re seeing youngsters who are unable to go to 
the game on a regular basis.’339  
 
The social scientist Kevin Dixon, however, challenges the view that ‘capitalist exploitation’ 
is something new, because it fails to take into account ‘the continuity that exists across time 
and space in relation to consumption.’340 In his view, football fans have always been 
consumers as part of a wider ‘commercial enlightenment’ from the late nineteenth century 
                                                          
337 Arsenal fixture lists 2002/2003 and 2003/2004. Obtained from Highbury ticket office on 17 July 2003.  
338 Chelsea fixture list for 2003/2004 and verbal information obtained from Stamford Bridge ticket office on 17 
July 2003.  
339 Alan Fisher, interview with the author, Tonbridge, 11 June 2015.  
340 Kevin Dixon, Consuming Football In Late Modern Life (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), p. 9.  
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onwards, indicating continuity rather than change. The difference is that once ‘this was 
minimal and concealed to the naked eye – now, in late modern life it is simply “naked”’.341  
 
It is worth mentioning at this point the social composition of the football crowd. There has 
been a drift from a working-class crowd to a middle-class one who can afford such prices, 
but at the same time, the crowd has got older. The teenagers of the 1970s and 1980s who 
paid a small amount to enter are now middle-aged adults and because of this many earn the 
level of salary that can accommodate the large increases in ticket price. They have grown 
into adulthood with the game and fewer teenagers are coming along behind them. This is 
an important factor that is often overlooked. Elevation in social class is hard to quantify, 
but it appears to have happened simultaneously with stadiums getting safer and more 
comfortable, which is of course a major contributory factor towards it.  
 
The changes in football’s audience driven by such financial dynamics were also caused by 
other factors in this period. Indeed, the paradox is that the revival from football’s low point 
of the mid-1980s continued despite the Hillsborough disaster and its consequences. This 
was due partly to the achievements of the England international team in the 1990 World 
Cup finals, when, under Bobby Robson, they reached the semi-finals and only lost by the 
narrowest of margins to West Germany. England started off slowly, with draws against the 
Republic of Ireland and then Holland before securing a 1-0 win over Egypt for a place in 
the knock-out stage. In the second round England beat Belgium 1-0 in the last minute of 
extra time with a goal from David Platt that was set up by a Paul Gascoigne free-kick. 
England’s quarter-final opponents were Cameroon, who had proved the surprise team of 
                                                          
341 Ibid., p.10.  
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the tournament, beating holders Argentina in the opening match. Again, the game went to 
extra time before England won 3-2. This set up a semi-final clash against West Germany. 
The Germans were fortunate to take the lead when Andreas Brehme’s free kick was 
deflected into the goal by Paul Parker. However, Parker made amends by supplying Gary 
Lineker with the cross from which he scored the equaliser. With no goals in extra time the 
game was decided on penalties, which West Germany won due to misses by Chris Waddle 
and Stuart Pearce.342 Despite this disappointment it was England’s best showing in the 
World Cup since winning the trophy in 1966.  
 
England’s appearance in the tournament had been marketed to an audience that was more 
middle-class than before. Matthew Taylor comments: 
 
 most significant was the way in which Italia ’90 was represented by the media and 
experienced as a television event. The BBC’s decision to link football with ‘high’ 
culture through use of Pavarotti’s rendition of Puccini’s  ‘Nessun dorma’ aria as the 
theme tune of its coverage was a conscious attempt, some have argued, to appeal to 
those social groups who had previously shown little interest in the game.343 
 
The official pop record for the tournament also demonstrated a shift in style and approach. 
The official England single was New Order’s World In Motion and it represented a genuine 
breakthrough from the unfashionable ‘football record’. Rather than the staple diet of records 
with singalong choruses released to coincide with World Cup or FA Cup final appearances, 
World In Motion merged the worlds of football and electric technopop and gained critical 
                                                          
342 Nawrat and Hutchings, Sunday Times Illustrated History, pp. 310 – 311.  
343 Matthew Taylor, Association Game, pp.363-364.  
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acclaim in so doing. The song helped take the game itself to a wider audience, making it 
more respectable and increasingly fashionable.344 
 
The fact that England progressed as far as the semi-finals also helped to expand football’s 
popularity to the middle classes that were deliberately being engaged by the football 
authorities and the media with the competition. Also assisting with this was the fact that 
England midfielder Paul Gascoigne, or ‘Gazza’ as he became commonly known, was one 
of the players of the tournament. Gascoigne’s ability on the pitch was beyond question 
because he could draw on a number of different skills to create scoring opportunities for 
teammates or for himself. But it was more than this that turned him into a household name, 
and arguably the most famous footballer since George Best. He was known for his practical 
jokes, thus revealing the persona of a mischievous schoolboy. Irving Scholar was the 
chairman of Tottenham Hotspur who signed Gascoigne from Newcastle United in 1988. In 
his autobiography he says of him: 
 
[He has] the instincts of a teenager who can never stop playing pranks. Bobby Robson 
… called him ‘daft as a brush’, and Gazza responded by turning up to the next England 
practice match with a brush tucked under his shirt. Sometime later, when there was a 
great deal of Press speculation about his contract, he turned up at the training ground 
with a £50 note sellotaped to his forehead and trained the whole morning in that 
manner … what singled out Gascoigne was that he carried on such childlike activities 
all the time. Bored by standing in the Tottenham reception, he would superglue all the 
phones together, or when he was staying at the Swallow Hotel in Hertfordshire … he 
let off the fire extinguisher at 3am … Gascoigne was twenty-one going on eleven.345 
 
 
                                                          
344 Ibid. p.366.  
345 Scholar, Behind Closed Doors, pp.56-57.  
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He also showed his vulnerability when, after receiving a booking during the semi-final 
against West Germany, which meant that he could not play in the final should England 
reach it, tears streamed down his cheeks. His sense of humour and vulnerability were 
characteristics which the home audience could relate to.  
 
The fanzine literature which commenced in 1986 with the publication of the first issue of 
When Saturday Comes continued as most clubs had fans who produced their own fans’ 
magazine. Fanzines were unofficial and completely independent of football clubs. For that 
reason they were free to pass comment and opinion in a way that officially sanctioned 
publications could not. Therefore they were outspoken, direct and displayed robust humour. 
This humour is indicated by some of the titles, such as at Queen’s Park Rangers, whose 
nickname is ‘the Rs’; fans produced A Kick Up The Rs. At Northampton Town, whose 
nickname is ‘The Cobblers’, fans published What A Load Of Cobblers, and Fulham fans 
could not resist the title There’s Only One F In Fulham. Some fans poked fun at their own 
club’s misfortune, such as the Brighton and Hove Albion fans who produced And Smith 
Must Score. This was named after the commentator’s words in the dying seconds of extra 
time in the 1983 FA Cup final between Brighton and Manchester United. With the score at 
2-2, Gordon Smith, with the ball at his feet and the goal at his mercy, had a golden 
opportunity to win Brighton the FA Cup. He missed and Brighton lost the replay 4-0. 
Fanzines could also take on a political role as in some instances they became a mouthpiece 
for fan protest. The Charlton Athletic fanzine Voice of the Valley was important in the 
campaign to return the club to The Valley:  
 
We have compared being at Selhurst to a prison sentence before, but there is one 
respect in which it is an imprecise comparison. The vast majority of prisoners do not 
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serve an indefinite sentence and thus are able to look forward to the day of their 
release. At present Charlton supporters have no such prospect and that contributes 
massively to their demoralisation. Secondly … the lack of information creates the 
impression … that nothing whatever is going on … thirdly, every match we play at 
Selhurst Park weakens our roots in Bexley and Greeenwich and diminishes the 
prospects for the club when it returns to the area.346 
 
The previous issue had advertised for sale Official Detour T-Shirts bearing on the front the 
slogan ‘We Couldn’t Give A **** For Selhurst’ and on the back ‘details of the detour, 
listing such world-famous venues as Crystal Palace Parade, Catford Town Hall, and even 
The Valley, all with appropriate timings.’347 The April 1989 issue, when news had arrived 
that the club would definitely be returning to The Valley, was entitled ‘Victory Issue’ and 
included a chronology of developments in the history of the campaign.348 
 
The Queen’s Park Rangers fanzine A Kick Up The R’s similarly became an important voice 
of protest against the planned merger of Queen’s Park Rangers and Fulham in 1987: 
 
Queen’s Park Rangers it was announced would, at the end of the season, be merged 
with Fulham. End of story. No question. No Discussion. No arguments against. 
Thankfully, supporters from both clubs were not prepared to accept this so lightly, and 
it was their impassioned response that helped sway the decision of the Football League 
Management Committee not to sanction the m****r.349 
 
The Fulham fanzine There’s Only One F In Fulham played a similar role on behalf of their 
supporters.350 
                                                          
346 ‘Editorial – How Much Longer?’, Voice Of The Valley, No.10, March 1989, p2.  
347 ‘The Official Detour T-Shirt’, Voice Of The Valley, No. 9, February 1989, p.32.  
348 ‘How The Battle Was Fought’, Voice Of The Valley, No.11, April 1989, p.24.  
349 ‘You’ll Never Walk Alone (With A M****r)’, A Kick Up The R’s, Issue 1, August/September 1987.  
350 Matthew Taylor, Association Game, p.371.  
130 
 
It was perhaps inevitable that the fanzine culture would in turn lead to an outpouring of 
literature in terms of books. In 1989, Steaming In by Colin Ward was published. Subtitled 
‘the journal of a football fan’, Ward describes his escapades following Arsenal, Chelsea 
and England.351 The book is more about the ‘aggro’ than the football, but this in turn would 
pave the way for a number of hooligan autobiographies, such as the writings of Cass 
Pennant.352 However, the most important book was Nick Hornby’s Fever Pitch. Therein 
Hornby describes with great clarity his obsession with Arsenal, contrasting with the 
mundanity of suburban life and his parents’ break-up, from the age of 11 onwards.353 As a 
university student at Cambridge he also describes some visits to Cambridge United.354 
Fever Pitch is in parts moving and at other times funny. It became a best-seller and was 
made into a play and a film. According to Matthew Taylor, ‘football’s new respectability 
was consolidated’ by Fever Pitch.355 A blizzard of literature followed as players, managers, 
and media personalities connected with the game wrote autobiographies. It became 
acceptable for academics to study football and its wider social and cultural implications, 
such as the research being carried out at De Montfort University in Leicester and at the 
University of Liverpool. At a time of massive inflation in terms of ticket prices, this 
contributed to the game becoming middle-class rather than working-class.  
 
The commonly held view is that as football became more commercial, boosted by 
England’s achievements in the 1990 World Cup and fresh revenues from satellite television 
                                                          
351 Colin Ward, Steaming In, pp.44–175.  
352 Cass Pennant is author of Congratulations You Have Just Met The I.C.F. (London: John Blake, 2003) and 
Cass (London: John Blake, 2008). He also co-wrote Want Some Aggro (London: John Blake, 2002), Rolling 
With The 6.57 Crew (London: John Blake, 2004), Terrace Legends (London: John Blake, 2005), and Good 
Afternoon, Gentlemen, The Name Is Bill Gardner (London: John Blake, 2006). 
353 Hornby, Fever Pitch, pp.9-28, 32-35, 38-46, 47-70, 73-95, 100-104, 106-109, 111-140, 141-143, 146-148, 
152-153, 157-200, 204-242, and 245-247.  
354 Hornby, Fever Pitch, pp.95-100, 104-106, 109-111, and 149-151.  
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companies, its audience changed from predominantly working-class men to socially diverse 
consumers who, adorned in expensive replica football shirts, took their seats in the new all-
seater stadiums. This shift from ‘authentic’ to ‘inauthentic’ is outlined by Matthew Taylor 
as being from ‘loyal, local, and anti-commercial’ to ‘fickle, non-local, and consumerist’.356 
This view is reflected as Giulianotti talks about the ‘post-fan’ in the new era. The ‘post-fan’ 
had a disapproving view of those who control football and were often active in the 
production of fanzines and the organisation of supporters’ movements. Better educated than 
most other fans, the ‘post-fan’ was middle-class in background and employed in sales, 
marketing, the media, or similar professions. There is no suggestion that the ‘post-fan’ 
replaced the traditional fan but instead emerged alongside them.357 
 
The emergence of the ‘post-fan’ was a phenomenon that was partly driven by advances in 
technology. By the end of the 1980s the computer was becoming an important part of office 
life and many had access to one. Therefore it was possible to print fanzines and leaflets in 
a way that had not happened before. Fans employed in such places who wished to air their 
views now had a means by which to do so. King divides the ‘new consumption of football’ 
into ‘the lads’, ‘new football writing’ and ‘the new consumer fans’. He points out that the 
reaction of the lads, and the producers and consumers of new football writing to the 
developments in football during the 1990s form ‘a complex and textured pattern of 
resistance and consent.’358 This statement acknowledges the paradox that fanzine writers 
oppose the commercialisation of football on one hand but on the other have contributed to 
its marketing to a wider audience themselves. Interestingly, the traditional fan and the 
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fanzine-writing ‘post-fan’ both share the view that the football fan should not be reduced 
to a ‘customer’, and the appearance of fanzines demonstrated that the nature of fan support 
was wider and more complex than the somewhat one-dimensional view of the free-market 
customer.359 More women started to attend football. Kirsty Stewart is a Chelsea fan. She 
commented on the development of ‘better, safer stadiums with a less intimidating 
atmosphere’, saying that they are ‘more inviting for women and children to attend’. Do 
more women attend as a result? ‘Most definitely’, it is a more pleasant experience for 
women now because stadiums are ‘safer and more comfortable’.360  
 
The diversification of the nature of the 1990s football supporter also needs to be seen in the 
context of an increase in the relevance of the leisure industry as a whole. The construction 
of leisure centres in the 1980s encouraged people to become more conscious about health 
and fitness with the result that they took up sport and exercise in increasing numbers. This 
trend was helped by a national campaign entitled ‘Ever Thought of Sport?’, aimed at young 
people to encourage them to take up a variety of sports. The public therefore gradually 
became consumers of sportswear and sporting accessories as manufacturers saw a ready 
market that could be tapped. This led to the expansion of sports retail stores such as JD 
Sport and Sports Direct. Sports gear became fashionable, and this is one explanation for the 
growth in the popularity of the replica football shirt. The 1990s football fan was a part of, 
or at least influenced by, the growth of numbers participating in sport and leisure activity. 
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These developments coincided with, and were partly responsible for, the large decline in 
the number of incidents of hooliganism at football matches. There are as many reasons for 
the decline in football violence as there were for the existence of the phenomenon in the 
first place, but let us consider briefly the main ones for its decline. Undoubtedly the arrival 
of all-seater stadia played a large part, as Taylor had intended that it would: ‘seating has 
distinct advantages in achieving crowd control … with the assistance of CCTV the police 
can immediately zoom in with a camera and pinpoint the seats occupied by the trouble-
makers as well as the trouble-makers themselves. Moreover, if numbered tickets are issued 
to named purchasers, the police have a further aid to identifying miscreants.’361   
 
With the anonymity of standing on the terraces gone, fans had to give details of their name, 
and sometimes their addresses, to clubs in order to purchase tickets. Any fan with intentions 
of bad behaviour now realised that they could be identified much more easily. There was 
also a broader cultural shift at work. The revival of youth culture in the shape of mods, 
rockers, and skinheads, and the bank holiday battles between them, at the cusp of the 1970s 
and 1980s had kept youth violence, and therefore indirectly soccer hooliganism, on the 
media’s agenda. Trouble was a fact of life for young people during those years. The early 
1980s were a time of mass unemployment, especially among young people, but by the end 
of the decade this had improved. Gloom and despondency were replaced by a more positive 
atmosphere as a new generation of teenagers and young people invented ‘acid house’ and 
the whole ‘rave’ culture. As Steve Redhead observes:  
 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the football terraces, then, experienced their own 
‘summer of love’ which had been evident earlier at clubs like Manchester’s Hacienda 
                                                          
361 HMSO, Taylor Final Report, p.12.  
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and London’s Shoom. The carnivalesque – even surrealist – nature of transformation 
in football culture was first symbolised by the inflatables craze started by Manchester 
City fans and their blown-up bananas, and speedily followed by virtually every other 
club (from Oldham Athletic’s yard dogs to Grimsby Town’s haddocks).362 
 
 
The new music scene originating in Manchester with bands such as the Stone Roses and 
the Happy Mondays spawned the mood to party rather than fight. The use of ecstasy was 
integral to this new atmosphere but as far as football was concerned some of its young 
followers were intent on having a party and loving each other at raves, so why fight each 
other at football? In an interview published in Melody Maker on the release of their single 
‘All Together Now’, Peter Hooton of Liverpool band The Farm was asked if the decrease 
in the amount of violence at soccer matches over the last couple of seasons was a direct 
result of Acid House. He replied, ‘Yeah, I’d say that’s definitely true. It’s like the way that 
all of the clans came together at the Happy Mondays’ party the other night … a couple of 
years ago there’d have been a really bad atmosphere between groups of lads from 
Liverpool, Manchester, London, this city, that city,  but that’s unthinkable now’.363 It 
simply became ‘uncool’ to be a thug.  
 
There was a whole new fashion associated with this trend. Redhead quotes from Manchester 
art magazine Avant in their guide for ’Sensually Right On Supporters’ where they 
distinguish between ‘new wave’ and ‘dinosaur’ fans in an ins/outs style. Avant suggested 
that the ‘new wave’ fan had: 
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1. long centre parting or short two-dimensional (not skin or perm) 
2. t-shirts Baggy (club shirts/slogans/James/Stone Roses/Happy Mondays etc.) not Lacoste, 
Perry, Union Jack, Gazza/England/tight fit        
3. parallel jeans or frayed flares/tracksuit bottoms Baggy not tight fit stonewash/drainpipes    
4. Puma trainers/kickers/lilac suede boots not brogues, Doc Martens, huge tongue trainers     
5. Pin badges/bracelets/crystals not scarves/tattoos/Rangers hats 
6. fanzines/obscure flags not official programmes, bricks and cans  
7. cannabis not beer or lager 
8. other team – Cameroon not Rangers or Celtic  
9. Blue Moon/blissed up not Here We Go  
 
 
While some of the above was localised on Manchester and with an eye on the global 
attention given to the ‘Madchester’ music scene at the time, it is even so a reflection of the 
changing nature of football and youth culture in England in the early 1990s.364 
 
John Williams, however, urges that this view should be tempered. He states:  
 
the Manchester and music thing has been important, but it has also been overplayed 
… the music/rave/warehouse party scene has been important, too, for rather more 
prosaic reasons. The loss of Europe to English football cut into the profit around the 
spectator scene … the party economy, by way of contrast, provides opportunities for 
making serious money for those with the street knowledge and muscle to match … 
inroads by the police into some of the major hooligan firms inevitably had its effects 
… ten years (or more) in prison ‘for football’ was a very serious thing to contemplate, 
especially when there was still plenty of action elsewhere, and without the attendant 
risks.365 
 
The decline of hooliganism also occurred due to a number of other factors. These included 
high levels of circuit television surveillance combined with new all-seater stadiums, 
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meaning that any miscreant could easily be identified. Combine these factors with those 
mentioned by Redhead and it is easy to see why the number of incidents of hooliganism 
declined markedly.  
                
Conclusion  
Ian Taylor comments ‘one vital aspect of the Hillsborough disaster … was the fact that it 
occurred in sequence with a series of other disasters in public facilities in Britain’.366 He 
goes on:  
 
The list of such disasters now includes the Bradford City fire (57 deaths in May 1985), 
the sinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise ferry in Zeebrugge Harbour in 1987 (188 
British passengers drowned), the fire in King’s Cross Underground Station in 
November 1987 (31 deaths), the explosion of the Piper Alpha oil rig in July 1988 (167 
oil workers blown up or drowned), and the Southern Region rail crashes at Clapham 




Also in 1989 forty-two were killed when a British Midland Boeing 737 crashed on to the 
M1 near Kegworth in Leicestershire, and in August of the same year, a few months after 
Hillsborough, fifty-one were drowned when the Marchioness pleasure cruiser sank in the 
Thames after being struck by the Bowbelle dredger. Add to this the terrorist attack that 
resulted in the Lockerbie plane crash in December 1988 and it would be easy to see the 
latter half of the 1980s as an ‘age of disasters’. Although these disasters seem unconnected 
when taken at face value, there were common themes among the causes. There was 
disregard for safety in public and private services, poor communications once tragedies 
                                                          




began, staff who were either overworked or poorly trained or both, and public amenities 
declining due to inadequate funding.368 Most of these tragedies were in areas of public 
service and transport, and many believed that the policies of the Thatcher administration 
had played a part. Many public services were privatised and the ethos of business and profit 
was applied to them. It was possible to make money by buying shares in the newly 
privatised companies as public services became answerable to shareholders. In this context 
corners were cut with the inevitable consequence that safety was sometimes compromised. 
Scraton puts it thus: 
 
An unswerving commitment to the principles of free-market economy actively 
promoted a market-place unrestricted by the state and its institutions …with instant 
returns on investment, risk-takers quickly becoming profit-makers … ordinary people 
could live the illusion of ‘share-holding’ in former state-run industries … cross-
channel ferries, frantically cutting turnaround times to meet the demands of 
profitability … put to sea with their bow doors open. Overcrowded commuter trains 
sped along under-maintained tracks, attempting to meet impossible schedules. 
Pleasureboats on the Thames vied for water with unsafe industrial vessels. Years of 
rubbish gathered beneath stands in football grounds, and escalators on the London 
Underground, just waiting for ignition.369 
 
 
While the events at Hillsborough can be seen in the context of other disasters at about the 
same time, it is also clear that the attitude of some of the police and the authorities were 
indicative of a wider perception of football supporters that prevailed. The wider emphasis 
on control and containment, rather than on safety, was a contributory factor to the disaster. 
Of greater importance was the inexperience of the senior police officer in control on the 
day. The failure to organise properly the flow of fans to the outside pens once the central 
pens were full was a major factor, and this should have been organised even before Gate C 
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was opened to relieve the pressure outside. There was also a breakdown in radio contact as 
the situation deteriorated, and then Duckenfield’s deliberate lie as he tried to pass the blame 
for the disaster on to Liverpool fans. In fact, the disaster was clearly more the result of 
Duckenfield’s own inadequacies rather than any actions by Liverpool fans.   
 
By the time of the publication of the Taylor Report, there was a drive in Europe towards 
all-seater stadiums for football. The preparations for the 1990 World Cup in Italy were 
forcing the pace of change. On 25 August 1989 the Italian Ministry of the Interior decreed 
that no standing would be allowed after 30 April 1990 in open air stadiums with a capacity 
of more than 10,000 or in covered ones with a capacity of more than 4,000.370 In Holland 
on 6 December 1989 the KNVB (the Dutch equivalent of the FA) decided with the Dutch 
clubs to reduce the standing capacity of football grounds by 10% each year over the next 
decade. Thus by the end of the 1990s football stadia in the Netherlands would be all-
seater.371 There was also a FIFA resolution, passed on 26 July 1989, that ‘matches may in 
principle only be played in all-seater stadia’ from the start of the qualifying games for the 
1994 World Cup, commencing in autumn 1992, and as from 1993 ‘it will be the duty of the 
Confederations and National Associations to hold high-risk matches in their zones only in 
all-seater stadia.’372 Looking at the dates on which these decrees and resolutions were 
passed it can be seen that the Hillsborough disaster was having an effect internationally as 
well as in England, and the pace of change, in Italy at least, was driven by the preparations 
for the 1990 World Cup finals. In Scotland, the all-seater stadium had already arrived. 
Aberdeen’s ground at Pittodrie became all-seater in 1978. This was followed by Clydebank, 
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and then St. Johnstone’s new ground in Perth.373 Scotland had, however, experienced the 
Ibrox disaster in 1971, thus putting the safety of football stadiums high on the agenda as 
early as the 1970s. Bearing this in mind, it could be argued that all-seater stadia would 
eventually have arrived in any case, but it cannot be denied that the Hillsborough disaster 
and the Taylor Report greatly increased the impetus and urgency to reconstruct.  
 
The recommendations of the Taylor Report revolutionised the experience of watching 
football in England. The all-seater stadiums that were built as a result of the Report, together 
with the change in organisational structure heralded by the advent of the Premier League, 
which will be examined in more detail in the next chapter, and the arrival of satellite 
television broadcasting, would transform football into a new cultural phenomenon very 
different from its previous incarnation. As new stadiums proved more welcoming, a wider 
fan base could be attracted – more middle-class, more families – and football became more 
fashionable in the 1990s than it had been in the 1980s. The ‘post-fan’ and fanzine culture 
that developed were part of this ‘new respectability’. The growth in football’s popularity 
was also part of the wider trend of increased focus on sport and leisure activity. There is, 
however, a contradiction here because at the same time there has been a growing concern 
about the levels of obesity among the young and the increase in diabetes among adults.  
 
In some respects the changes in football grounds over the decades have mirrored changes 
in society. Most clubs had settled into a permanent home by the outbreak of the First World 
War, before mass ownership of the motor car. These grounds nestled in the midst of a grid 
of streets all lined with the terraced houses that were home to the working-class 
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communities from which the football clubs drew their support. Increased mobility brought 
by the motor car and the construction of motorways brought a drift from small town to big 
city clubs, thus weakening the link between the football club and the local community. Then 
increasing concern about the growth of hooliganism came in the context of violence 
between youth cultures and the growing ‘generation gap’. In football this led to segregation, 
later enforced by fences to keep rival fans apart and off the pitch. This focus on law and 
order, and emphasis on crowd control at the expense of safety, permeated football. Its 
results were felt only too painfully at Hillsborough. Meanwhile, the high price of land in 
town and city centres had led to a drift of amenities to new ‘out-of-town’ sites as 
supermarkets, leisure complexes, and multiplex cinemas were all built on the periphery of 
urban development. Once Taylor had published his Report, it was inevitable that football 
grounds would join the exodus to the bypass. This turned the football club into a spectacle 
instead of it being part of the cultural fabric of a town or area. Bale points out that a football 
club is part of the community in two forms – the urban community in which the club is 
located and after which it is named, and the people and businesses in the immediate 
surroundings of the club’s ground or stadium.374 It can also be said that the location of the 
new grounds, and the distance fans have to travel out from the urban centre, is another 
contributory factor in the decline of hooliganism.  
 
The poignancy of Hillsborough lives on. In 2014, on the equivalent weekend of the twenty-
fifth anniversary of the disaster, both FA Cup semi-finals and all Premier League and 
Football League matches were marked by one minute’s silence as a mark of respect to the 
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ninety-six victims. This was observed at six minutes past the normal scheduled kick-off 
times to mark the time at which the game was stopped at Hillsborough. The games kicked 
off at seven minutes past. On the anniversary itself a service was held at Anfield attended 
by tens of thousands. Scarves were laid out on the pitch to form the shape of the number 
96. Across Merseyside public transport was stopped and at Liverpool Lime Street railway 
station a huge screen displayed photos of each of those who died. At 3.06pm across the city 
bells tolled ninety-six times, once for each of the victims.375  
 
Two weeks earlier a new inquiry had commenced into the disaster. In September 2012 it 
had been announced that this inquiry was likely to be held following the verdict of 
‘accidental death’ arrived at by the original inquiry.376 The report by the Hillsborough 
Independent Panel had just been published and it confirmed that ‘not only was there a delay 
in recognising that there were mass casualties, the major incident plan was not correctly 
activated and only limited parts were then put into effect. As a result, rescue and recovery 
efforts were affected by lack of leadership, coordination, prioritisation of casualties and 
equipment’.377 To summarise, the main reason for the disaster was ‘failure of police control’ 
and added that ‘multiple failures’ in other emergency services and public bodies contributed 
to the death toll.378 At the new inquiry relatives of each of the victims were asked to give 
details describing characteristics of their loved one in a process aimed at considering each 
victim as an individual human being rather than just as part of a mass defined only by a 
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number. As an example, pen pictures of Victoria Hicks and Sarah Hicks were presented to 
the jury by their parents: 
 
Ms. Hicks spoke lovingly of Victoria using a typewriter to write her own match 
reports, but keeping them a secret from her family … ‘we’d hear you typing away, 
filing the reports … you hid the files under the bed. You never let me read them. I only 
did so after you died.’ According to her father, Victoria, known to her parents as 
Vicky, had wanted to become a sports reporter. The reports were stored in a red 
Liverpool FC match folder.379 
 
The jury at the new inquest was finally sent out to consider its verdict on 6 April 2016, 
more than two years after proceedings began. After 276 days of evidence, the inquests were 
‘by far the longest case ever heard by a jury in British legal history.’380 Coroner Sir John 
Goldring gave the jurors fourteen questions to answer, including whether or not the victims 
were unlawfully killed. To reach this verdict, they had to be unanimous in their view that 
Duckenfield had been responsible for manslaughter by gross negligence, which meant that 
his breach of his duty of care ‘was so bad, having regard to the risk of death involved, as in 
your view to amount to a criminal act or omission.’381  
 
On 26 April, the inquest jury announced its verdict. They decreed that the ninety-six 
Liverpool fans had been unlawfully killed. 382 Equally importantly, they exonerated 
Liverpool fans of any blame for the tragedy.383 During the course of the inquest, 
Duckenfield admitted that over the years he had not been entirely honest, but now wanted 
                                                          
379 ‘The Hidden Talent Of Victoria Hicks’, The Times, 16 April 2014.  
380 David Conn, ‘After Two Years, Hillsborough Jury Is Sent Out’, The Guardian, 7 April 2016.  
381 Ibid.  
382 Justin Davenport, ‘Hillsborough: Justice For 96’, London Evening Standard, 26 April 2016.  
383 Brian Reade, ‘A Dream Come True’, Daily Mirror, 27 April 2016.  
143 
 
to tell the ‘whole truth’. He admitted that, being newly promoted and inexperienced, he had 
made a ‘serious mistake’ in taking over responsibility for the match only fifteen days 
beforehand. He was, he said, ‘overcome by the enormity of the situation’, agreeing that if 
he had closed off access to the tunnel leading to the terrace, he could have relieved the crush 
outside without endangering fans in the already packed central pens. He admitted that his 
failure to do so was a ‘blunder of the first magnitude.’384 Seb Patrick, in When Saturday 
Comes, argued that, ‘an integral part of being a Liverpool supporter since 1989 … has been 
the shared, burning desire to see justice done. Not just for a level of accountability to be 
brought against those responsible (although that’s certainly been a primary aim) but to try 
to dispel the awful lie that has smeared the names of the dead ever since that day.’385 
 
The verdict raised the possibility of public prosecutions against certain individuals and 
organisations. As it was announced, the Independent Police Complaints Commission and 
Operation Resolve were undertaking a joint £80 million investigation to consider charges 
that could be as serious as manslaughter, negligence, and perverting the course of justice.  
 
A case could yet be brought against police officers, South Yorkshire Police, the Football 
Association and Sheffield Wednesday FC, with the possibility of corporate charges against 
the stadium engineers, the ambulance service and Sheffield City Council. 386   
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Table 7. The inquest jury’s fourteen questions and verdicts  
1. Basic facts: 96 people died in the disaster  YES 
2. Was there an error or omission in police planning? YES 
3. Was there an error or omission in policing at the turnstiles? YES 
4. Was there an error by commanding officers on the terraces? YES 
5. Was there an error by commander in ordering the gates to be opened? YES 
6. Are you satisfied those who died were unlawfully killed? YES 
7. Did fans’ behaviour contribute to the dangerous situation? NO 
8. Did the stadium design contribute to the disaster? YES 
9. Was there an error in the stadium safety certification? YES 
10. Was there an error in planning for the match by Sheffield Wednesday? YES 
11. Did an error by Sheffield Wednesday on the day contribute to the danger? NO 
  MAY an error by SWFC on the day have contributed to the danger? YES 
12. Should stadium engineers have done more to advise on safety?  YES 
13. Was there an error in the police response after the crush developed? YES 
14. Was there an error in ambulance response after the crush developed? YES 
       Source: Daily Mirror, 27 April 2016.  
 
 
It had taken twenty-seven years. The original inquest jury had, in March 1991, returned a 
verdict of accidental death.387 In June 1997, Tony Blair’s new Labour government ordered 
scrutiny of new evidence and it was found that the police had changed 164 officers’ 
accounts before their submission to the Taylor inquiry, but Jack Straw as home secretary 
did not believe there was sufficient evidence for a new inquiry. The following year, the 
Hillsborough Family Support Group launched a private prosecution against Duckenfield 
and his assistant Murray. The latter was acquitted and no verdict was reached on 
Duckenfield. In 2009, twenty years after the disaster, Andy Burnham MP and Maria Eagle 
MP called for all documents relating to the disaster to be published, with the result that the 
Labour government, now led by Gordon Brown, launched the Hillsborough Independent 
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Panel. Its report was published in September 2012, resulting in the original verdict of 
accidental death being quashed, and the commencement of the second inquest.388 
 
The Hillsborough disaster marked a watershed in the fan experience of attending football 
matches. The Taylor Report’s recommendation of all-seater stadia introduced surroundings 
that are safer and cleaner, but the cost of attending football matches has risen enormously 
and crowds display noticeably less passion. Some of the rebuilding fits in with the broader 
context in that many of the new grounds have followed the trend to out-of-town sites. New 
grounds have coincided with the emergence of a new type of fan – educated, affluent, 
middle-class – as football enhanced its social status. The number of incidents of 
hooliganism have been greatly reduced. This ‘new respectability’ fits in with the broader 
context of increasing popularity of sports and leisure activity as society became more 
conscious about health and fitness, yet, paradoxically, at the same time less fit. Other factors 
were at work driving football’s social and cultural realignment, such as the establishment 
of the Premiership and far greater television coverage due to satellite broadcasting and the 
immense wealth it provides in live coverage deals. It is to those subjects we turn in the next 
chapter. 
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The love of money is the root of all evil 
 
- I Timothy ch. 6 v. 1O 389 
 
 
If you were to make a list of everything that bedevils football and put them 
in a pile, at the top of that pile would sit Manchester United. 
 
                                 - Ed Horton, author and fanzine contributor, 1997.390 
 
 
As a result of the Premier League, England will never, never, never, never, 
ever win the European Championships or the World Cup 
 
                                           - Alex Fynn, sports consultant, 2014.391 
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The origins of the Premiership lay in the coming together of three key phenomena. Firstly, 
the 1980s had seen a handful of elite clubs – the ‘Big Five’ of Arsenal, Everton, Liverpool, 
Manchester United, and Tottenham Hotspur – growing in terms of assertiveness and power. 
Their relationship with a network of media and commercial interests was deepening, and 
their aims ran counter to the ethos of power-sharing and income redistribution that had been 
espoused by the Football League for a century. As far as the big clubs were concerned, their 
smaller neighbours were holding them back and 'restricting their potential for commercial 
growth'.392 With English clubs still banned from European competition as a result of the 
Heysel stadium disaster, they were also concerned that, when readmitted, they might be 
unable to emulate the success enjoyed by English clubs in Europe during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s.  
 
Secondly, there had been various proposals over the years to amend the structure of the 
League. These had aimed to reverse the decline in attendances which had been apparent 
since the ‘bumper’ crowds of the late 1940s. By re-organising the League’s structure, so as 
to increase the number of meaningful games, it was hoped that attendance figures would 
revive. Also, by reducing the number of games played by top players it was reasoned that 
they would be less tired and this would give the England international team a greater chance 
of success in major competitions. 
 
The final factor was the incipient power struggle that had developed between rival 
footballing authorities. There are two ruling bodies in England – the Football Association 
and the Football League. The FA was formed in 1863 as the governing body, and was 
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responsible for the game from the grassroots level of junior, local, and county associations, 
up to the top professional clubs. The League was formed in 1888 and administered its own 
competition in accordance with, and under licence from, the FA.393 The two authorities had 
a different outlook and ethos. From its inception the FA aimed to establish a shared set of 
rules, and thus became authoritative in nature, whereas the League was simply the organiser 
of a competition within an expanding family. There was clearly the potential for dispute.  
 
As the 1990s dawned, these simmering tensions, exacerbated by the other mentioned 
factors, would erupt into open conflict – out of which would be born a new organisational 
structure for domestic football at the national level. At the top of this was the Premiership, 
and the new format would help bring about a remarkable transformation in the culture and 
experience of ‘top flight’ football.  
 
 
Football League versus Football Association: Debating an Organisational Format 
The sequence of events that led to the Premiership breakaway commenced in October 1990 
with the publication of the Football League’s document One Game One Team One Voice. 
Among its proposals was the creation of a Joint Board consisting of six members from the 
FA and six members from the League to run football. This proposal aimed to put an end to 
the historic division between the ruling bodies.394 The Joint Board would develop a 
‘coherent and consistent set of policies ... across all issues which are of joint concern’, such 
as finance, commercial affairs, crowd control, and the organisation of the England team.395   
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The FA responded to the League’s initiative by producing its own document. Entitled 
Blueprint For The Future Of Football it was published in its final form in June 1991. Much 
of it was similar to the League’s One Game One Team One Voice - so much so that Trevor 
Phillips, the League’s commercial director, accused the FA of plagiarism.396 However, 
there was one very important difference. The Blueprint included the following proposal: 
‘that the Football Association should establish a Premier League within its own 
administration, that the League should be named The Football Association Premier League, 
[and] that the Football Association Premier League should start in the season 1992-1993’. 
It was also proposed that the Premier League reduce in size, losing one club per season, to 
consist of eighteen clubs from 1996/1997 onwards.397 One possible explanation of the FA’s 
motives were suggested by a remark made by Charles Hughes, the FA’s director of 
coaching and education, at a meeting in the office of Graham Kelly, the FA’s chief 
executive, at Lancaster Gate on 24 January 1991. He said that ‘the Football League had 
gone too far with its own plans, the FA could never countenance power-sharing and the 
time had come to sweep away the cobwebs of a hundred years. The FA would run the new 
League, thus marginalising the trouble-making Football League forever’.398 This was very 
important because the backing of the FA completely legitimised the new League and 
effectively beheaded the Football League, thus weakening its power.  
 
Within the existing literature, opinion varies as to the impulses underlying the Premier 
League proposal. David Conn states that the FA seemed unable to see the broader picture. 
There was the potential for a united body responsible for the game, with public money 
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coming in for the construction of new stadiums, and cash from satellite television 
broadcasting, which could have been used for the benefit of the whole of football, rather 
than just a handful of rich clubs. But this was not the vision of the FA, who could not see 
any further than their squabble with the Football League. The Blueprint was their attempt 
to establish authority.399 James Walvin, by contrast, takes a more balanced view. He says, 
'in a way, both were right. The major clubs … could not continue to be wagged by the 
Lancastrian tail of the Football League. Yet, in its turn, the League was also right to persist 
in the defence of that broader community of footballing interests'.400 
 
King refers to the drift from ‘small town clubs’ to the ‘big city clubs’ in terms of attendance 
due to increased car ownership and the construction of motorways.401 Using Peter J. 
Sloane’s example of Lancashire, where the M6 was built through the county, he gives 
evidence to back up this movement of spectators as a direct result of the completion of the 
motorway. Therefore, as overall football attendance levels declined, the reduction fell 
disproportionately on the small clubs. It was this that helped legitimate the demands of the 
big clubs for a greater share of the television revenue, because it could easily be 
demonstrated that they drew a greater percentage of those attending football matches.  
 
That the big clubs received a greater share of television revenue was a trend already under 
way and could have been maximised, especially given the unprecedented amounts that 
could now be negotiated from satellite television broadcasters, without the need for a 
breakaway. The establishment of the Premier League was, as Hughes’ remark shows, as 
much about establishing the supremacy of the FA over the League as it was about ensuring 
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that the big clubs received sums in keeping with their greater support base and their major 
contribution to the game as a whole.  
 
The battle between the League and the FA was fought over the League’s contentious 
regulation 10, which stated that if any club wished to resign from the League it had to give 
three years’ notice. The League did not apply to the FA to alter its rules, but the League had 
to apply to the FA for sanction on an annual basis and received official sanction for 1989 
and 1990, so the FA were aware of this rule. Regulation 10 was inconsistent with the FA’s 
own sanction regulation 24, which stated that ‘a club shall not be required to withdraw its 
membership of a league before 31st December in any year’. On 8 April 1991, the FA 
Council decided that the League’s regulation 10 should be expressly disallowed for its 
incompatibility with FA sanction regulation 24.402 They also added, on 22 May, the 
following words to their own sanction: ‘any rule by which a League purports to require that 
a club should give more notice than the notice prescribed in this regulation shall be void’. 
The target of this change could scarcely have been clearer.    
 
 The League responded a month later by offering First Division clubs financial incentives 
to stay within the League structure; they also threatened to bring heavy compensation 
claims if they broke the aforementioned Regulation 10.403 Arthur Sandford, the League’s 
chief executive, called into question the FA’s financial projections; its failure to answer the 
question of how it would cover lost gate receipts resulting from fewer games; and 
questioned the FA’s record on attracting commercial revenue.404 The FA, however, refused 
to enter into any discussions unless the League agreed in principle to the breakaway. This 
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was unacceptable to the League. Sandford sent Kelly an open letter headed 'Consensus Not 
Conflict'. In it he stated the League's belief that the proposed breakaway was 'a serious 
threat to scores of clubs throughout the country, based on suspect and unproven financial 
projections, not supported by the majority of players and supporters, a real conflict of 
interest for the FA, and an elitist and undemocratic approach to the issues facing the future 
of English football.'405    
 
The row between football’s two ruling bodies ended in court. The hearing began at the 
Queen’s Bench on 22 July. The case hinged on whether or not the League’s three-year 
notice rule was consistent with FA regulations and annual sanctioning, and whether or not 
the FA as a ruling body had authority over the League. On 31 July, Mr. Justice Rose found 
in the FA's favour. He dismissed the League’s case on three counts. He rejected the 
argument that the FA was subject to a judicial review, and said ‘a requirement for three 
season’s notice is inconsistent with annual sanctioning ... the League cannot enforce its 
regulation 10 against the clubs because to do so would be to force the clubs to accept a later 
contract inconsistent with their contracts with the FA and to bind clubs beyond their annual 
sanction period’. He also passed the comment, ‘the fact that, for three years, the FA 
sanctioned the League despite the inconsistency of regulation 10, does not prevent the FA 
from insisting on compliance with its rules for the forthcoming season’.406 Rose also agreed 
that the FA had a right to run a league. Finally, he stated that the FA’s rules took precedence 
over the League’s rules. The practical implication of the last point was that clubs were free 
from the League’s rule that they had to give three year’s notice of resignation, which meant 
that the Premier League could start in the 1992/1993 season.407  
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Consequently, on 16 August 1991, the 22 First Division clubs resigned en masse from the 
League, giving exactly one year's notice. The Premier League was then legally established 
with the signing of a founder members’ agreement. However, the 18-club ideal was not 
mentioned. Alex Fynn and Lynton Guest state that the ideal was lost because the FA ‘did 
not fight hard enough for it, because the bulk of the First Division clubs did not want it, and 
because pragmatism was always going to triumph over idealism’.408 They also made the 
point that the Premier League, instead of being controlled by the FA, which had obviously 
been the FA’s intention, soon became effectively autonomous.409  
 
All of this left the League without a functioning management committee. The plans for the 
breakaway were still under threat from an appeal, as the remaining League members wished 
to defend the three years’ notice of resignation rule, and from the Professional Footballers’ 
Association, whose chief executive Gordon Taylor stated the wish to defend the integrity 
of the League. Quite understandably, the players and clubs left behind feared that the 
breakaway league would take the lion’s share of commercial revenue generated by the game 
at the expense of the rest, leaving a large number of clubs facing extinction. PFA chairman 
Brian Marwood had earlier in the week refused to rule out the possibility of a player’s 
strike.410 
 
Without a management committee in place, the High Court appointed executors to run the 
Football League. On 21 August, the executors lodged an appeal against the High Court 
judgement allowing the FA to set up its Premier League.411 Then the League changed tactics 
and rather than forcing a long and potentially damaging appeal process, it tried to see what 
                                                          
408  Fynn and Guest, Out Of Time, p.54.  
409  Ibid. pp.54-55.  
410  Peter Ball, ‘First Division Clubs To Pull Out Of The Football League’, The Times, 17 August 1991. 
411  John Roberts, ‘Sandford’s Power Left In The Balance’, The Independent,  22 August 1991.  
154 
 
it could gain in terms of compensation. At the Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM), on 
10 September, the League demanded the retention of the ‘three-up, three-down’ promotion 
and relegation system and £6 million in compensation. This was agreed to by the FA, but 
legally binding guarantees were not given. The meeting was adjourned until 23 September. 
Due to this protracted legal situation, the 1991/1992 season was now under way without 
the necessary annual sanction from the FA because the League’s three years’ notice 
regulation was effectively still in place.412  The FA had turned a blind eye to the season 
commencing unsanctioned, but they could not be expected to let this situation continue 
indefinitely. 
 
At the 23 September EGM, held at the New Connaught Rooms in London, the League clubs 
decided to cut their legal costs and vote overwhelmingly to drop the three-year Notice 
regulation. This regulation had been important because, if observed, it effectively blocked 
the breakaway. In return for this concession the League secured three-up three-down 
promotion and relegation to and from the Premier League, and compensation, albeit 
reduced to £3 million (£2 million from the FA and £1 million from the Premier League) per 
year for the next five years. The League, which was now being run by an administrator 
because many of its personnel had gone to the Premier League, had already spent more than 
£1.2 million in legal fees.413 It was forced to accept defeat.      
 
  
All that remained for the League was to adjust to the changing world as best it could. There 
were, for example, important practicalities to be dealt with. Now the First Division had 
gone, the old Second Division was now de facto the Football League’s top division, and it 
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was thus renamed Division One. Likewise the Third Division became Division Two and 
the Fourth became Division Three. What was needed was a rebranding, for the League and 
its member clubs to advertise themselves as a desirable product and spectacle, but it would 
take a long time for this to happen. Eventually, it would include the selling of television 
rights to show Football League matches. Yet, even in this, the League’s efforts proved far 
from successful. In 2002, a deal was signed with ITV Digital, but unfortunately they failed 
after one year and went into administration owing the Football League, and therefore the 
clubs, £178.5 million. The two parent companies of ITV Digital, Carlton and Grenada, were 
taken to court as the Football League tried to recoup their money, but the High Court 
decided that there were no guarantees legally enforceable, because no such guarantees had 
been written into the final contract. Thereafter the Football League negotiated a new deal 
for £95 million with BSkyB for the right to show matches for a four year period: twice as 
long as the remaining period of the ITV Digital deal, for half the amount. The Football 
League clubs were furious over the League’s handling of TV negotiations. Subsequently, 
having learned from these experiences, the Football League did achieve greater success in 
rebranding and marketing itself properly. In 2004, Division One was renamed the 
Championship, thus giving it a more appealing title. Division Two became League One and 
Division Three became League Two. They then managed to persuade Coca-Cola to sponsor 
all three divisions, and from 2006/2007 onwards 85 live games per season were shown on 
BSkyB.414   
 
In 1991/1992, however, all of that lay a long way in the future. For now, the League and its 
members seemed to face an uncertain future and they were forced to watch from the 
sidelines as the Premiership prepared to commence. 
                                                          




From scarves on the terraces to fans in the pub: the evolving fan’s experience 
A survey, conducted by Research Services Ltd. on behalf of the FA in 1991, questioned 
1,000 adult football supporters who regularly attended games. All First Division grounds 
were covered, of which at the time there were twenty, but would soon return to twenty-two, 
and supporters were asked if they would prefer to see an eighteen-club First Division or a 
return to a twenty-two-club one. The result was exactly equal at forty-one per cent each. 
This was taken as a positive result, given the British public’s tendency to be conservative 
and align with the status quo. Also, among the Big Five (Arsenal, Everton, Liverpool, 
Manchester United, and Tottenham Hotspur) fans had been shown to be in favour of the 
eighteen-club scenario by forty-nine per cent to thirty-four per cent.415  
 
On the other hand, the League commissioned Gallup to organise a survey of supporters' 
views. A total of 4,310 fans from eighty different clubs were asked about their views on the 
proposed breakaway. No fewer than sixty-eight per cent were against a Premier League, 
and only twenty-two per cent actively in favour. Even among fans of First Division clubs, 
sixty-six per cent were against the proposals. Among the fans of the 'Big Five' forty-six per 
cent were against and forty-two per cent in favour. With nearly seven out of ten fans against 
the proposals, Sandford pointed out that this vindicated what the League had said.416 The 
concerns of many supporters were expressed eloquently in When Saturday Comes. An 
editorial published in June 1991 offered a detailed summary of the grievances. Firstly, there 
was concern over the name ‘Premier League’. The editorial argues that if the FA were keen 
to maintain links between their new competition and the rest of the League a new name was 
not necessary, and points out that the name ‘First Division’ had not so far deterred sponsors 
                                                          
415  Fynn and Guest , Out Of Time, p.51.  
416  The Times, 23 May 1991.  
157 
 
from giving their name to the competition.417 It also called into question the notion 
expressed by the top clubs at the time that big clubs were ‘carrying’ the small clubs and 
argued on what basis a club was a ‘premier’ club. To support this argument it was pointed 
out that if the criterion of a premier league club was that it had been a member of the top 
division for a decade or more, a number of the best supported clubs in terms of attendance 
would fail; examples used to make this point were Chelsea, Manchester City, Leeds United, 
Aston Villa, Sheffield Wednesday, and Sheffield United. The editorial also pointed out 
that clubs only argued from their own point of view. Many involved in football would 
happily back a streamlined premier league if they were guaranteed a place, and only became 
concerned for the majority of the League members when they feared that they might be 
excluded.418  
 
One of the requirements included in the FA’s original Blueprint had been that clubs in a 
new premier league should have a minimum of 20,000 all-seater stadia. Supposing clubs 
qualified through League position, but did not have the capacity or the money available for 
construction of such grounds, it was asked. According to the latest statistics available, there 
were nineteen teams in the top two divisions who, if all standing areas were replaced with 
seats, would have a capacity of below 20,000. Connected to this point was the possibility 
that some clubs might invest a lot of money to bring their grounds up to scratch only to be 
relegated after one season. This, it was feared, would waste a club’s valuable resources and, 
most importantly for all concerned, end up threatening the existence of the system of 
promotion and relegation.  
 
                                                          
417  Andy Lyons and Bill Brewster, ‘League Of Their Own’, When Saturday Comes, issue 52, June 1991, pp.5-8. 
418  Ibid. p.6.   
158 
 
On a positive note, the editorial pointed out that the idea of an eighteen-team First Division 
was a good one, especially if accompanied by a decrease in the smaller cup competitions, 
because it would be less physically demanding and the players would be allowed more time 
for preparation for international matches. However, it was pointed out that the appeal of a 
smaller First Division from the point of view of the big clubs was driven by its attractiveness 
to potential sponsors and for television deals. The editorial ended by pointing out that the 
whole premier league saga proved that the FA and the Football League were incapable of 
acting in unison, but seemed to be on a path towards confrontation.419 
 
The clubs most likely to be directly affected in an adverse manner by the breakaway were 
those that spent the 1991/1992 season struggling in the First Division, and stood to miss out 
on whatever income was agreed from broadcasters if they were relegated. Two such clubs 
were Norwich City and Notts County, so it is appropriate to look at the fanzines written by 
supporters of the two clubs. In the Norwich City fanzine The Citizen an article entitled ‘The 
Superleague?’ was written in deliberately sarcastic fashion and pointed out that it was 
stating the obvious to say that the clubs likely to be included were the ones most in favour, 
and those without a chance of being included were the ones most against. Regarding the 
claim that the ‘superleague’ would be to the severe detriment of the lower league clubs, the 
article warned of dwindling resources leading to smaller squads, players going part-time, 
dwindling crowds and ultimately some clubs going out of business. This in turn would lead 
to fewer opportunities for young players to get into professional football, meaning that some 
talented ones would miss out. As a result, there would be fewer players for the big clubs to 
poach, which would not be in the interests of the top clubs or the national team. It is worth 
mentioning that some clubs would buy from abroad, which could turn out to be just a short-
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term fix rather than a considered investment for the future. The article went on to argue that 
the standard of football in England ‘will plummet in the long term’. It concluded that the 
‘superleague’ was elitist, short-sighted and likely to be ruinous on the lower placed clubs 
and ultimately the game itself.420 In the Notts County fanzine The Wheelbarrow, under the 
heading ‘The Voice Of The PFA [Professional Footballer’s Association]’, the view was 
expressed, directly and clearly, that the FA was trying to diminish the Football League and 
with it, most of the professional clubs in the country, and that the Blueprint was a way for 
the leading clubs to seize virtually all the money. The FA, it stated, had been enticed away 
from its main function – to look after the general welfare of the game, not the elite interests 
of a minority. The article finished with the point that neither the Football League nor the 
PFA had contributed any input to the proposed breakaway.421   
 
It can be seen from such fanzine articles that among those fans who regularly attended 
football matches, or at least among those who wrote for fans’ magazines, there were strong 
opinions against the breakaway. A number of valid concerns were expressed. However, 
what few of these fans realised, and what was unforeseeable at the time, was the way and 
the extent to which the broader culture of football would change with the arrival of the 
Premiership, particularly in terms of the way it would be experienced by the average fan.    
 
 
 ‘The old First Division in emperor’s clothes’: The Rise of a New Elite?  
It would be easy to look back and regard 15 August 1992 as the dawn of a new age in 
football history, but the most striking thing is not how much things had changed, but how 
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little. Apart from the change in name, there was nothing else obvious to the fan in the street. 
Chris Horrie, in Premiership, states: 
 
At first it looked as if nothing much had changed. The Premier League, due to kick 
off in August 1992, was really just the old First Division armed with a new pay-TV 
deal and relieved of the burden of sharing its income with the rest of football. As far 
as the fans were concerned the main change was that referees and linesmen would 
wear green shirts instead of the traditional police-uniform black. And that, really, was 
it.422    
 
 
After many years of discussion and argument over the size that the top division should be, 
it was ironic that the Premier League had twenty-two clubs, the same as the old First 
Division. This would not be reduced to twenty until the end of 1994/1995, another three 
years hence. The system of promotion and relegation from and to the division below, 
involving three clubs, was retained, again like the old First Division. The favourites to win 
the Premier League in its first season were Arsenal. They had been favourites to take the 
title the previous season. As Sue Mott commented in The Sunday Times, 'it is the old First 
Division in emperor's clothes. The football world as we knew it has gone … to be replaced 
by one that, well, looks exactly the same'.423  
 
The twenty-two clubs that made up the Premier League in its first season were: Arsenal, 
Aston Villa, Blackburn Rovers, Chelsea, Coventry City, Crystal Palace, Everton, Ipswich 
Town, Leeds United, Liverpool, Manchester City, Manchester United, Middlesbrough, 
Norwich City, Nottingham Forest, Oldham Athletic, Queen's Park Rangers, Sheffield 
United, Sheffield Wednesday, Southampton, Tottenham Hotspur, and Wimbledon. A quick 
look through this list reveals a few big, successful clubs scattered among a far greater 
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number of 'also rans' including sleeping giants and small clubs who were very temporarily 
good enough to be in the right place at the right time, but would soon fall from grace. As 
Mott went on to say, ‘nobody in their right mind would consider the new confection a 
“Super League”. As long as Wimbledon and Middlesbrough and Coventry are making up 
the numbers, the Premier League is a mere staging post.’424 (The staging post to which she 
referred was that on the way to a European Super League involving the top English clubs, 
which many predicted would ultimately constitute the top tier of domestic football.) 
 
The difference of course was money, 'sheaves, reams, and bales of lovely money'.425 From 
the outset it had been envisaged that the new Premier League would be televised - either 
through an improved ITV deal, or a new relationship with the BBC or a satellite television 
broadcaster. There was the potential for a bidding war in which the stakes could be huge 
and any revenues received did not have to be shared with the Football League. The existing 
deal between ITV and the Football League was set to expire in the summer of 1992, 
coinciding with the commencement of the Premier League.       
 
The bidding to televise the new breakaway League was shrouded in controversy. In May 
the FA, who now administered the Premier League, invited the television companies to 
make secret bids for exclusive coverage. The clubs were due to vote on the deal on 23 May, 
but it was widely alleged that Rick Parry told Alan Sugar, who, as well as being the owner 
of Amstrad, was chairman of Tottenham Hotspur, that ITV had bid £262 million. BSkyB 
had not yet made its final bid but Sugar, who needed BSkyB to win to help sales of his 
satellite dishes, rang Murdoch’s company urging them to ‘get something down here quickly 
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to blow them out of the water’.426 So BSkyB, in partnership with the BBC, raised its bid to 
a reported £304 million and won the vote.  
 
The way each club voted is worthy of note in itself. Six clubs voted for ITV. They were 
Arsenal, Everton, Liverpool, Manchester United – in other words the Big Five minus 
Tottenham Hotspur – Aston Villa, and Leeds United. There were two abstentions but 
fourteen clubs voted for BSkyB, which was just enough to secure the two-thirds majority 
needed. Sugar cast Tottenham’s vote against the Big Five due to his personal interest, which 
he had declared. It turned out that his vote was crucial in winning BSkyB the contract.   
 
Four of the six clubs who voted for ITV had done so because they were among the big clubs 
that ITV had given greater coverage to following the deal of 1988, whereas the clubs who 
voted against ITV and in favour of the BBC/BSkyB partnership did so because they were 
unhappy with this situation, which had robbed them of revenue.427 It therefore turned out 
that the favouritism shown by ITV to the big clubs in the 1988 deal played a large part in 
losing them the Premiership deal four years later. Thus Rupert Murdoch’s Sky, in 
partnership with the BBC, secured exclusive coverage for the Premiership for a deal 
reported as £304 million. In actual fact, the real figure received by the Premiership would 
be closer to £191 million.428 According to the sports consultant and author Alex Fynn, ‘there 
was a five year deal which went from £34 million in the first year to £39 million in the fifth 
year, which was around £200 million, and a BBC highlights package was added, which 
might have taken it up to about £220 million, but the rest was an estimate of overseas rights 
which never materialised. Some of it did, but not £84 million.’429 Even so, this was a huge 
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increase on the deal struck in 1988. The first televised match under the new deal was 
Nottingham Forest v. Liverpool screened live on a Sunday afternoon.  
 
The other reason the Premiership was awash with cash was because it was now a separate 
entity and therefore did not have to share its money with the seventy clubs that made up the 
Football League. Having fought a rearguard campaign and lost, the Football League were 
powerless to do anything about this once the Premier League was in operation. Faced with 
most of the television money going to the breakaway league, the compensation of £3 
million annually, of which only £1 million came from the Premier League, was a mere drop 
in the ocean compared to the expected £304 million deal the Premiership had negotiated 
for itself with satellite television broadcasters. As Mott put it, this represented 'the 
unhooking of this first class footballing carriage from those awful fly-blown cattle trucks 
now destined to lumber along at their slower pace in the name of the Football League'.430 
To further the analogy, it was like Thomas the Tank Engine steaming into the distance with 
Annie and Clarabel detached and falling further and further behind.  
 
However, a system of parachute payments was devised to assist clubs relegated from the 
Premiership. This was to soften the blow of the reduced level of income upon losing 
Premiership status, and was to be paid for two seasons. But initially, the financial disparity 
between the Premier League clubs and the Football League clubs caused great concern 
regarding the plight of smaller clubs, some of whom were already experiencing financial 
difficulties. Attention was drawn to this by the plight of two clubs in particular, namely 
Aldershot and Maidstone United.   
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Aldershot went out of business on 25 March 1992, and were obliged to resign from the 
Football League. Maidstone United had their first match of the 1992/1993 season called off 
and were given until the following Monday to guarantee that they would be able to fulfil 
all of their fixtures. The club were unable to secure the necessary backing, and on 17 August 
1992, resigned from the Football League.431 It should be pointed out that neither Aldershot 
nor Maidstone United folded as a result of the Premier League breakaway. Aldershot went 
out of existence in March 1992, before the Premier League had even started, and Maidstone 
United did so in August, only a game into the new season. This was far too early for the 
Premier League to have had any impact and Maidstone had for a long time spent beyond 
their means. They did so initially to achieve League status, and then continued to do so to 
try and stay there. More than anything, the club fell victim to an unsustainable business 
model.   
 
 
Nevertheless, what was important about the demise of Aldershot and Maidstone United was 
the perception rather than the fact. It was imagined that cash strapped clubs in the lower 
divisions would go bankrupt because the Premier League would take a greater share of 
football’s revenue, leaving small clubs to their fate. Although both would reform and be 
constituted as new clubs, the death of two small clubs – one in Hampshire, one in Kent – 
just as the Premier League began served to increase this concern and it seemed at the time 
that they would be the first of many. It should be noted that later on in the 1992/1993 season, 
Barnet came perilously close to suffering the same fate. In June 1991, accountants Touche 
Ross had said that the breakaway league could cause no fewer than thirty-eight clubs to go 
bankrupt if revenue that had been shared throughout the League ended.432 There was of 
                                                          
431  Nawrat and Hutchings, Sunday Times Illustrated History, p.328.   
432   Peter Ball, ‘Widespread Worry In Parliament Over Game’s Future’, The Times, 13 June 1991.  
165 
 
course an agreement now in place that there would be some subsidy from the FA and the 
Premier League, but the outlook for many clubs still seemed bleak.   
 
Fortunately, many of the gloomy predictions that followed the extinction of Aldershot and 
Maidstone United proved to be unfounded. Many clubs did run into financial difficulties, 
and to list them all would read like a ‘who’s who’ of lower division football clubs, but they 
did not follow Aldershot and Maidstone into oblivion. The point should be made that in 
some instances clubs were very badly run, and always had been, so financial woe was not 
always due to the Premiership breakaway. The survival of all the clubs facing difficulties 
was because, as Conn puts it in The Beautiful Game?:  
 
Every time a club was on the brink, with no saviour or solution apparent, somehow, 
with fans rallying round and local businessmen believing they could do better, clubs 
pulled through and survived. The League clubs have grown into a curious mixture – 
commercial organisations required to make money to compete, yet drawing on a deep 
well of support from fans who don’t see them that way at all, but believe in them as 




Life at the other end of football, in the new breakaway league, was not dominated by such 
anxieties. The Premiership in its first season was won by Manchester United. However, the 
season did not start well for United. They lost the opening game 2-1 away to Sheffield 
United, then suffered a home defeat 3-0 against Everton. The next game, also at their Old 
Trafford home, was against Ipswich Town and resulted in a 1-1 draw. It was not until the 
fourth match – away to Southampton – that United registered a win.434 Having finished the 
previous season very close to winning the old First Division, there were demands from 
some quarters that manager Alex Ferguson should go. But form picked up and the team 
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enjoyed a long unbeaten run from November and went top of the table in January. As the 
season progressed, the title race developed into a contest between Manchester United and 
Ron Atkinson’s Aston Villa.435 It was United, however, who marched to the title, winning 
their last seven games in succession. The main factor in the vast improvement in form after 
a bad start was the purchase of Eric Cantona from Leeds United for a bargain £1.2 million 
in November. Leeds, who the previous season had been the last champions of the old First 
Division, slumped dramatically following the sale of Cantona and finished seventeenth, 
only avoiding relegation by two points. Arsenal, who had been the bookmaker’s favourites, 
finished a disappointing tenth, but this fact was tempered by the fact that they won both the 
FA Cup and the Coca Cola Cup. Winning the Premiership in 1992/1993 was Manchester 
United’s first title success since 1966/1967. The 1970s and 1980s had been dominated by 
their North West rivals Liverpool and during those two decades United’s successes were 
confined to the cup competitions. However, the success of 1992/1993 was repeated the 
following season, and United also won the FA Cup in 1993/1994 to become only the fourth 
club to do ‘the double’ in the twentieth century.436 By the end of the 1999/2000 season, 
Manchester United had won the Premiership a total of six times.437   
 
Thus it is impossible to detail the early years of the Premiership without mentioning 
Manchester United’s dominance. It would be easy to look back in hindsight and make a 
connection between the two, but the fact was that under Alex Ferguson the club had slowly 
been building towards success and had only narrowly missed out on the title the season 
before the Premiership breakaway. Manchester United’s success coincided with the 
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establishment of the Premiership, but it did not happen because of it. Rather, the success of 
Ferguson’s United was another sign of continuity. 
 
 Nevertheless, there were straws in the wind, which suggested that the face of football was 
changing at the top level. The Premiership, though not responsible for all of these, would 
exacerbate such trends. On 17 January 1991 it had been announced that Jack Walker, with 
the full support of the board of directors, had taken control of Blackburn Rovers.438 Walker, 
together with his brother, Fred, had built up a steel business, ‘Walkersteel’, and sold it to 
British Steel for a reported £330 million. With his wealth Jack wanted to invest in the club 
he had watched as a boy; he wanted to ‘put something back’.439  
 
In 1990/1991 Blackburn had finished nineteenth in the Second Division. With Walker’s 
wealth they had attempted to attract some well-known players, but only David Speedie, 
signed for £500,000 from Liverpool, could be deemed a ‘big name’ signing. A poor start to 
the new season led to the sacking of manager Don Mackay, and, on 12 October 1991, a new 
management team of Kenny Dalglish, the former Liverpool legend, and Roy Harford, a 
respected coach and former manager of Luton Town, Fulham, and Wimbledon, was 
announced. With this set up in place, it was easier to attract the top players that Blackburn 
required. Dalglish and Harford set about building a team that could turn the season around 
and win Blackburn promotion. Crucially, this would be done with the deployment of 
Walker’s financial power to construct an entirely new side. The signings included left-back 
Alan Wright from Blackpool (£500,000), defender Colin Hendry from Manchester City 
(£700,000), striker Mike Newell from Everton (£1.1 million), and midfielder Gordon 
Cowans from Aston Villa (£200,000). Results were transformed and Blackburn reached 
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third by December. The new signings kept coming, most notably in the shape of midfielder 
Tim Sherwood from Norwich City (£500,000) and striker Roy Wegerle from Queen’s Park 
Rangers (£1.1 million).440 Promotion was won at the end of the season via the play-offs, as 
Blackburn beat Derby County over two legs in the semi-final and Leicester City in the final 
at Wembley.  
 
Thus Blackburn arrived in time to be founder members of the Premiership, complete with 
its lucrative Sky deal. The success that Blackburn would go on to enjoy was not a result of 
the Premiership breakaway, but a direct result of Walker’s investment, and it can be argued 
that, like Manchester United, the club’s experience showed continuity rather than change. 
Yet, although a product of these circumstances, Blackburn would come to symbolise a new 
era. Dalglish and Harford set about improving the team to make a serious impact in the 
Premiership’s inaugural season. The size of Walker’s wallet and the pulling power of 
Dalglish were adequately demonstrated when striker Alan Shearer was signed from 
Southampton for £3.6 million, a new British transfer record.441  Unsurprisingly in the 
circumstances, Blackburn did well, finishing 1992/1993 in fourth position, only three points 
behind runners-up Aston Villa. Meanwhile the side continued to be strengthened with 
Graeme Le Saux arriving from Chelsea (£650,000) and Kevin Gallagher from Coventry 
City (£1.5 million).442 Neither was expenditure confined to building the team. Plans were 
laid to turn Blackburn’s ground, known as Ewood Park, into an all-seater stadium befitting 
a top club. It was during the 1992/1993 season that work began on this transformation.   
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At the same time, on the playing side the spending spree continued. Dalglish prepared for 
a serious assault on the title, signing utility player Paul Warhurst from Sheffield Wednesday 
(£2.7 million), midfielder David Batty from Leeds United (£2.75 million)443, and 
goalkeeper Tim Flowers from Southampton (£2 million). Blackburn finished the 1993/1994 
season in second position, eight points behind double-winning Manchester United. In the 
summer of 1994 the British transfer record was smashed again when striker Chris Sutton 
was signed from Norwich City for £5 million. Sutton was twenty-one years old, uncapped, 
and had played 127 times for Norwich, scoring forty-three goals.444 He signed for a reported 
contract of £12,000 a week in wages.445 The rise in players’ wages, along with the escalation 
in transfer fees, happened throughout the Premiership and was assisted by the increased 
revenue from the Sky television deal.   
 
Sutton and Shearer proved a lethal strike force as the title race in 1994/1995 became a two-
horse one between Blackburn and Manchester United which ran until the last day of the 
season. On the last day Manchester United were away to West Ham United while Blackburn 
travelled to Anfield to face Dalglish’s former club, Liverpool. Blackburn lost 2-1, but 
Manchester United were held to a 1-1 draw, which meant that Blackburn had won the 
Premiership.446 
 
The story of Blackburn Rovers in the early 1990s can be seen in a number of ways. On one 
hand, there was a touch of romance about it – an old mill town long in decline, its football 
team emerging from the lower reaches of the Second Division, in a decrepit, half-empty 
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ground, to become Champions playing to capacity crowds in a brand new stadium. 
Blackburn’s Premiership title in 1995 was the club’s first major trophy since 1928. They 
had not won the League Championship since 1914.447 On the other hand, developments at 
Blackburn embodied the wider cultural trends experienced throughout the Premiership. 
There was the shift of the football club from a civic sporting institution to a business, 
complete with rising prices, inflated transfer fees, and spiralling wages. Whether viewed as 
a positive or a negative development, the experience of Blackburn Rovers suggested that 
the nature of football was changing, both in terms of how it was constituted and also how 
it was experienced.   
 
There was evidence early on, soon after the breakaway, that fans were disenchanted. A 
report, completed in December 1992 by Adrian Langford and Richard Hunt on behalf of 
The Guardian to be sold to advertising and television companies, entitled ‘TV Football – 
Own Goals and Late Winners’, was based on the views of groups of soccer viewers 
throughout England. In it the Premier League was condemned. According to the fans 
surveyed, not only was the Premier League the old product in new packaging, but it was 
actually getting worse. This was because good players sold to foreign clubs were not being 
replaced by players of the same standard from abroad; there were also still too many games; 
and there was great concern about the increase in price. It was found that, while fans 
accepted the construction of seated stadia, they believed that expensive seats in parts of 
football grounds that had previously been cheap represented a move by clubs to acquire a 
new class of customer and turn their backs on traditional fans. The overall feeling of these 
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fans was that football was moving away from them and that changes were being 
implemented for monetary gain without due consideration towards them as customers.448  
 
No-one could any longer accuse the game of being resistant to change, which had often 
been a fair criticism in the past. For many, too much had changed, and little of it for the 
better. David Lacey, in The Guardian, commented that ‘in the space of twelve months the 
Football League has been transformed from a prim dowager of 104 into a bright young 
thing accompanied by an elderly and disinherited aunt. To put it more bluntly, the old 
League has been decapitated by a Premier League carrying few thoughts in its disembodied 
head which do not concern money’.449 On the other hand, Tony Francis, in The Times, 
argued that the Football League was ‘antediluvian and out of step with the real commercial 
world’, but acknowledged that further moves towards radical change, such as a reduction 
to eighteen clubs in line with the original proposal, would prove problematic and therefore 
unlikely. The democracy within the Premier League meant that the big clubs were being 
held in check by the greater number of smaller clubs. There was also an even spread of 
attention in the terms of the satellite television deal, meaning that Oldham Athletic were 
due to be screened as many times as Arsenal.450 Herein lay a supreme irony.       
 
During the early 1990s there was a transformation in the football fan ‘milieu’, which ran 
parallel to, and was influenced by, the modernisation of the game that was under way. 
Football grounds post-Taylor appeared less brutal and in this new emerging climate 
hooliganism became less fashionable. John Williams, the co-editor of the book British 
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Football and Social Change, identifies a number of reasons for this. These include the 
Manchester music scene and the subsequent rave culture, which in turn implies the use of 
ecstasy and the will to ‘party’ rather than fight. He also points to police infiltration into 
hooligan gangs combined with the risk of long prison sentences, post-Italia ’90 optimism, 
and fanzines and supporters’ movements challenging hooligans’ violent and racist attitudes. 
He quoted the fact that arrests were down 30% in the 1990/1991 season, compared to the 
season before, as evidence that police forces were starting to think seriously about getting 
the balance right between security, safety, and customer service. This fitted in with the 
growing democratisation of the game as there was, paradoxically for an age that seemed to 
experience a triumph of the elite, a move towards greater fan representation.451               
 
There was also the impact of Sky television, which successfully marketed football to the 
extent that it appeared ‘trendy’. This marketing was to ensure that Sky profited on the large 
investment they had made in acquiring live coverage. Set into a broader context, the success 
of Sky conformed to the Thatcherite values of the free market – consumer choice, 
individualism, and enterprise – as a vehicle to promote the consumption of football.452 Sky 
had gained the broadcasting rights largely because the smaller Premier League clubs 
remembered ITV’s elitist approach in bonding with the big clubs in the 1988 deal, and so 
voted for Sky, as a July 1992 editorial in When Saturday Comes pointed out: ‘it is 
particularly ironic that ITV should have failed to secure the rights to exclusive coverage of 
the Premier League because they played a crucial role in its creation through their elitist 
approach to the televising of English football over the past few years.’453                 
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The Sky deal had given football its most lucrative broadcasting settlement by a wide 
margin. The 1988 ITV deal, which at the time had seemed generous, was paltry compared 
to the sums now being paid. Such was the influx of money that it had a serious impact on 
the whole culture of the game. The relationship between Sky and the Premiership was 
mutually beneficial. Sky promoted the Premiership relentlessly, using its coverage to 
generate millions of subscriptions. In October 1998, Sky Digital was launched and this 
generated 120,000 new subscribers in the first four months.454 By the time of the 
changeover from analogue to digital Sky could boast about 3.5.million subscribers.455 Sam 
Chisholm, the managing director of Sky, said that the relationship was ‘one of the great 
corporate romances’. From the start, however, the arrangement had its detractors. Conn 
argues that the relationship was ‘more Page Three than romance’. He goes on to say: 
 
 the beautiful game, slapped all over a Murdoch medium between the adverts, hyped 
relentlessly, appreciated only for its surface ... spend an evening with Sky and it’s as 
if they’re trying to sell you something ... they’re trying to sell you an idea, that there 
is nothing wrong with football having been taken off the terrestrial screen and given 
to them, supporters having to pay Murdoch to watch England’s national game. They’re 
trying to sell you the idea that football clubs did nothing wrong, turning the game … 
into a commodity, selling it to the highest bidder.456  
 
Not everyone sees Sky’s coverage in the way that Conn does. John Motson, the BBC 
commentator, said that ‘whatever you think about Sky, the way they presented football was 
modern and fresh. Live coverage led to a wider audience overseas from which the 
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Premiership benefitted and then looked at global opportunities ... Sky have turned the 
Premiership into a worldwide phenomenon’.457 Sky’s coverage analysed the game more, 
giving statistics on a team’s percentage of possession, the number of passes a player makes, 
the number of shots on target, the number of shots off target, and so on. During half-time 
and full-time analysis, it used computer-generated images to draw on the screen the 
trajectory of the ball and where players were positioned or running to. This gave greater 
insight into what was happening in a match.  
 
Yet in Motson’s opinion, the most significant changes were the all-seater stadiums as a 
result of the Hillsborough disaster leading to a new audience and families and the influx of 
huge money.458 As stated earlier, the Premiership marketed itself as fashionable at a time 
when stadiums were converting to all-seater set ups and therefore becoming more 
comfortable, and the success of the England team in reaching the semi-finals of Italia ’90 
helped to broaden football’s audience. There was a resurgence of public interest in the game 
that could be tapped, and attendances continued to revive.   
 
At the same time replica football shirts became a fashion accessory and replaced the scarves 
of the 1970s and the ‘casual’ look of the 1980s. This generated further income for clubs as 
they could be made cheaply and fans were willing to pay up to £40 each for them. 
Merchandising became a significant part of a football club’s income. This was especially 
true for the big clubs, because they could attract followers throughout the country and 
increasingly overseas. Football supporters became harder to categorize. They were no 
longer simply people who attended games, but broadened to include ‘viewers’ in addition 
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to ‘spectators’. A ‘viewer’ is a fan who watches on television, a ‘spectator’ is a fan who 
attends games. The revenue streams of football clubs now diversified as they found they 
could make larger amounts from television ratings and from memorabilia sales than had 
been the case in the past.459 As far as the football clubs were concerned, the growing 
importance of merchandise, combined with increased income from live television 
broadcasting rights, meant that revenue from ticket sales declined as a percentage of a 
club’s overall income. Stephen Wagg makes the following observation regarding the way 
in which the outlook of many football supporters has changed in tandem with these 
developments: ‘a large section of the football public now approach the game … as 
consumers and not as members. They demand spectacle, skill, thrill, and satisfaction … for 
them, football is a celebrity culture.’460  
 
Due to the huge increase in admission prices already detailed, there was concern that 
football would price itself beyond the reach of its market, but this did not happen. So did 
fans become more affluent? Did rich fans displace poor fans? Did football ascend the social 
ladder? Up to a point, the answer to these questions must be ‘yes’, but with reservations. 
Firstly, many fans were never as poor as they were stereotyped. Secondly, devotion to a 
club was such that some would forego other pleasures and increase credit card debt just to 
‘be there’. Thirdly, there may have been more frequent instances of season tickets being 
passed around among friends than used to be the case, meaning that fewer attended all the 
home games, but a greater number saw a few. A season ticket holder who has to miss a 
game would prefer to sell a ticket on to a friend than see it wasted. The individuals making 
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up the crowd may have changed more, thus the composition of the crowd changed more 
from week to week than used to be the case. 
 
If this last point is true, it is in keeping with Britain’s move to longer opening hours in 
retailing and other service industries. Those employed in it have leisure time that is less 
structured, and therefore are forced to work on occasions that coincide with games. The 
fact that some games are played on Sunday afternoons, or any evening of the week, can be 
seen as part of a broader disintegration of time structure as Britain moved towards a 24 hour 
a day, 7 day a week culture. From 1988, pubs could open all day from Monday to Saturday, 
and in 1995 this was extended to include Sunday. As result of the extended hours on a 
Sunday, watching the live Premiership game in a pub on a Sunday afternoon rapidly passed 
into British culture and became an institution.    
 
The fact that attendances held up in the 1990s as opposed to being in terminal decline up to 
1985/1986, despite huge increases in the cost of watching games, can be ascribed to 
football’s growth in popularity, which in turn was assisted by the Premiership and satellite 
television and their successful marketing strategy, safer and cleaner football grounds, and 
the point made above about season tickets being passed around groups of friends.   
 
Growing predictability  
The first Sky television deal expired in 1997. A four season deal worth £743 million was 
signed and as part of the deal the Premiership clubs received £125 million as it got under 
way.461 In just five years Sky was able to offer about two and a half times the headline 
amount of the previous deal, which had at the time been regarded as huge. The 
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overwhelming success of Sky’s football coverage, which had been mutually beneficial, 
justified this large increase. The higher placed clubs received a greater share, in addition to 
any sums they received from participation in the evolving Champions League. This had the 
effect of making the Premiership more predictable because the most successful clubs 
acquired greater resources with which to attract the best players and build on that success 
further. As the millennium approached, a duopoly developed as Arsenal and Manchester 
United competed for the title every season. It turned out that in five of the six seasons from 
1997/1998 to 2002/2003 the top two places were occupied by the same two clubs, drawing 
comparisons with the Scottish Premier League, which had developed into a two-horse race 
between  Celtic and Rangers. John Curran, Ian Jennings and John Sedgwick of the London 
Metropolitan University used three different indices to calculate competitive balance in the 
top division of English football over six decades. Having established that competitive 
balance is vital to retaining fans’ interest and securing sponsorship, they concluded that 
‘competitive balance is decreasing in the top level of English football … the top flight in 
English football has seen the number of competitive teams … halve, from ten to five, over 
the 60 years of the dataset. This is a worrying development if competitive balance is deemed 
important.’462 
 
The Premiership would develop into a three-tier division: at the top the best four, at the 
bottom the strugglers, and a broad middle band. The strugglers consisted of the bottom five 
or six clubs, the three to be relegated and those who just manage to avoid it, and this group 
would usually contain two of the three clubs promoted up to the Premiership at the end of 
the previous season. The remaining ten or eleven clubs formed a broad mid-table group, 
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and the best that any of them could hope for was to finish in fifth position. The situation at 
the bottom of the table can be demonstrated statistically. In the ten seasons up to and 
including 1991/1992, of the thirty promotions to the First Division, only eight clubs were 
relegated after one season. In the ten seasons to 2009/2010, of the thirty promotions to the 
Premiership, the number of clubs relegated after just one season had risen to thirteen. Those 
clubs relegated from the Premiership are in receipt of parachute payments, thus giving them 
a huge advantage over other clubs in the Championship. It is not surprising in the 
circumstances that these clubs will often be promoted back up again. The potential 
developed for some teams to become ‘yo-yo clubs’. The best example of this was West 
Bromwich Albion, who in the nine seasons from 2001/2002 to 2009/2010 were promoted 
to the Premiership four times and relegated from it three times.463 The reason for this level 
of predictability is the gulf in financial resources. The clubs promoted into the Premiership 
from the League generally do not have as much money to spend on players as clubs who 
have been in the Premiership for some time. Therefore they struggle against richer 
opponents.  
 
The authors Simon Kuper and Stefan Szymanski argue that predictability is nothing new as 
certain eras in the past have seen dominant clubs. Arsenal in the 1930s, Liverpool in the 
late 1970s and 1980s, and Manchester United in the 1990s are good examples of this. Their 
argument, however, does not address the level of predictability. At no time before the 
Premiership breakaway could one confidently predict all of the top four clubs for season 
after season before a ball was kicked, but for five of the six seasons from 2003/2004 to 
2008/2009 the top four positions were occupied by the same four clubs, namely Arsenal, 
Chelsea, Liverpool and Manchester United. Kuper and Szymanski take their argument a 
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step further by stating that fans like predictability. They use the fact that attendances 
declined from the late 1940s to the mid-1980s, in a less predictable age, but increased since 
the start of the Premiership, in a more predictable age, to back up their argument. There 
have, however, been other factors at work. They acknowledge that football grounds have 
improved, which is an important contributory factor, but fail to take into account the 
relentless marketing of the Premiership by Sky television. When something is marketed 
successfully, in time this passes into the common perception, and people then flock to it. 
The reason that football crowds have increased, despite escalating prices, is not because 
fans prefer predictability but because of a very successful marketing strategy by Sky 
television, who stand to gain more viewers and subscribers if the Premiership is popular.464  
 
Andy Burnham MP was Britain’s Culture Secretary in Gordon Brown’s government. In 
2008, he warned that the Premier League risked becoming too predictable. He told The 
Guardian, ‘I keep referring to the NFL … in the US … they understand that equal 
distribution of money creates genuine competition, which is good for the League.’465 In the 
NFL of American Football the clubs share TV income equally, and forty per cent of each 
game’s gate money goes to the visiting team. A slogan promoted by the League states that 
‘on any given Sunday any team can beat any other team.’466 The key to such equality is the 
college draft system. This was introduced by the NFL in 1936 and remains a major feature 
of American football. The draft system was designed to ensure that all teams have a fair 
opportunity to recruit new talent. It is held as an annual event and has changed over the 
years, but at present the bids to recruit are made one team at a time. The lowest placed team 
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starts first, and it goes in ascending order up the League with the champions last. New 
players to the League are not free to join any club they choose.467 This ensures competitive 
balance.468 
 
As the revenue from satellite television broadcasting continued to rise, so too did players’ 
wages. The amounts paid to their players by Blackburn, which at the time seemed 
extravagant, would, within a relatively short period, be superseded. Between 1992 and 
1996, which includes the period of Blackburn’s expenditure, wages in the Premiership rose 
by an average of 25 per cent a year. That rate rose to 35 per cent in 1997, and this higher 
rate seemed likely to continue.469 The increase was because the top clubs had more money 
to spend, and because the players were in a stronger bargaining position after the Bosman 
Ruling (more of which in the next chapter). However, there is a need to consider the broader 
picture rather than just that of the famous players whose wages produced sensational 
headlines for the sports pages of the tabloids. An article in When Saturday Comes gave the 
cautionary warning: ‘when the media covers the issue of players’ pay in football, accuracy 
is rarely at a premium. The huge sums bandied around on the back pages are often entirely 
speculative and must be taken with large doses of salt.’470 Bobby Barnes spent most of his 
playing career with West Ham United and is now Deputy Chief Executive of the 
Professional Footballers Association. Regarding the huge salaries that some players are 
reported to earn, he stated: 
 
I think it’s important to make it clear that it is only at the top level of the game. Our 
membership, for example, if you go down the pyramid, League One and League Two 
clubs … although they might earn more than what would [be] considered to be average 
wages … it’s a very short career, and it’s a very precarious career … when a young 
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man comes into the game at aged sixteen as a scholar he’s probably given up a large 
part of his education so that means that effectively he’s put all of his eggs into this 
particular basket at sixteen. By the age of twenty-one something like 85 per cent of 
those who come in at sixteen are permanently lost to the game. If you’re fortunate 
enough to be one of those sixteen-year-olds who gets to twenty-one then the average 
career for a player may be eight, nine years, so it gives you the idea that it’s a very, 
very difficult and precarious profession to get on with and a very, very short window 
to earn what you earn.471 
 
 
The WSC article backs this up: ‘the oft-repeated arguments used by the players’ union about 
short-lived careers, the risk of injuries and the lack of post-football opportunities are 
entirely valid ones.’472 When seen as part of a broader picture, however, there was cause 
for concern because some clubs were spending as much as two-thirds, or in the case of 
Blackburn all, of their income in wages.473   
 
As the Premier League received ever-increasing amounts of money, the gulf between its 
resources and those of the Football League grew. This situation was exacerbated by the 
League’s failure to safeguard their interests adequately in their negotiations with ITV 
Digital. The two main backers, Carlton and Granada, pulled out of the 2001/2002 deal. The 
League had received guarantees, but they were not formalised in writing. 474 This blunder 
cost the League, and therefore the clubs, dearly. A smaller deal was negotiated with BSkyB, 
but many clubs suffered hardship because they had budgeted for receiving the greater 
amount agreed in the original deal.475 Theo Paphitas, the Millwall chairman, summed up 
his anger with the League’s negotiators: ‘it’s a billion-pound business, but if I had kebab 
shop I wouldn’t let them run it.’476 In this instance it can be seen that the shortcomings of 
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the League contributed to a widening of the gap in resources between the Football League 
and the Premier League.  
 
Conclusion 
At the birth of the Premiership, the stakes were high, and becoming increasingly so for 
English football. It is this that, in part, explains the extent of the wrangling between the 
League and the FA. This was because of the extra revenues that could potentially be gained 
from satellite television broadcasters, who in turn had an important role to play due to the 
close relationship that had developed between the top clubs and television. In the end it was 
the FA’s vision that triumphed: it was this that created the modern Premier League. 
Nevertheless, the paradox was that in practice – at least immediately - very little appeared 
to have changed. The differences between the Premiership and the old First Division would 
only start to show up as time progressed. These included spiralling transfer fees and wages, 
increased admission prices, and a large amount of coverage on Sky television. This last 
point can be linked to the broader cultural and social trends of fans watching games in pubs 
and an increasing number who were content to do so rather than physically attend matches. 
There has also been a large growth in the wearing of replica shirts as a fashion accessory. 
Sky’s role in popularising football to this extent was crucial.  
 
The subject of the Premiership, and the wider changes in football that occurred as a result, 
can elicit strong opinions, and this can be seen in some of the secondary sources. Conn 
accuses the top clubs of greed and apportions blame; King interprets the arrival of the 
Premiership as inevitable due to the trends already under way; Walvin offers a more 
balanced assessment; Fynn and Guest take the view that the episode was badly handled by 
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the FA, and the Premiership soon became autonomous in nature rather than subservient to 
its wishes. 
 
It can be demonstrated that the top clubs needed to secure a greater share of revenue in 
order to compete for trophies and to make progress in the European competitions. 
However, there was a mechanism to allow for this, which had been in place since 1986 
when equal distribution among all 92 League clubs ceased. This meant that revenue could 
have been skewed even further towards the big clubs. It did not require a breakaway league. 
The Premiership came about largely because the FA wanted to assert its authority over the 
League.  
 
Regardless of its origins, however, it cannot be denied that the Premiership’s wider cultural 
implications have been enormous. Football at the elite-level has been made fashionable 
again. Promotion of the Premiership by Sky television has been central to this as football 
gained wider popularity to include millions of viewers in addition to the thousands of 
spectators who attend games, and the resulting shift in fashion has provided clubs with 
income from merchandising. The Premiership has also promoted football upwards in terms 
of the social status of its followers at a time of disintegrating class structures. Ultimately, it 
has been the vehicle for the commercialisation and embourgeoisement of football at a 









                                
Some people say it devalues the European Cup, 
but it’s progress. It’s the way we have to go eventually 
 
- Sir Bobby Charlton, Manchester United director and former player 477 
 
 
The Premier League is a honeypot for overseas players 
because of the money available through television 
 
- Gordon Taylor, Professional Footballers Association chief executive 478 
 
 
You want to sign Carlos Kickaball and so do I. 
So I’m in an auction with you and in the end I have 
pissed all my money up the wall and so have you 
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At the start of the 1990s, English clubs were readmitted to Europe following the ban 
resulting from the disaster at the Heysel Stadium in Brussels. The next few years would see 
a transformation in the format of European competition. Europe’s leading clubs, in order to 
secure a certain number of fixtures, and, more importantly, to guarantee a certain level of 
revenue, pushed for a change in the way that the European competitions were organised. 
This was against the background of talk about the possibility of a new European ‘Super 
League’. These circumstances resulted in the expansion of the European Cup and its 
transformation into the UEFA Champions League, the abolition of the Cup-Winners’ Cup, 
and later on the conversion of the UEFA Cup into the UEFA Europa League. English clubs, 
who had been left behind in footballing terms because of the European ban, would, as a 
result of the Premiership, rise again to achieve in Europe, but much of this success would 
be due to the introduction of foreign players. Moreover, as European competition expanded 
it had the effect of diminishing the importance of the domestic cup competitions. As we 
have seen, it also contributed towards the Premiership becoming more predictable because 
the huge sums received by the top clubs from the Champions League gave them an 
advantage over other clubs. This contrasts with the seven seasons from 1966/1967 to 
1972/1973 when the League title was won by seven different clubs – Manchester United, 
Manchester City, Leeds United, Everton, Arsenal, Derby County, and Liverpool.480 
 
The latter half of the 1990s would see an influx of foreign players coming to England to 
play for Premiership clubs. They were able to do this as a result of the Bosman Ruling, 
which guaranteed players freedom of movement within EU states. They were drawn by the 
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attractiveness of Premiership football, and, perhaps more importantly, the lucrative wages 
that could be earned as a result of the income football gained from satellite television 
broadcasting. There was concern that the arrival of so many players from overseas would 
hinder the prospects of local English youngsters, and this in turn would be detrimental to 
the performance and progress of the England team in major competitions. In time, the 
international flow of players into the Premiership would attract wealthy foreign owners who 
would take over some of the top English clubs with mixed results.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to chart the growth of European competition in relation to its 
impact on English football, to follow the increasingly cosmopolitan nature of domestic 
football, and to detail how these changes affected and drove the development of the game 
in England. Beyond this, the aim is to see how these changes fit in with wider developments 
in terms of English people and their perception of the continent, the relationship between 
Europe’s nation states, and the role of England within a Europe that was drawing closer 
together.       
 
Europe, Politics and Football  
In order to see the relationship between English football clubs and their continental 
counterparts in a broader context, it is worth considering the political relationship between 
Britain and its European neighbours. The European Economic Community had been 
formed by the Treaty of Rome (1957) and was effective from the start of 1958. It comprised 
six member states – Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 
Initial British scepticism subsequently gave way to an acceptance that EEC membership 
would be compatible with the UK’s national interests. Twice during the 1960s Britain 
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opened negotiations to join but was rebuffed, but finally joined in January 1973, along with 
Denmark and the Republic of Ireland. The EEC expanded further, admitting Greece (1981) 
and Portugal and Spain (both 1986), before events elsewhere changed the complexion of 
international relations completely. Most notably, the unification of East and West Germany 
(1990), and the attendant collapse of the Soviet Union meant that the EEC had the potential 
to enlarge further as Eastern European states which had formerly been in the Soviet bloc 
sought to gain admittance. This would also change the map of football. Simultaneous to 
these changes was the proposal for a European Free Trade area in which tariff barriers 
would be removed to facilitate trade, coming into effect in 1992.481 
 
Stephen George points out that, according to opinion polls, the attitude of the public towards 
Europe gradually changed to become more pro-European. This was because of a new 
generation who could not remember the imperialist Britain of the past, and had only known 
Britain as a European partner.482 In a wider social context, cheap airlines were opening up 
Europe to British holidaymakers and many were visiting continental resorts which were 
beyond the reach of previous generations. There has been an ‘Open Skies’ initiative, which 
is a liberalization of rules and regulations in the aviation industry. These factors helped to 
change the outlook of Britons towards Europe. A comparison can be drawn with football 
in that gradually isolationist views gave way to a perception of football in a European 
context. This was due to the international movement of players, the transformation of 
European competition, and satellite television broadcasting to a global audience.       
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In international politics the period from the 1960s onwards has thrown up the issue of 
Anglo-European relations and the extent to which England can be seen as a reluctant partner 
in Europe. Among some – the pro-European lobby - there was a fear of isolation, and of 
Britain being left behind. On the other hand, as far as the ‘Eurosceptic’ lobby were 
concerned, there was concern about greater integration throughout Europe. This concern 
fell into two broad areas, namely the potential threat to sovereignty, and the fear that Britain 
could lose out economically. During the 1980s British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
used the rhetoric of sovereignty to resist moves towards federalism and centralised 
economic, political, and social management.483 In the early 1980s differences arose over 
the scale of Britain’s contribution to the EEC budget, and when these had been resolved, 
the Prime Minister spent the latter half of the decade trying to resist the renewed drive 
towards deeper integration.484 Britain’s position regarding the European budget turned out 
to be a recurring theme. It was again an issue in 2005, when Britain argued that its rebate, 
which was about two-thirds of the difference between its contribution and its receipts, must 
stay until the Common Agricultural Policy was reformed.485        
 
Where does this leave football? It is easy to draw a comparison between political isolation 
from Europe and isolation from the continent in football. England’s infamous defeat against 
Hungary at Wembley in 1953 stirred declinist fears. Many were anxious that other countries 
were developing styles and methods of play in advance of English football. Even England’s 
World Cup success in 1966 arguably turned out to be a mixed blessing in the long term in 
that it reinforced isolationism. It led to English football ‘sticking obstinately to its own 
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game’, rather than adopting new coaching methods and continental styles of play, thus 
making subsequent failures more likely.486 This isolation only started to be reversed when 
lucrative deals between the Premiership and satellite television broadcasting companies 
created high wages and therefore attracted foreign players and managers – most notably 
Arsene Wenger at Arsenal where he introduced continental ideas regarding training and 
diet. Arsenal captain Tony Adams recalls that Wenger used a doctor who believed in ‘the 
importance of dietary supplements such as Creatine … Creatine can be invaluable in 
physical conditioning’.487 The players were also blood-tested to ‘determine which player 
needed which level of vitamins’.488 Physiotherapist Gary Lewin also remembers, ‘Arsene 
felt that, due to the wear and tear of the season, players needed them, so you’d have Vitamin 
C drinks and Vitamin B tablets. Yann Rougier, a nutritionist from France, came over and 
did blood and hair tests to see which minerals and vitamins the players lacked.’489 The trend 
of continental players arriving to play in England was furthered by the Bosman Ruling of 
1995, and occurred simultaneously with the closer integration of European states mentioned 
above.     
 
   European competition: readmission and expansion    
By the time England reached the semi-finals of the 1990 World Cup in Italy the prevailing 
view of English supporters on the continent had changed. Lennart Johansson, the UEFA 
president, stated that ‘English supporters are no worse than those in other countries. It is 
just that we have focussed on them’. On 10 July 1990, just over five years after the tragedy 
at Heysel, the decision was taken that English clubs should be allowed back into European 
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competition. This was not extended to Liverpool because it was generally regarded that 
Liverpool fans had been largely responsible for that disaster. The events at Heysel also 
helped shape the prejudices of some regarding the tragedy of Hillsborough. The ban on 
Liverpool was to stay in place for another season. As champions, Liverpool would have 
qualified for the European Cup, so for 1990/1991 there was still no English club in Europe’s 
main cup competition.490 However, in the UEFA Cup Aston Villa entered, and in the Cup 
Winners’ Cup Manchester United made the best possible return for English clubs by 
winning the trophy, beating Barcelona 2-1 in the final in Rotterdam.  
 
In 1991 the League Champions were Arsenal, and therefore in 1991/1992 became the first 
English club to enter the European Cup following readmission to Europe. As it turned out, 
English clubs re-entered Europe just in time for the major changes that were about to take 
place in European club competitions, especially in the European Cup. The transformation 
of European competition, and in particular the replacement of the European Cup with the 
Champions League, was driven by internal and external factors. Internally, there was the 
need to secure a guaranteed level of income for Europe’s big clubs, and also the need to 
stave off ongoing attempts at a breakaway European ‘Super League’. In 1992, trading 
restrictions between Europe’s member states were lifted, and at the start of 2002 most of 
them, although not Great Britain, would join the Euro, and in so doing abandon their own 
national currencies. Increasing integration and the growing power of Europe were reflected 
in the development of Europe’s international football competitions. The amendments to the 
European Cup introduced for 1992/1993 allowed for seven new countries, of which five 
were admitted because of the creation of new states. The recent break-up of the Soviet 
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Union provided new entrants in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine, while the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia provided Slovenia. The composition of Europe was changing 
and these additions reflected this.  
 
Regarding internal pressures, with a knock-out format in place a club’s European campaign 
might only last two games, especially if drawn against strong opponents. The owners of 
Europe’s biggest clubs, particularly Silvio Berlusconi of AC Milan, Bernard Tapie of 
Marseilles, and Ramon Mendoza of Real Madrid, were concerned that early elimination 
would mean missing out on huge potential revenues. This put UEFA under pressure to turn 
the knockout tournament into a league, thus guaranteeing a certain number of games for its 
participants. In response they agreed to turn the quarter-finals and semi-finals into two 
groups of four, with the winners of each group playing each other in the final. This was 
introduced for the 1991/1992 season, coinciding with Arsenal’s appearance. The winners 
of the respective groups were Sampdoria and Barcelona, who met in the final, Barcelona 
winning 1-0 after extra time.491 The decision to play the final at Wembley demonstrated 
further that UEFA had given a vote of confidence to the return of English football to the 
European fold.492 The alteration of the quarter-finals and semi-finals into two groups, each 
competing in a league system, was deemed to be so successful that UEFA gave serious 
consideration to extending the idea to the UEFA Cup and the Cup-Winners’ Cup.493 More 
importantly, it was the first step in the transformation of the European Cup into the UEFA 
Champions League. 
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The possibility of some kind of European League had been suggested as early as August 
1988 by Alex Fynn, then of Saatchi and Saatchi, in a speech given to launch the Rothman’s 
Football Yearbook. Fynn’s plan was for two parallel leagues, North and South, with each 
league consisting of nine or ten teams leaving the existing European competitions 
unaffected. Believing that the changes implemented in the European Cup – that of replacing 
the quarter-finals and semi-finals with a group system – had improved the situation but not 
solved the problem, Fynn produced, in December 1992, a new more radical proposal. He 
recalls, ‘I was fortunate enough to work for an advertising agency. The client was Silvio 
Berlusconi. We were his agency in Italy. The chief of our talent agency rang up one day 
and said to me, ‘I’ve got the job you’ve always wanted, please design a European Super 
League for Silvio Berlusconi.’494 This consisted of a pyramid structure with a premier 
division of ten clubs and beneath it three regional divisions of nine clubs each, with a play-
off system to operate between them. This new competition would replace the European Cup 
and the Cup-Winners Cup, but the UEFA Cup would survive and serve as a feeder to it. 
This proposal, Fynn pointed out, would satisfy the requirements of giving financial security 
to the biggest clubs, give smaller clubs a pinnacle at which to aim, be a fair test of merit, 
and give fans a regular diet of top European football.495 Then three months later Johansson 
announced embryonic plans for a 128-club European League to replace the European Cup 
and the UEFA Cup.496 Regarding his own proposal, Fynn recalls, ‘I did what I felt might 
work. In fact, the only way it worked was as a catalyst that frightened UEFA into 
reformulating the European Cup into the Champions League.’497 
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Manchester United’s Cup Winners’ Cup achievement apart, the return to the fold of English 
clubs was usually marked by disappointing results and early elimination. This brought back 
concerns about the isolation of English clubs from their European neighbours in terms of 
style and a fear that English clubs had been left behind. Donald Saunders, writing in The 
Daily Telegraph following a disappointing night for English clubs in Europe in November 
1992, asserted that ‘the early dismissal of Leeds [United], Manchester United, Sheffield 
Wednesday, and Liverpool from the three UEFA competitions ... suggests that English 
football has been left behind, even by Europe’s modest middle class’. He also commented 
that ‘English soccer will regain the prestige and authority it enjoyed between Manchester 
United’s European Cup triumph in 1968 and the 1985 Heysel disaster only when Premier 
League clubs plan, think, and act with the intelligence, foresight, and professionalism of 
their major European rivals’.498  Liverpool manager Graeme Souness, in an interview in 
The Times, slammed the English preference for what he described as ‘kick-and-rush ... hoof 
it, back it up, and pick up the bits from the opposition’s errors’.499            
 
Initially the name ‘Champions League’ was used to describe only the group stage, but the 
names ‘European Cup’ and ‘Champions League’ would become interchangeable during the 
early 1990s until the latter became the norm in the middle of the decade. The final would 
be officially designated the UEFA Champions League final for the first time for 1995/1996. 
Simultaneous to this was the expansion of the competition - for 1992/1993 entry was 
increased to thirty-six clubs, and for 1993/1994 the preliminary round was expanded.  
However, in December 1993, UEFA also took the decision to introduce wider changes, and 
in so doing shifted the focus of the competition on to the league stage, which was doubled 
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from two to four groups. The group stage would be followed by home and away ties in the 
newly-restored quarter-finals and semi-finals, bringing excitement back to this stage of the 
competition.500 These developments were introduced for 1994/1995.      
 
Yet the proposal for a European League would not go away. At a meeting in Geneva in 
February 1996 UEFA met the top European clubs. Concerned that some clubs had talked 
about a Super League run by themselves, UEFA offered more places, the new entrants to 
be included by doubling the number of clubs from eight countries including England.501 
Thus UEFA sparked controversy by allowing the runners-up in the leagues of the eight 
strongest countries to enter, and in so doing diluted the competition’s nature as the preserve 
of champions. In the case of England this meant that Newcastle United joined Manchester 
United as the second English entrants. For the first time ever, one country – Germany – had 
three entrants, namely Bayern Munich, Bayer Leverkusen, and Borussia Dortmund, as 
German champions, runners-up, and reigning European Champions respectively.502     
 
Even so, suggestions of a rival European league continued. A proposal, drawn up in 1998 
by Media Partners, a sports marketing consultancy based in Milan, suggested that a 
European League of twenty-four or thirty-two clubs be established with a group of founder 
clubs being given permanent membership by virtue of their size and wealth. Media Partners 
maintained that participants could earn substantially more than clubs were receiving by 
competing in the Champions League.503 One Liverpool fan summed up adequately the 
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sense of inevitability and immediacy surrounding the coming European Super League and 
the motives behind it: 
 
Let’s be honest from the start; it’s going to happen, isn’t it? The European Super 
League thingy will, within the next few seasons, become a fact of life. It doesn’t matter 
what you think and it doesn’t matter what I think. It doesn’t even seem to matter what 
UEFA think. Whether it’s under their auspices or not, it’s going to happen … the 
whole thing is driven by greed, the men doing the driving wear sharp suits. The seeds 
for a European Super League can be traced back to the advent of the plc. Shareholders 
live to maximise profitability. Football is now just another product. Marketing men 
will tell you that a product needs to be constantly updated to keep it fresh and 
appealing to the customers. However, the consumers with the financial clout are no 
longer you and me, coughing up our £300+ each year for a season ticket. The real 
guv’nors [sic] are the satellite and TV channels catering for old Armchairarse at 
home.504  
 
In response to continued threats of defection, there was further expansion of the Champions 
League. For 1999/2000, the qualifying stage was extended from two to three rounds, and 
this was to be followed by a double group stage, consisting of thirty-two clubs instead of 
the previous twenty-four. At the start no fewer than seventy-one clubs participated and the 
continent’s strongest countries could each now be represented by up to four clubs. The 
threat to UEFA had been furthered by the formation, in November 1998, of ‘the G14 
Group’, of fourteen top European clubs, including Liverpool and Manchester United, who 
joined together with the aim of coordinating activities and possibly forming their own 
‘Super League’. Their number would later increase to eighteen, but they retained the title 
of ‘the G14 Group’.505 The extra matches introduced to the UEFA Champions League 
brought in more revenue and seemed to stave off the threat of a breakaway for the time 
being.  
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The competition had, however, become too large and bloated. It had lost some of its focus 
and the excessive number of group matches reduced the excitement of the competition, 
making it boring, according to many.506 There were now 157 matches and the finalists 
would have to play seventeen times. In 2000/2001 Gerhard Aigner, UEFA’s chief 
executive, was in a position of having to respond to falling television audiences throughout 
Europe and the fact that some of the leading clubs were playing to small crowds. He said 
that ‘the Champions League is too long and the fixture list is saturated. We don’t want 
people to get bored’.507  UEFA responded to these concerns by dispensing with the second 
group stage, replacing it with an extra knock-out round. This applied from 2003/2004 
onwards.508   
 
The UEFA Cup had begun in 1955 as the Inter-Cities Fairs Cup. The original tournament 
lasted for three years, with matches timed to coincide with trade fairs. For the second 
tournament club participation was introduced but the entrants still had to come from the 
cities staging trade fairs. This tournament lasted two years, after which it was held on an 
annual basis. The first English club to win the trophy was Leeds United, who, in 1967/1968, 
beat Ferencvaros over a two-legged final. This started a run of six successive seasons when 
English clubs won the trophy. In 1971/1972 the name of the competition was changed to 
the UEFA Cup in recognition of the fact that the competition was now run by UEFA, and 
was no longer associated with the trade fairs.509 Hunter Davies, in The Glory Game, said of 
Tottenham Hotspur in this competition in the 1971/1972 season: ‘playing in Europe is both 
an end and a beginning for the top British clubs. It’s in their minds all season, knowing that 
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if they finish high enough in the English League, they will end up qualifying for one of the 
three European competitions the following season’.510 The importance of the competition 
to the teams and fans in its early days is clear. However, in the 1990s the European Cup 
transformed into the Champions League, and more importantly as far as the importance of 
the UEFA Cup was concerned, started to admit those clubs who would previously have 
entered the UEFA Cup.  Inevitably, the prestige of the UEFA Cup gradually slipped to that 
of a competition that was greatly inferior, ridiculed, and even an inconvenience. Paul 
Wilson, in The Observer, wrote that ‘there is simply no point to the UEFA Cup any more’. 
He went on to comment that ‘the UEFA Cup has been obliterated by the Champions 
League. A mouse crushed by an elephant would expire with more of a squeak.’ He justified 
this view with the observation that ‘it doesn’t make you any money, it disrupts your whole 
playing week, and it seems to go on forever’.511   
     
As with the Champions League the knock-out system was changed and a group stage was 
introduced. For the UEFA Cup this was in 2004/2005. This meant that forty entrants played 
four games each. The competition was renamed the UEFA Europa league from 2009/2010 
and expanded to forty-eight clubs playing six matches on a home and away format similar 
to the Champions League.512 The Europa League’s greatly inferior position to the 
Champions League is reinforced by the fact that some of the clubs eliminated from the 
Champions League enter the Europa League as a consolation. Regarding the Cup-Winners’ 
Cup, it commenced in 1960/1961 as the competition for those teams that had won their 
main domestic cup competition. The first English team to win the trophy were Tottenham 
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Hotspur, who did so in 1962/1963. As stated above, Manchester United heralded the return 
of English clubs to European competition following the ban resulting from the Heysel 
tragedy by winning the trophy in 1990/1991. But the competition was scrapped in 1999, 
and since then for English clubs the FA Cup winners have entered the UEFA Cup, later the 
Europa League, instead.         
              
The expansion in European competition had the negative effect of diminishing the 
importance of some of the English domestic competitions. The Premiership, due to its 
revenue from and promotion by satellite television broadcasters, remained largely 
unscathed but both of the cup competitions were adversely affected. There were a number 
of reasons for this decline and although not all of the blame can be laid at the door of 
European competition, a significant part of it can. In order to progress in the Champions 
League the managers of the big clubs saved their best players so that a team fielded in the 
League Cup (under its various sponsorship titles) was often a weakened side. This also 
applied to a lesser extent in the FA Cup, especially when a big club was drawn against a 
small club and a weakened side could still be expected to progress to the following round. 
The League Cup was also affected by its numerous name changes. Sponsorship was 
originally introduced to help a cash-strapped game, but the number of name changes has 
had a detrimental effect on the perception of the standing of the competition. There have 
been seven, each of them sounding less important than the original one, in less than thirty 
years.513 
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The reduction in the importance attached to the FA Cup has been even more acute. As with 
the League Cup, there have been other factors at play in addition to European competition 
muscling in. Firstly, as football’s oldest competition the FA Cup was traditionally cherished 
and therefore had a greater height from which to fall. The role of the FA Cup final as the 
last game of the domestic season helped to preserve the sense that the FA Cup final was 
something special. An article by Roger Titford about the FA Cup final in When Saturday 
Comes also points out that ‘the fact of being the only live, televised, domestic club football 
match and virtually the only one at Wembley all added to the sense that this was a game 
like no other, famed for its ultimate endeavour and lasting legend.’514 The timing of the FA 
Cup final as the season’s last game has altered for two reasons. Firstly, the introduction of 
the play-offs in 1986/1987 meant that the respective divisional play-off finals were 
scheduled later than the FA Cup final. Secondly, the establishment of the Premiership as a 
breakaway league would result in the fact that, for 2000/2001 and 2001/2002, the last day 
of the Premiership season was a week later than the FA Cup final, thus taking away the FA 
Cup final’s importance as the last game of the season.515 This would happen again in 
2010/2011 and 2011/2012.   
 
Simon Kuper and Stefan Szymanski, in Why England Lose And Other Curious Football 
Phenomena Explained, provided statistics to demonstrate a decline in interest in the FA 
Cup. Using crowd figures at FA Cup ties involving two teams from the same division, they 
demonstrated that in 1976/1977 FA Cup games attracted thirty per cent more spectators 
than the League fixture between the same two teams. These extra supporters were drawn 
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by ‘the magic of the Cup’. At the start of the 1990s, this figure dropped slightly to around 
twenty-five per cent, but as from the mid-1990s, by which time the UEFA Champions 
League was under way, this figure collapsed. In 1997/1998 FA Cup games for the first time 
drew fewer spectators than their League equivalents. This downward trend continued. In 
the 2000s FA Cup games attracted between eighty and ninety per cent of their equivalent 
League fixtures.516 The situation was that the revival in attendances that applied to the 
League, and especially to the Premiership, did not filter through to the FA Cup. This, 
according to Kuper and Szymanski, was because of satellite television promoting the 
Premiership, whereas FA Cup coverage remained sparse by comparison.517 However, they 
do not mention that the FA Cup was simply overshadowed by the expanding UEFA 
Champions League, with its greater level of media attention, greater potential revenue, and 
big European names. Jim White, in The Daily Telegraph, illustrates the extent to which the 
Champions League expansion damaged the FA Cup by comparing a Champions League 
game and an FA Cup replay played on the same evening: 
 
At the precise moment on Wednesday night that 60,000 people were packing the 
Emirates with noisy expectation ahead of Arsenal’s Champions League tie with 
Barcelona, 7,515 diehards were filing into the DW stadium to watch Wigan play 
Bolton in an FA Cup replay. There can be no sharper indication of the decline in 
prestige of the world’s oldest football competition than the gap between these two 
fixtures ... at the Emirates ITV’s Clive Tyldesley was polishing his superlatives for a 
television audience approaching10 million to watch football as it should be played. At 
the DW the home club shut one of the stands leaving it an empty reproach behind the 
goal ... the Cup is a shrivelled parody of what it used to be ... a distant third in the 
concern of our more ambitious football businesses.518 
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Ken Jones, in The Independent, also points the finger of blame for the FA Cup’s decline in 
prestige at the Premiership and the Champions League, by referring to the fact that the 
number of viewers for the FA Cup final fell steadily, with one exception, from 14.9 million 
in 1991 to 6.3 million in 2002.519 These two articles blame the revenue that can be gained 
from the Premiership and the expansion of the Champions League for the FA Cup’s decline. 
Manchester United player Roy Keane makes this observation: ‘there’s no doubt that in an 
era when the Premiership and the Champions League have become the competitions to win, 
the FA Cup is nothing more than a consolation prize, an afterthought really.’520 
   
Coverage also remained on the BBC for good reason. It was one of the eight sporting ‘crown 
jewels’ that, according to the Broadcasting Act 1990, could not be shown on pay-per-view 
channels. This ruling was extended to cover all subscription satellite channels in a 1996 
Amendment.521 If the FA Cup final was to go live and exclusively to Sky, as it could have 
done before the 1996 Amendment, it would have meant that eighty-five per cent of the 
population would have been unable to see it. Thus there was a mood to preserve live 
coverage of the Final as a tradition for those who could not afford to receive satellite 
television broadcasts.  
 
The FA Cup was dealt a further blow in 1999/2000 when Manchester United, the holders, 
opted out of the competition to play at the World Club Championship in Brazil. Manchester 
United had just completed their unique ‘treble’, and, as winners of the Champions League, 
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were invited to take part in FIFA’s new competition. At the time the FA were bidding to 
host the 2006 World Cup finals in England. David Davies, executive director of the FA, 
asked Alec McGiven, the bid director, what it would mean to England’s World Cup bid if 
Manchester United declined to attend the tournament in Brazil. He was told ‘bad, bad 
news’. Supporting the competition was vital to gaining the support of FIFA, a message 
reinforced by FIFA executive Chuck Blazer, when he stated that ‘if United didn’t represent 
Europe in FIFA’s major club competition it would be impossible for the FA even to dream 
of hosting 2006’.522 It can be seen that the FA and Manchester United were in an impossible 
‘damned if we do, damned if we don’t’ situation. Heavily criticised for withdrawing from 
the FA Cup, United flew to Brazil to keep England’s World Cup bid alive. Their place in 
the FA Cup was taken by a ‘lucky loser’, Darlington, who were drawn from the teams 
defeated in the previous round. Keane gives his view on United’s position: 
 
The truth of this affair, which caused so much controversy, was that the FA Cup had 
lost its relevance, certainly for me. Sure, it was a day out for our families, and 
everybody who worked hard behind the scenes at the club. The Wembley myth, the 
folklore attached to the walk out of the tunnel, the red carpet, meeting the big shots, 
going up to the Royal Box to receive your medal, a pat on the back from the great and 
the good (and hopefully the Cup), all of it was bollocks. The Premiership and the 
Champions League were the only trophies we were concerned about.523 
 
It is clear, however, that opinions differ considerably. The season after Manchester United’s 
withdrawal from the competition, Liverpool won the trophy, and Liverpool player Steven 
Gerrard makes the following observation: 
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Some cynics were suggesting the FA Cup had lost its magic. What a joke! Try telling 
that to the tens of thousands of Liverpool fans who charged down the motorway to 
Cardiff in May 2001, singing all the way, flags and scarves streaming from windows, 
a Red Army on the move. Try telling that to the players, Englishmen like me, who 
view the famous old trophy as a Holy Grail. Our dads taught us about the Cup, sat us 
down on that great Saturday in May to watch, and explained that few honours can beat 
the man who steps up to lift the FA Cup.524 
 
Even so, statistics on attendances and the fact that some of the top teams are inclined to 
field weakened sides in an FA Cup tie, especially if they fall just before a Champions 
League encounter, point to a decline in prestige. Another possible reason for the FA Cup’s 
decline has been a reduction in the quality of the final itself. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
although not every final was a great game, there were several years when it was. Interest 
was generated by an exciting game or by an underdog triumphing over a favourite. This 
last point applied to finals in 1973 (Sunderland beat Leeds United), 1976 (Southampton 
beat Manchester United), 1978 (Ipswich Town beat Arsenal), 1980 (West Ham United beat 
Arsenal), 1987 (Coventry City beat Tottenham Hotspur), and 1988 (Wimbledon beat 
Liverpool). On the first point, the final of 1979 provided a thrilling finale (Arsenal beat 
Manchester United 3-2 with three of the game’s five goals coming in the final minutes), 
and high-scoring draws in 1983 (Manchester United v. Brighton and Hove Albion) and 
1990 (Manchester United v. Crystal Palace) made for entertaining games. By comparison, 
almost all of the FA Cup finals from 1991 onwards made for less interesting affairs with 
predictable outcomes. During the next two decades only the 2006 final (Liverpool v. West 
Ham United - West Ham as underdogs led twice before the game finished 3-3 and Liverpool 
won on penalties) could be described as a thrilling match. Gerrard remembers: 
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Everyone raved about the match. The 125th FA Cup final was called the greatest ever, 
even ‘The Gerrard Final’! That meant the world to me. I love the FA Cup. It has taken 
a few knocks over recent years, and Premiership clubs are perhaps more focused these 
days on the Champions League, but Liverpool and West Ham put the shine back on 
the trophy that day in Cardiff. Good. I never knocked the FA Cup. I never 
underestimated its importance to fans.525 
 
The 2006 final was the exception that proves the rule. In other years, there is ample evidence 
to suggest that the event is not as revered as it once was, and since then it has been further 
diminished by the decision to stage semi-finals at Wembley. The first time this happened 
was for practical reasons, but later on it became a regular feature. Until 1990 the semi-finals 
were always played at a neutral club ground - usually Villa Park (home of Aston Villa), 
Highbury (Arsenal), Hillsborough (Sheffield Wednesday), or Old Trafford (Manchester 
United). However in 1990/1991 Arsenal and Tottenham Hotspur were drawn against each 
other, and, there being no neutral club grounds in London large enough, the semi-final was 
played at Wembley. Two seasons later the same happened again, and the other semi-final, 
between Sheffield Wednesday and Sheffield United, was also played at Wembley to avoid 
unfair advantage to players who had already played there come the final. Semi-finals 
thereafter reverted to neutral club grounds (bar one season) until the 2007/2008 season 
when it was decided to stage FA Cup semi-finals at Wembley permanently.   
 
By the time Wigan Athletic beat Manchester City in the 2013 final it had been twenty-five 
years since the rank outsiders had lifted the trophy.526 While the point about finals 
diminishing in excitement is probably less important than the other factors previously 
mentioned it has nonetheless contributed towards the decline of a once great competition. 
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The biggest factor in what Kuper and Szymanski term ‘the strange death of the FA Cup’ 
has been the expansion of European competition, and in particular the Champions League, 
along with the associated television coverage. The decline can also be linked to wider 
societal changes. Titford makes the observation that ‘there was a certain inevitability that 
the pre-eminence of the FA Cup final would decline as the mass society that was Britain in 
the post-war period fragmented into more media choice and more leisure pursuits.’527 
 
The Bosman Ruling  
While the European Cup was beginning to expand into the Champions League, there was a 
legal case being contested, the final judgement of which, in December 1995, would have 
far-reaching consequences as far as the international transfer of players was concerned. In 
1990, Jean-Marc Bosman, a Belgian footballer registered with RC Liege but out of contract, 
sought a new contract with the French club US Dunkerque. The two clubs reached 
agreement on the terms of the player’s temporary transfer. Bosman would become a US 
Dunkerque player for one season in return for compensation payable on receipt of the 
transfer certificate from the Belgian FA. US Dunkerque were also granted an option for the 
player’s permanent transfer in return for a further payment. However, the contracts between 
Bosman and US Dunkerque and between US Dunkerque and RC Liege were both subject 
to the Belgian FA’s transfer certificate reaching the French Football Federation by 2 
August. RC Liege doubted US Dunkerque’s ability to pay the agreed sum, so they failed to 
apply to the Belgian FA to issue the transfer certificate, so both contracts lapsed. Also, RC 
Liege suspended Bosman with the result that he was unable to play in the new season.528 
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Bosman responded by bringing an action before the Belgian court suing RC Liege for 
damages. His claim was based on two points. Firstly, he alleged that RC Liege were in 
breach of contract. Secondly, he called into question the legality of the transfer system. This 
second point involved one of the fundamental principles of European Community law, 
namely that of the freedom of movement of workers within its member states.529 The case 
took five years to reach its conclusion. The judgement was delivered by the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ). In it Advocate General Carl Otto Lenz ruled that Article 48 of the Treaty 
of Rome prohibited ‘a football club from being able to demand and receive payment of a 
sum of money when one of its players whose contract has expired is engaged by another 
club’. He also ruled that Article 48 prohibited ‘the access of players who are nationals of 
another member state to the club competitions organised by the national and international 
associations from being restricted’.530 In short, a transfer fee was not required if a player 
was out of contract and players were free to move between the member states of the 
European Union.    
 
The possible effect of the ruling was seen in different ways. Colin Randall, in The Daily 
Telegraph, stated that the ‘multi-million pound soccer transfer market was thrown into 
disarray’.531 He claimed that although the ruling only applied to clubs of different member 
states, the British football authorities might have to change the domestic rules to bring them 
in line, pointing out that the lawyers acting for Bosman believed this to be the case. There 
was a lot of concern about the plight of smaller clubs who depended on transfer fees 
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received from selling players to bigger clubs.532 However, Christopher Davies, in the same 
newspaper, said that, ‘it appeared that players transferring between clubs in the same 
country would not be eligible for a free transfer.’533 This meant that smaller clubs would 
still get their fee unless a player was transferred abroad. The interpretation of the ruling 
published in the Daily Mirror focussed on the amount of money that top players could 
receive in signing-on fees and pay increases. Using Manchester United’s Ryan Giggs as an 
example, it claimed that he would ‘be able to hang up his boots at the age of 30 – with up 
to £40 million in the bank.’534 The article also predicted, correctly as it turned out, that ‘the 
trickle of foreign imports … into English football will now become a torrent.’535 
 
The two main points of the ECJ ruling would have an impact in terms of implications for 
transfer fees and players’ wages, but it turned out that it would be far more important as far 
as the international movement of players was concerned. Players moving out of contract 
could demand more wages because they knew that the buying club would not have to pay 
a transfer fee. The clubs as employers would try to lock players into long contracts to 
guarantee a large transfer fee should a player wish to leave. This was a policy which was 
already being pursued by Tottenham Hotspur and Wimbledon. Also, contracts could be 
renewed before expiry to prevent a player leaving for free. However, the Bosman Ruling 
had only a limited impact on transfer fees because it only applied to those players who were 
out of contract and were nationals of an EU member state. In 1995 in England, only ten per 
cent of transfers involved out of contract players Also, fears that the Bosman Ruling would 
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have a negative effect on lower division clubs, leading to their demise or reduction to part-
time status, proved to be unfounded because most of the big money transfers of English 
players to clubs in other member states involved players who were already playing for 
Premier League clubs.536 
 
As far as the freedom of movement between member states was concerned, before this time 
UEFA had operated what was known as the ‘three plus two foreigner rule’. This stipulated 
that clubs could only field three foreign players plus two ‘assimilated’ players in European 
club competitions. An ‘assimilated’ player was one who had lived in that country for five 
years or one that had played in that club’s youth team.537 Previously there was no limit, 
although, as we shall see, in England there had once been an effective ban on the 
recruitment of non-Britsh players, which was rescinded in 1978. The ECJ held that rules 
limiting the number of players from other member states whom a club can play in a match 
were discriminatory and thus inapplicable according to the terms of Article 48.538 Following 
the ruling, players were now free to move between states and were drawn to England by 
the potentially lucrative earnings available, by the reputation of the Premiership as an 
exciting and entertaining league, and to further their careers. The Ruling also opened 
opportunities for English clubs to improve their performance in European competition as 
they were now free to sign an unlimited number of foreign players.539 The journalist Joe 
Lovejoy said that the Bosman Ruling was probably the most important of the recent changes 
in English football.540 
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 ‘Football’s Coming Home’: Euro 96 and its implications  
In 1996 the European Championships were held in England. After the disappointment of 
failing to qualify for the 1994 World Cup finals in the United States, the fact that England 
was host to the next major competition gave an automatic boost of optimism and a chance 
to revive the international team’s fortunes after Graham Taylor’s disastrous leadership. As 
hosts England did not have to play through the qualifying rounds and this gave new 
manager Terry Venables less pressure and the opportunity to forge the players into a unit 
capable of making a serious impact on the competition.  
 
Set in a broader context, the early 1990s had seen economic recession, negative equity and 
the repossession of homes, the Gulf War, bloodshed in Bosnia, the unpopular ‘poll tax’ or 
community charge, redundancy and unemployment. However, this started to change 
towards the middle of the decade as the economic situation improved and there was a more 
positive mood. This was encapsulated and reflected by ‘Britpop’ as British bands such as 
Blur and Oasis gained popularity. With the mood now more positive in an age called ‘Cool 
Britannia’, Euro 96 was something to look forward to.  
 
There was a new generation of fans who could enjoy the facilities of the new post-Taylor 
stadiums and, thanks to the promotion of the Premiership by Sky television, football was 
now more popular than it had been for decades.541 Simultaneous to this was the Fantasy 
Football phenomenon. This was a competition which started in the newspapers whereby 
                                                          
541  Ward and Williams, Football Nation, p.312.  
210 
 
the entrant had an imaginary amount of money with which to pick a team. Sometimes 
groups of friends or work colleagues organised their own fantasy football leagues within 
the competition. This had the effect of giving people who do not usually attend football 
matches more interest in the game.  To coincide with the tournament the comedians and 
hosts of the Fantasy Football television programme David Baddiel and Frank Skinner 
teamed up with the pop band The Lightning Seeds to record Three Lions On A Shirt. In so 
doing the worlds of pop music, television and popular culture blended in a similar way to 
that which had happened six years earlier for ‘Italia ‘90’ with Pavarotti’s Nessum Dorma 
and New Order’s World In Motion. The Baddiel, Skinner and the Lightning Seeds record 
was released and went straight to the top of the charts. It arguably eclipsed all previously 
released football songs in terms of its universal popularity, and its refrain of ‘it’s coming 
home, it’s coming home, football’s coming home’ rang around stadiums during the 
tournament. It is also worth remembering that the new map of Europe gave some newly 
independent nations their first appearance in such a competition – Croatia’s first since the 
break-up of Yugoslavia, the Czech Republic’s first since the break-up of Czechoslovakia, 
and Russia’s first since the break-up of the USSR.   
 
England kicked off on 8 June at Wembley against Switzerland. The international team’s 
reputation for starting major competitions slowly was in evidence again at Euro 96. The 1-
1 draw against the Swiss was disappointing. England’s second game was a week later 
against Scotland, a match that drew a lot of interest due to the history between the two 
countries. With England leading 1-0, David Seaman in the England goal crucially saved a 
penalty, then Paul Gascoigne produced one of his most memorable moments, juggling the 
ball over Colin Hendry before volleying into the Scotland net to make it 2-0. England’s 
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third and final group match was against Holland on 18 June. With the knowledge that defeat 
would end England’s involvement in the competition, the team put on one of the nation’s 
best ever footballing performances, crushing the Dutch 4-1. Now through to the knock-out 
stages England faced Spain in the quarter-finals. A goalless draw resulted in a penalty 
shoot-out, which England won 4-2, Stuart Pearce’s successful strike laying to rest the ghost 
of his penalty miss against West Germany at Italia 90.542 In the semi-finals England played 
Germany. An early goal by Alan Shearer was cancelled out by an equaliser from Stefan 
Kuntz and penalties loomed again. Both teams scored all of their first five, but in the sudden 
death series Gareth Southgate’s effort was saved resulting in England’s exit from the 
competition.    
 
Once again England had been glorious in defeat, reaching the semi-final of a major 
competition and being eliminated only by the narrowest of margins. The importance of 
Euro 96 was that it promoted England as a football destination. With the money that was 
by this time being generated by the Premiership, promotion by satellite television, and 
stadiums that were newly rebuilt and safer, the modern footballer could now see England 
as a good place to ply his trade and earn vast fortunes. The fact that England had done well 
in the competition meant that ambitious players knew that they had the opportunity to play 
alongside teammates who were good footballers and that the English game was in a healthy 
state. Just six months after the Bosman Ruling Euro 96 placed England firmly in the shop 
window as a desirable country in which to play football.    
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England’s foreign legion  
As we have seen, there was an effective ban on the import of non-British players that had 
been in place since 1931 and this had contributed to isolationism in the English game. 
Although this was reversed by the Football League in 1978 the number of non-British 
players playing in the Football League remained very low, although it should be pointed 
out that many English clubs included Welsh and, in particular, Scottish players. The arrival 
of overseas players such as Argentinian World Cup stars Ossie Ardiles and Ricardo Villa 
at Tottenham Hotspur and Dutch stars Arnold Muhren and Frans Thijssen at Ipswich Town 
in the late 1970s might have been a foretaste of the internationalisation to come, but the 
total number of non-British players playing for English clubs remained small until the 
lucrative earnings that could be made playing in the Premiership became apparent. During 
1992/1993, the Premiership’s first season, there were just eleven foreign registrations with 
Premiership clubs. These were the Danish pair John Jensen (Arsenal) and Peter Schmeichel 
(Manchester United), the Swedes Anders Limpar (Arsenal) and Roland Nilsson (Sheffield 
Wednesday), the Frenchman Eric Cantona (Leeds United then Manchester United), the 
Dutch Michel Vonk (Manchester City) and Hans Segers (Wimbledon), the Russian Andrei 
Kanchelskis (Manchester United), the Norwegian Gunnar Halle (Oldham Athletic), and the 
Czechs Jan Stejskal (Queen’s Park Rangers) and Ludek Miklosko (West Ham United).543 
This figure grew from eleven in 1992/1993 to sixty-six in 1995/1996 and 166 by 1998/1999 
and continued to grow. By the opening day of 2000/2001 there were over 400 non-British 
players in all English leagues.544  
 
                                                          
543  Joe Lovejoy, Glory Goals and Greed: twenty years of the Premier League (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 2011), 
pp.213-214.  
544  Taylor, Association Game, p.396; Patrick McGovern ‘Globalization Or Internationalization?: foreign 
footballers in the English League 1946-95’, Sociology 36/1 (2002), pp.28-30.  
213 
 
This influx led to a dramatic reduction in the number of English players that were fielded 
as the seasons progressed. Taking the Premiership alone, at the beginning of 2003/2004 out 
of 220 players who kicked off the season, only eighty-six were English. This figure was 
down from 170 a decade earlier. In percentage terms this was a reduction from seventy per 
cent to thirty-nine per cent.545 There were a number of reasons behind this trend. It is 
certainly true that the Bosman Ruling served to increase player mobility. As we have seen, 
soon after the ruling Euro 96 promoted England as a destination in which to play football. 
The most important factor, however, was the lucrative earnings that could be made. Gordon 
Taylor, chief executive of the Professional Footballer’s Association, was quoted as saying 
‘the Premier League is a honeypot for overseas players because of the money available 
through television’.546 It can be seen that a trend which began as a trickle in 1978 increased 
with the start of the Premiership in 1992 and became a torrent following the Bosman Ruling.  
 
In July 1995, at the time that the ECJ was approaching the end of its long deliberations over 
Bosman, Chelsea manager Glenn Hoddle signed Ruud Gullit on a free transfer from 
Sampdoria. As a Dutchman who had played in Italy, Gullit proved the ideal person to lure 
players at bargain prices from both Holland and Italy. When Hoddle left to take over from 
Terry Venables as England manager after Euro 96, Gullit was promoted to manager of 
Chelsea. He soon signed Gianluca Vialli on a post-Bosman free transfer from Juventus. The 
absence of a transfer fee meant that Vialli earned a reputed £1.5 million a year. Soon West 
Ham United followed, signing Paulo Futre from AC Milan on a post-Bosman free transfer, 
paying him wages reported at over £1 million a year.547 The impact of the Bosman Ruling 
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differed from club to club. Whereas Chelsea could sign good players on free transfers 
paying huge salaries instead, Manchester United found that they had to offer their best 
players vast new salary packages and long-term contracts to prevent them from going 
abroad. This had the effect of almost doubling the club’s wages bill. It was a similar story 
at Arsenal where within a year of the Bosman Ruling the wage bill leapt from £8.7 million 
to £13.3 million.548     
 
 While Gullit proved important in influencing foreign players to sign for Chelsea, the same 
could be said for Arsene Wenger at Arsenal. Wenger arrived as manager of Arsenal in 
September 1996 and set about building a cosmopolitan team comprised almost completely 
of foreign players.549 The first to arrive was Patrick Vieira, a French midfielder signed from 
AC Milan for £3.5 million, around whom Wenger would build his side. This signing was 
soon followed by another Frenchman, a young striker with great potential called Nicolas 
Anelka from Paris Saint-German for £500,000, who could play alongside Dutch striker 
Dennis Bergkamp who had already been signed by previous manager Bruce Rioch. After 
finishing third in his first season, Wenger spent the summer of 1997 signing more foreign 
players, including French defensive midfielder Emmanuel Petit from Monaco for £2.5 
million, and Dutch winger Marc Overmars from Ajax for £7 million. In his first two years 
at Arsenal, Wenger would go on to recruit eighteen players of whom all except one was 
foreign. During the same period he sold seventeen players of whom all except four were 
English.550 Arsenal were transformed from the ‘boring, boring Arsenal’ of the 1970s and 
1980s into a side that by the end of the 1990s played attractive, exciting football due to the 
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skills of foreign players. The experiences of Chelsea and Arsenal proved that an influential 
player or manager with extensive overseas connections could be important in recruiting 
foreign players and this in turn played a part in the growing internationalisation of English 
football.  
 
Wenger introduced methods at Arsenal which marked a sea change in English football. His 
approach was completely different to what the English game had been used to. While in 
Japan, Wenger had ‘marvelled at the virtual absence of obesity, and concluded that rice, 
fish, and fermented bean products, all washed down with high-in-anti-oxidants green tea, 
were exactly what modern footballers needed ... he informed Arsenal’s slack-jawed players 
that the lager, chips, and Black Forest gateau days were over’.551 He also introduced mostly 
French health and wellness gurus. One was Philippe Boixel, who believed in a lateral 
thinking first approach to physical injury. The players were baffled. Tony Adams describes 
his initial reaction to Wenger: ‘what does this Frenchman know about football? He wears 
glasses and looks more like a schoolteacher.  He’s not going to be as good as George 
[Graham, Arsenal’s former manager].’552 However, Adams would go on to alter this view: 
‘he has a lot of qualities, he is a thinker, a listener, and he cares a great deal about the 
welfare of players … he is certainly an educated man, well qualified, and I think he knows 
professional footballers inside out. He can tell just by how a player runs whether he is fully 
fit or not.’553 Bergkamp confirms how much things changed under Wenger: ‘with Arsene, 
everything changed completely. The training, the diet, the drinking, everything.’554 
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Arsenal started winning, convincingly and with style. Arsenal’s achievement of winning 
the FA Cup and Premiership ‘double’ in 1997/1998 was a triumph of Wenger’s methods.555 
Arsenal were not the only club to adopt this new approach. Keane comments on his 
experience at Manchester United: 
Now, what you eat and drink is carefully measured. Gatorade, fruit and pasta all come 
highly recommended. Foreign players and coaches, and the dieticians employed by all 
the top clubs, have convinced us of the need to look after ourselves. Speaking as a 
convert to this new order, I believe that the disciplines that we now follow have led to 
significant improvement in our fitness levels and general performance. The English 
game has been transformed … for the better. No doubt about that. It scares me looking 
back at how we were in my early years at Old Trafford.556 
 
He does comment nostalgically: ‘we’d had a lot of fun in the drinking era and the part of 
me that hankered after the rowdy banter and camaraderie of the best drinking sessions 
missed those gloriously irresponsible nights.’557 Liverpool player Steven Gerrard echoed a 
similar change in approach at his club when the French Gerard Houllier took over from Roy 
Evans. He quotes the new management regime: ‘eat what we tell you. Drink what we tell 
you. We want you physically ready for the first team. You are not far away.’558 He 
remembers, ‘things moved fast. A dietician spoke to us. He checked me over and ordered 
me to cut out fast food. My eating habits weren’t too bad before, but I knew I had to get 
fitter. No more burgers.’559 
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Bobby Barnes, former player and Deputy Chief Executive of the Professional Footballer’s 
Association, commented: 
 
it’s not so long ago that players would sit down at lunchtime and have a pre-match 
steak, and nowadays it’s very much pasta-based and quick carbs and slow release 
carbs. In terms of the nutrition the players eat every day, a lot of clubs now – 
particularly the top clubs - they would insist that the players come to work in the 
morning, they have breakfast, the club can control what they have for breakfast, they 
will have lunch together, so there’s far more of an input from the clubs now into the 
nutrition of their players, and quite rightly so … you wouldn’t buy a machine and 
leave it out in the rain and use dodgy oil on it, would you? That’s quite a good analogy 
for footballers.560 
 
He also pointed out: 
it’s a far more scientific business now, and it’s tailored to individual players … players 
now wear heart monitors when they train, clubs can have an idea of when they’re 
reaching their maximum capacity, how far they’ve run, they’ve got statistics now that 
actually look at effectiveness of where they’ve run, what they do, so it really is a 
million miles away … nowadays there’s a lot more individual tailored fitness plans 
for players, and I think that you can see the benefits of that because players are fitter.561 
 
Thus it can be seen that there was a marked shift away from drinking and towards 
athleticism and continental ideas, with an approach that was more aesthetically pleasing 
than that seen in English football in the past. The methods introduced as part of this 
continental approach also had the effect of improving the perception of the football manager 
in the English game.     
 
                                                          
560 Bobby Barnes, interview with the author, London, 15 June 2015.  
561 Ibid.  
218 
 
Internationalisation was not confined to the big fashionable clubs. While Wenger set about 
moulding his Arsenal side into a sleek continental outfit, in the unlikely surroundings of 
Teesside the Italian Fabrizio Ravanelli and the Brazilian Juninho helped Middlesbrough 
reach the finals of both the Coca-Cola Cup and the FA Cup in 1996/1997. Unfortunately 
for Middlesbrough, these players could not prevent relegation from the Premiership. As an 
aside, Middlesbrough’s bitter-sweet experience of reaching two cup finals and being 
relegated in the same season remains unique in English football. The trend of more and 
more foreigners playing for English clubs continued. In 2002, Fulham fielded a team 
including only one Englishman (Lee Clark), and towards the end of the decade, in 
December 2009, Portsmouth played Arsenal and out of twenty-two players on the pitch, 
not one of them was English.562   
 
Neither was this growing trend of internationalisation limited to Europe. The development 
of satellite and digital television effectively globalised both the UEFA Champions League 
and the Premiership. Europe’s top football competitions proved popular in Africa, in 
Australasia, and in South-East Asia. There was a desire to exploit fresh markets and 
Manchester United opened up megastores in Kuala Lumpa and Singapore and toured the 
Far East and the United States in order to establish themselves in a global marketplace.563 
FIFA’s decision to award the 1994 World Cup finals to the United States had been partly 
due to a desire to boost football’s popularity there. The same would apply to the decision 
to award the 2002 finals to South Korea and Japan. Football’s popularity throughout the 
world was increasing due to global satellite broadcasting, but there was also a keen desire 
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to exploit this interest by penetrating new markets. There was an almost missionary zeal to 
spread the good news of ‘the beautiful game’ to the unconverted parts of the world, in a 
move comparable in mood to the colonizers and settlers who spread Christianity throughout 
the expanding British Empire in the nineteenth century.  
 
There was of course an ulterior motive in that this expansion was due to a desire to increase 
profit margins. In this, the Premiership would prove to be very successful. In 2001 the sale 
of overseas television rights brought in £178 million but this would increase to £625 million 
in the deal that would be struck in 2007. Of this figure, £100 million was spent by NowTV 
to secure the rights for Hong Kong, £60 million by Showtime Arabia to secure the rights 
for the Middle East and North African markets, and £50 million by Win TV to show games 
in China. The potential was vast, and Premier League football was proving especially 
popular in Asia and the Middle East. By 2008, Premier League games were broadcast to 
over 600 million homes in 202 countries around the world.564 In response to this, and to 
increase potential yet further, in February 2008 the Premier League clubs agreed to look 
into the suggestion of playing an extra round of matches abroad. The suggestion of ‘the 39th 
game’ did not materialise, but the issue demonstrated adequately both the impact of the 
overseas market and the lengths to which clubs were prepared to go to maintain and increase 
that market. In the 2010 deal, the income from overseas television rights would more than 
double, from that struck in 2007, to £1.4 billion.565  
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Given the influx of foreign players, especially in the latter half of the 1990s, it is an irony 
that the iconic player of the age was an Englishman. David Beckham made his first 
appearance for Manchester United during 1992/1993, coming on as a substitute against 
Brighton and Hove Albion in a Coca-Cola Cup tie.566 He made no other first team 
appearances that season or the following one, and in 1994/1995 went on loan to Preston 
North End for a short time. It was during 1995/1996 that he established himself as a regular 
Manchester United first team player, usually playing on the right of midfield. His first 
England international appearance occurred in the 1996/1997 season in a World Cup 
qualifier against Moldova.567 Beckham’s workrate was always good, but it was his ability 
with free-kicks that became his hallmark. Beckham perfected the skill of kicking the ball 
on a curved trajectory with lethal precision, thus creating good scoring opportunities for 
teammates and havoc among opposing defenders. This skill even gave rise to the title of a 
comedy-drama film – Bend It Like Beckham. 
 
Beckham’s rise in status as an icon coincided with a growth of interest in celebrities fuelled 
by media coverage and celebrity magazines. His marriage to Victoria Adams or ‘Posh 
Spice’ of the Spice Girls only served to enhance his position. Like George Best in the 1960s, 
David Beckham in the 1990s straddled the worlds of sport, fashion, pop music, and popular 
culture. Companies were keen for someone as famous as Beckham to promote their 
products – with Beckham as the face, ‘Police’ sunglasses recorded a sixty-seven per cent 
increase in UK sales, and after Beckham’s ad campaign ‘Brylcreem’ recorded a fifty per 
cent increase in sales.568 Football’s elevated status since the advent of the Premiership 
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meant that a top footballer such as Beckham became seen as a marketable commodity, a 
role that was very lucrative to him. Between 2001 and 2003, Beckham would earn £15 
million from advertising alone. The attention he received in an age of high celebrity status 
included the way he dressed, the names he and Victoria gave to their children, the places 
they went to on holiday, and where they relaxed on evenings out. For some Beckham 
reflected a new type of masculinity. The traditional roles of the man as the wage labourer 
and the woman as the domestic labourer (or housewife) had reflected a patriarchal order 
which was challenged as women demanded and moved towards equality inside and outside 
of the home.569 This emancipation inevitably called into question the role of the man and 
the perception of the male gender role. As a result the portrayal of men and masculinity 
changed to include a softening of image. Film, television and advertising depicted men 
holding babies or expressing emotions other than anger. Mike O’Donnell and Sue Sharpe, 
in Uncertain Masculinities, stated that ‘Nineties Man’ was more caring than his 
predecessors, and fatherhood was important.570 This reappraisal coincided with Beckham’s 
rise to fame and he fitted the bill perfectly, a ‘Nineties man’ who was a loyal husband and 
devoted father with a classless ‘new mannishness’ about him. Beckham was a star at a time 
when masculinity was being reassessed from ‘earner and grafter’ to ‘caring husband and 
father’.571 The growth of Beckham’s status fitted in with the increased attention given to 
footballers as football realigned itself into a fashionable area of interest. Also, with the 
amount of money now coming into football, players could achieve fame and suddenly 
become very wealthy at a young age. The footballer as high profile celebrity fitted in with 
the game’s new standing and was also part of a wider cultural trend as the role of celebrity 
in general was enhanced. Those who achieved celebrity status increased in 2000 with the 
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advent of the reality television show Big Brother. This, along with a host of similar shows 
after it, opened up the possibility for anyone to become famous. You no longer had to be 
talented in a particular field or born into royalty to achieve this status. The tabloid press 
extended their publicity to expose these ‘man in the street’ or ‘woman in the street’ 
contestants in what was a marked cultural shift in terms of enhancing and broadening the 
role of celebrity.              
 
The Football Task Force 
At this time the Football Task Force was set up. The Task Force had its origins in the Labour 
Party’s Charter for Football, which was produced by Shadow Sports Minister Tom Pendry 
in 1996. By the latter half of the 1990s, there was in some respects a large ‘feelgood’ factor 
surrounding English football. The Premiership was turning out to be a huge success, 
attendances were up, and numerous foreign players were signing for English clubs. 
However, this positive mood was punctuated by bungs, bribery and misbehaviour. For 
example, former Nottingham Forest manager Brian Clough was being investigated by the 
FA for allegedly taking a bung as part of the sale of Teddy Sheringham to Tottenham 
Hotspur; there were allegations of match fixing surrounding Liverpool goalkeeper Bruce 
Grobbelaar; during a game at Selhurst Park Manchester United’s Eric Cantona leapt over 
an advertisement hoarding surrounding the pitch and attacked a Crystal Palace fan.  
 
The Charter was therefore a response to a perceived crisis in the game and also an attempt 
by Tony Blair’s ‘New Labour’ to get to grips with the pace of change in English football. 
As we have already seen the period saw a substantial increase in admission prices. There 
was also concern about the price of merchandising because there had been a massive hike 
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which appeared to exploit fans’ loyalty, especially with regard to replica shirts which had 
become a ‘must have’ accessory. Meg Henderson, writing in The Guardian, commented:  
 
as any parent with football-conscious children will know, replica kits have become 
big business and dodgy business at that. Where once it was social death to be seen in 
the ‘wrong’ jeans or trainers, these days, to wear last season’s football top is to risk 
lifelong banishment from decent society … football teams and sports manufacturers 
manipulate this with effortless cynicism. 572 
 
 
The Office of Fair Trading would later allege that football clubs, retail chains, and the shirt 
manufacturer Umbro were keeping the price of replica shirts artificially high by striking 
anti-competitive deals between themselves. Phil Evans, competition and retail spokesman 
for the Consumers’ Association, said ‘for too long the football industry has been untouched 
by market regulation. This [OFT action] shows the clubs are beginning to be judged on the 
same basis as commercial operators’.573 Fans continued to be excluded from representation 
at all levels of the game. Supporter movements were in existence at some clubs, and they 
sometimes mobilised as campaign groups to defend their club from bad ownership and 
unpopular proposals, so why not have fan representation on the board? This would have the 
dual effect of making supporters feel more involved and challenging the most unpopular of 
the decisions a board might make. As we shall see, one of the Task Force’s achievements 
was to begin to address this.  There was also concern about the increasing gap in terms of 
levels of income between the Premiership and the three divisions remaining in the Football 
League because of the disparity that was developing due to the growth in Premiership deals 
with satellite television broadcasters.574  
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Even so, football had become very fashionable. It was marketed by Sky in a showbiz 
manner, fan autobiographies became bestsellers following the huge success of Nick 
Hornby’s Fever Pitch, and a host of celebrities presented themselves as being in some way 
associated with the game, such as Oasis openly displaying their support for Manchester 
City.575 Even politicians from across the political spectrum, such as Roy Hattersley, Tony 
Banks, and David Mellor, declared their lifelong attachment to football.576 In January 1995 
Tony Blair, at the time leader of the Opposition, said that despite the increasing popularity 
of football, he was concerned at its growing commercialisation, stating that ‘there is a 
market, certainly, but there is a community too. Football clubs are part of it’.577  
 
It is worth considering successive prime ministers’ attitude to football. In the 1980s, 
Thatcher had taken no interest in the game whatsoever. It was a working class institution 
which had given her government nothing but problems. Major, on the other hand, was more 
positive, being a Chelsea supporter as well as a keen cricket fan. Major describes his 
affection for Chelsea thus: 
 
I saw Chelsea play for the first time in 1955, the year they won the championship. 
They beat Wolves 1-0 with a Peter Sillett penalty, and I was hooked for life. I have 
spent many happy afternoons at Stamford Bridge, and many frustrating ones as well, 
as Chelsea demonstrated their legendary unpredictability … supporting Chelsea over 
the years has been a rollercoaster ride, but it has been a great aid in developing a 
philosophical view of life.578 
 
Blair declared an interest in football and supports Newcastle United. In his autobiography 
he tells us of an occasion in 1995 when he met Kevin Keegan for a photo-shoot:  
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I had also agreed to do a photo-opportunity that morning at a school with Kevin 
Keegan, then manager of Newcastle United (my team) … when Kevin said, let’s do a 
heading session in front of the kids (and mass media) … I said, ‘Sure, fine, whatever’ 
… It was, of course, a monumental risk as it always is when a political leader plays 
sport in public. No one expects you to be brilliant, but you can’t afford to be absolutely 
rubbish, otherwise you are plainly not fit to run a nation. This wasn’t kicking the ball 
– quite difficult to mess up completely – but head to head. That’s a very easy way to 
make a total idiot of yourself … of course Kevin was such a professional and could 
head the ball back to where I could get it, that we did twenty-nine headers on the go, 
which was impressive.579 
 
 
For a political party as media-sensitive as ‘New Labour’, the game was ripe for populist 
policy intervention. The Charter for Football included a commitment to create a Task Force 
drawn from ‘the bodies responsible for the national game’ with the remit of restructuring 
the FA, investigating links with television, looking at the treatment of fans and at football’s 
finances, and ‘looking to the future’.580 It was a big commitment for a party in opposition 
towards its future policy. This concern with the running of the national game was a contrast 
to the law and order agenda and hostility that had been shown towards the game in the days 
of the Thatcher government.  
 
Indeed, there were some striking parallels between football and the Labour Party. Both were 
born towards the end of the nineteenth century, both promised a chance of escape from 
working-class life and hardship, both relied on the support of the masses, and, more 
contemporarily, both had experienced bad times in the 1980s only to re-emerge as 
fashionable in the 1990s. After a time at a low point, football, just like ‘New Labour’, came 
to be seen as ‘cool’, cosmopolitan, and modern. It should also be pointed out that both had 
achieved this revival by moving away from their traditional roots in local communities, by 
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heavy dependence on media image, and by embracing corporate business and high 
finance.581  
 
In 1997, three months into office, Tony Blair’s newly elected Labour government set up 
the Football Task Force. The Minister for Sport was Tony Banks, and to lead the Task Force 
Banks appointed David Mellor, the former Conservative minister and host to Radio Five’s 
football phone-in programme 606.582 Mellor’s appointment surprised some but was 
indicative of the new government’s aims to be inclusive and adopt a broad centrist political 
philosophy.583 To promote the Task Force, Banks and Mellor posed on the pitch at The 
Valley. That morning, Mellor fondly recalled the 1960s, when players travelled to matches 
with fans on Corporation buses, whereas now they drove to the ground in the latest Ferrari. 
There was the symbolism of uncontrolled fortunes. Fortunes for players were creating a 
huge gulf between players and fans which did not exist before. The amount of wealth, he 
claimed, was contaminating the game.584 Players’ wages continued to rise and the annual 
wage bill of the twenty Premier League clubs in 2001/2002 would reach £475 million, a 
780% increase since the start of the Premiership nine years earlier. By 2000, over 100 
Premier League players were making a basic wage of at least £25,000 per week. Four years 
later, top wages would escalate to between £50,000 and £100,000 per week.585 Fans now 
had less in common with the players and were aware of this growing disparity, but one can 
understand how players were attracted from overseas when there was this potential for 
earnings.  
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The Task Force was given a specific remit. Seven areas were to be investigated, and 
separate reports on each were to be submitted to the Minister for Sport at the Department 
of Culture Media and Sport. The seven areas were racism, disabled access, supporter 
involvement, ticketing and pricing, merchandising, player involvement in community 
schemes, and the potential conflict of interest where clubs had been floated as PLCs. The 
first thing to note is that there were already differences between the aims that had been 
included in the Charter and the remit given to the Task Force. Commitments to restructure 
the FA, to investigate football’s relationship with television, and to consider supporters’ 
rights were now conspicuously absent. While commercial aspects were still included, the 
remit was narrower in its aims than the commitment to investigate football’s finances as set 
out in the Charter.  
 
In addition to this, the call to reopen the Hillsborough Inquiry and to consider the 
reintroduction of terracing had been rejected by the Home Secretary. The subject of 
reintroducing safe standing areas at football grounds would be raised a number of times 
over the next few years. In March 2001 the Football Licensing Authority produced a report 
on the ‘kombi’ seating at the Volksparkstadion, Hamburg, relating to the technical merits 
of convertible seating systems in use at a number of football stadia in Germany.586 But 
successive governments have been dismissive of the idea. In October 2003, Richard 
Caborn, Minister of State (Sport and Tourism), Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 
stated that ‘the Government’s position on standing at football grounds has not changed. 
Whatever their size, standing terraces are implicitly more dangerous to spectators than 
seated areas. As such, there are no plans to revise the all seater policy, which applies to all 
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Premier and First Division [later Championship] grounds’.587 The issue was raised again 
nearly a decade later, in December 2012, and Hugh Robertson, Parliamentary Under 
Secretary of State, Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport, reiterated the same viewpoint, 
stating that ‘the football authorities, police, and those responsible for safety all continue to 
support the current policy and a compelling case has not been made to change this’.588  
 
The Charter for Football had been concerned with structure, organisation, ownership, and 
control. Once Labour was in office the emphasis had shifted to achieving consensus and 
improving the image of the game.589 It seemed that they had talked a good game while in 
opposition, but now they were in government many of the original aims were either watered 
down or conveniently forgotten.590 This shift in emphasis is demonstrated by the 
Government’s change of tack over two issues in particular, namely the return of terracing 
and BSkyB’s attempt to take over Manchester United. Discussions between the Task Force 
and the Government were kept within strict boundaries ‘which the Government deemed 
acceptable’, and drafts of reports were checked before release. It was not prepared to enter 
discussions on the return of terracing for fear of upsetting its public relations image. This 
demonstrated that ‘for New Labour, there was some very old-fashioned controlling going 
on.’591  
 
The possibility of BSkyB taking over Manchester United had serious implications for 
ownership, governance, and finance within the game. However, the Task Force made no 
comment against the bid to the Minister for Sport, the Secretary of State for Trade and 
                                                          
587  http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2003-10-14.132402.h last accessed 14 June 2013 
588  http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2012.12.06b.131788.h last accessed 14 June 2013 
589  Brown, ‘Thinking The Unthinkable’ in eds. Hamil, Michie, and Oughton, A Game Of Two Halves, p.71. 
590  Ibid., p.62.   
591  Ibid., pp.72-73. 
229 
 
Industry, the Office of Fair Trading, or the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. Adam 
Brown, a member of the Football Task Force Working Group, argues that ‘the Task Force’s 
remit was inadequate as it was susceptible to interpretation and therefore to becoming a tool 
for certain interests, and the membership of the Task Force allowed those powerful interests 
in the game to dominate and effectively veto the wishes of the majority’.592        
 
In the circumstances it was inevitable that the Task Force ran into problems. To start with, 
its budget was only £100,000, a figure ‘derisively insufficient’ for tackling football’s 
shortcomings.593 The majority on the Task Force agreed that the Premier League breakaway 
had sliced off too much of football’s money and there had to be a return to the days of 
greater redistribution of revenue. This was necessary to reverse the alienation of traditional 
fans by football clubs whose only concern seemed to be to maximise profits on ticket sales 
and merchandising, thus compelling alienated fans ‘to pay through the nose’.594 The FA 
and the leagues, including Football League and non-League, opposed greater redistribution. 
Even the Football League could not argue its own corner for fear of upsetting the Premier 
League clubs, whose co-operation was needed to partake in the League Cup, which was an 
important source of television revenue.595  
 
Andy Burnham, the Task Force administrator, did however manage to get an agreement 
from the Premier League that 5% of the next television deal would be redistributed to 
improve grassroots football facilities, which had been neglected despite the amount of 
money now around at the top of the game. The pledge was finally agreed and included in 
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the report Investing In The Community in January 1999.596 This funding led to the setting 
up of the Football Foundation. The purpose of the Football Foundation was to manage this 
money and administer it to the grassroots. A comparison can be made with the Football 
Trust, which also administers money to pay for improving facilities at grassroots level, 
except that the Football Trust gained its revenue from the pools companies. 
 
The figure of 5% of the Premier League’s television deal amounted to £20 million a season. 
This was matched by the FA and by the government from various lottery pots. The 
government would only agree to it if the Premier League honoured their commitment. The 
Premier League had informally threatened to withhold their contribution because they 
wanted the government to abandon the idea of appointing a regulator. The government 
decided to make a contribution in order to force the Premier League into doing so.597 Conn 
points out that the arrangement was only secured in the first place because the Premier 
League faced a court challenge from the Office of Fair Trading regarding the clubs’ right 
to operate as a cartel to sell their TV rights exclusively to Sky. Burnham argued that their 
case would be more convincing if they were sharing their wealth with the wider amateur 
game.598   
 
Another achievement of the Task Force was the establishment of Supporters Direct. This is 
a body backed by the government that was set up to encourage supporters to form trusts. 
Football Trusts involved supporters paying into a fund which could be used to give financial 
support to their club, to buy shares, and, if the club agreed, to elect a director onto the board. 
The idea came from the belief that football clubs should not be companies to be bought and 
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sold by businessmen, but run by mutual bodies of supporters as sporting institutions vital 
to their local communities. The idea was pioneered by Brian Lomax, a Northampton Town 
fan and co-founder of the Northampton Town Supporters’ Trust (NTST), who was himself 
elected on to the board of his club as Trust representative. He tells us that the NTST had 
been set up in January 1992 following a large public meeting held in response to a financial 
crisis at the club. Its two main objectives were to raise money to save the club, but not under 
its then regime, and to gain ‘effective involvement and representation for supporters in the 
running of the club.’599 The issue of supporters’ trusts was close to the heart of any fan 
disillusioned by what they perceived as greed shown by some of the Premiership clubs.600 
Lomax tells us of the philosophy and aims of Supporters Direct: 
 
The aim of Supporters Direct is to offer support, advice and information to groups of 
supporters who wish to play a responsible part in the life of the club they support. All 
models used and recommended will be based on democratic, mutual, and not-for-
profit principles. Legitimate objectives will include: 
Influence – the formation and running of representative bodies for supporters. 
Ownership – the acquisition of shares in the football club to pool the voting power of 
individual supporters to further the aims and objects of the Supporters’ Trust. 
Representation – securing the democratic election of supporters’ representatives to 
the Boards of Directors of individual football clubs. 
By these means we hope to improve the whole of the football industry.601  
 
 
A general observation can be made about the intentions of those forming such groups. The 
social scientists Jamie Cleland and Kevin Dixon state: ‘across the recent history of 
supporters’ groups, trusts, and clubs, most have been created because of a short-term crisis 
at a particular club, but the longevity of them suggests some form of long-term focus, 
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whether that be by acquiring shares or gaining some other form of inclusion at the respective 
club.’602 
 
Who was being greedy – the clubs, the agents, or the players? To a degree it was all three. 
The clubs were by this time receiving lucrative amounts from live television coverage, but 
that did not stop them charging double or treble the amount for tickets compared with only 
a few years earlier, nor did it stop them charging extortionate amounts for replica shirts. 
With agents, some were not above inventing a potential move or deliberately unsettling a 
player so he wished to move, and when a deal was struck their percentage of that players’ 
defence of their earnings, as stated in the previous chapter, but they continued to want more 
due to the ever increasing revenue that the clubs enjoyed. Was there a case for the return of 
a maximum wage? Possibly so, as long as it was set at a very high level because no-one 
wants a return to the days when players were virtual slaves. It would have brought an end 
to spiralling wage inflation, and freed up more money which, if the clubs were sensible, 
could have been used to benefit supporters. There was the danger, however, that at some 
clubs any extra money would simply end up in the pockets of unscrupulous owners.  
 
Evidence that many fans wanted some direct involvement in the running of their clubs is 
borne out by the fact that the NTST were asked to advise and assist with the formation of 
other such Trusts at AFC Bournemouth, Kettering Town, Middlesbrough, and Plymouth 
Argyle. Hot on the heels of these, it also helped to advise groups who wished to form Trusts 
at Chester City, Lincoln City, and Manchester City.603 More recently there have been other 
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examples of clubs passing into community ownership.604 Greater fan involvement at a time 
when more wealth and power get concentrated into the hands of a very few clubs is one of 
the paradoxes of modern football. An article in When Saturday Comes makes the point that 
some clubs have survived only due to their supporters’ trusts, and names Exeter City as an 
example. It concludes that, ‘as the financial position of more clubs deteriorates, the work 
of fans and trusts is going to increase in importance if others are to survive.’605 
 
On commercial issues the Task Force was less successful, however. On the price of match 
tickets, the cost of merchandising, and the issue of market flotations, no agreement was 
reached. The majority of the Task Force called for firm regulation by the FA and by the 
leagues, including Football League and non-League, and for a ‘Football Audit 
Commission’ to ‘develop rules to steer football in the direction of more equality, better 
management of clubs, [and] more responsiveness to supporters and the grass-roots’.606 This 
idea was rejected, and the FA and the leagues called instead for an ‘Independent Football 
Commission’. This would be funded by the football bodies themselves and rejected the 
notion of outside regulation. The government, unwilling to legislate or upset football’s 
governing bodies, backed the latter.607  
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An article by Steve Greenfield and Guy Osborn summarised the Task Force’s achievements 
or otherwise. Labour’s motives were not hard to detect: ‘football was seen as a way of 
connecting with the public and this was a useful tool for New Labour to assert their populist 
credentials.’608 They make the point that there were differences between the original 
proposals of the Charter and the remit given to the Task Force, but there were positive 
aspects. It should not be forgotten that it was the first time the government had become 
involved in the running of the national game since the Chester Report of 1968. The 
introduction of the Supporters Direct initiative was good, but the Football Offences and 
Disorder Act (1999) and the Football Disorder Act (2000) meant that a banning order could 
be imposed simply on the ‘reasonable suspicion’ of a police officer rather than proof of a 
criminal conviction. To conclude, Greenfield and Osborn state:  
 
Overall, New Labour have adopted a somewhat contradictory attitude to football 
during their first term, too often driven by their eagerness to provide a populist appeal 
both to football fans and the law-and-order brigade. On the one hand they have shown 
fan-friendly credentials via the DTI response to BskyB’s attempted takeover of Man 
Utd and their support for the mutuality of ownership through Supporters Direct. On 
the other hand, the civil liberties of fans have been eroded by some extraordinarily 
rigorous provisions.609 
 
At the end of the day, the Task Force’s achievements were hampered by its lack of unity, 
because of football’s governing bodies’ unwillingness to co-operate fully, and because 
weakness on the part of the government meant that they did not impose the necessary 
legislation on those bodies to redistribute wealth, improve club management, make the 
game more accountable to supporters, and to make a greater contribution to assist the game 
at grassroots level.    
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Conclusion   
The internationalisation of the English game has taken place within a broader context of 
greater international travel due to cheap airlines, increasing global communications due to 
the internet, and the drawing together of the group of states that make up the European 
Union. This internationalisation is another area in which changes in football have reflected 
wider developments. They were also driven by changes within the game. This interaction 
between internal and external factors led to the process best described as 
‘internationalisation’. This is a better term than ‘globalisation’ for two reasons. Firstly, the 
term globalisation often refers to the expanding web of networks, such as media 
broadcasting, electronic communication, and banking, and the spread of football’s 
popularity is different in nature because it has not been instant, as those things are. 
Secondly, there are still large parts of the globe, such as Australasia and the United States, 
where football, although growing, is still of secondary importance to other sports. One of 
the main factors within the game was the transformation and growth of the European Cup 
into the UEFA Champions League. A major driving force behind this development was the 
desire by the top clubs to make a certain level of money because these changes 
accommodated their financial ambitions while at the same time they staved off the threat 
of a breakaway European ‘Super League’.  
 
The arrival of many foreign players in England was driven primarily by the lucrative 
earnings that could be made, but the Bosman Ruling also played a part in that it made 
international movement easier. It should perhaps be pointed out that the Bosman Ruling 
would not have led to a migration of good players to England if the prospects were not 
attractive. We have also seen how a continental manager with good overseas connections, 
such as Ruud Gullit or Arsene Wenger, could play an important role in attracting top 
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players. The expansion of the UEFA Champions League had the effect of diminishing the 
importance of the domestic cup competitions and also of reducing competitiveness in the 
Premiership as the top clubs earned vast revenues from Champions League games televised 
to global audiences by satellite television broadcasters. As the 2000s progressed the clubs 
that finished in the Premiership’s top four places became a foregone conclusion because of 
this.  
 
The arrival of many foreign players had a positive effect in terms of introducing continental 
flair and style. However, their arrival also caused concern that they might be preventing 
young English players from getting adequate opportunities to develop and progress in the 
game. This problem was in turn detrimental to the chances of the England international 
team. We need at this point to remind ourselves that one of the arguments used by the FA 
for backing the Premiership breakaway was to improve England’s chances, but the reality 
has been that satellite television revenues and the Bosman Ruling between them had the 
opposite effect as England’s progress in major competitions has shown no sign of 
improvement and the progress of English players has been hindered. Euro 96 stands out as 
the last major competition in which England progressed to the semi-final stage. It was just 
after the Bosman Ruling and England’s subsequent disappointing performances are 
probably not a coincidence.  The Premiership, rather than being a breakaway First Division, 
has transmuted into a global league that happens to be played in England. This has been to 
the detriment of English players and the performance of the international team.   
 
After the arrival of foreign players and the elevation of the Premiership, the Task Force was 
formed in an attempt to rein in football’s most extravagant excesses but this was only 
partially successful. The appointment of Mellor to lead it reflected an inclusive mood as 
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Tony Blair set out on a course that could be best described as ‘Broad Centre’ in the early 
days of his government. However, its impact was limited by its own internal divisions, by 
football’s authorities being unenthusiastic about implementing some of the proposals, and 
the government - due to how it would be portrayed - being unwilling to introduce legislation 
that would force those authorities to implement those proposals. ‘New Labour’ in 
opposition had been very media-sensitive, but now they were in government a fear of 
upsetting that media now seemed to paralyse them.610  
 
Despite the appearance of so many footballers from abroad, it was an English player who 
was the star of the age. The rise of David Beckham as an icon coincided with the growth 
and changing nature of celebrity status throughout the country as celebrity gained a higher 
profile due to its promotion by magazines and the popular press. Beckham’s popularity also 
emerged at a time when perceptions of manhood and masculinity were changing and he 
fitted easily into a role not occupied by previous stars.   
 
This shift was occurring at the same time as continental influences challenged previously 
held perceptions in other ways. In broader terms the country and its people were becoming 
more influenced by Europe. Due to cheap airlines, people were holidaying abroad in places 
that their parents had not been able to afford and they were becoming more familiar with 
other countries and their cultures. The nation states of Europe were drawing ever closer 
together as the European Union emerged from the European Economic Community and, 
following the demise of the Soviet bloc and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, became a 
larger entity with more member states, lower trade barriers, and a common currency as it 
drew together to become a powerful alliance in a world entering a new millennium. With 
                                                          
610  Brown, ‘Thinking The Unthinkable’ in eds. Hamil, Michie, and Oughton, A Game Of Two Halves?, p.71.  
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the number of players and managers coming to England from the continent, there was a 
certain inevitability that in their wake would come businessmen from overseas who would 




























I think you’ve got modern football, 
which is the closest thing to 19th century unfettered, unregulated 
capitalism we’ve got because not only does money dominate, money 
creates power, power is centralising in the hands of the powerful and rich 
 
- Alan Fisher, sociologist611 
 
My friend, we’re richer than God 
- Sheik Mansour, Manchester City owner612 
 
 
Nobody in the world will decide for me how I run my companies … 
nobody questions my decisions in my business 
 
- Dr. Assem Allam, Hull City chairman613 







                                                          
611 Alan Fisher, interview with the author, Tonbridge, 11 June 2015. 
612 Quote from an interview with David Conn; David Conn, Richer Than God: Manchester City, modern 
football and growing up (London: Quercus, 2013 paperback edition), p.133.  
613 Spoken in response to fans’ protests against plan to change name to Hull Tigers. ‘Hull City: Tigers’ 
Chairman Dismisses Fans’ Protests’, www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/24920893 last accessed 12 June 2016.  
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    Introduction  
The subject of foreign ownership is part of the broader topic of club ownership, which itself 
has changed a good deal since the 1960s. The local businessman who ran the local football 
club in the 1960s with a paternalistic benevolence, while doing his own business interests 
no harm, did not become involved to make money out of the club. As Anthony King puts 
it, ‘for traditional directors, the football club was a public utility, and … these directors did 
not regard the football club as an appropriate or possible site of capitalist accumulation.’614 
As stated earlier, the rule restricting the maximum dividend for any shareholder in a football 
club to 7.5 per cent was revoked in 1982 to encourage involvement by those businessmen 
suitably placed financially to invest in football clubs and who could assist with club 
finances. This led to a number of entrepreneurs establishing themselves on the boards of 
football clubs, hoping for a return on their shares – David Dein (Arsenal), Ken Bates 
(Chelsea), Martin Edwards (Manchester United), and Irving Scholar (Tottenham Hotspur) 
all serve as examples of this.615 Thus it can be seen that traditional owners became replaced 
by a new generation who were more attuned to hard commerce, who saw the football club 
as a business. The shift in view between ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ is best captured by Arsenal 
chairman Peter Hill-Wood’s comments about David Dein when he became director at the 
club. He said, ‘some rich men like to buy fast cars, yachts and racehorses but Dein is more 
interested in Arsenal. I’m delighted he is, but I still think he’s crazy. To all intents and 
purposes, it’s dead money.’616 As the 1990s progressed, the ethos of the free market 
economy became applied increasingly to football clubs, and, as a result, it soon turned out 
that Dein was not ‘crazy’.  
                                                          
614 King, End Of The Terraces, p.122. 
615 Ibid., pp.123-124; see also pp. 39-40.  
616 The Sunday Times, 8 August 1991, cited in King, End of the Terraces, p.122. 
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The advent of the Premiership, and, more importantly, the vast fortunes from satellite 
television broadcasters made successful football clubs an attractive proposition for potential 
investors and buyers. Then the Bosman Ruling attracted foreign players, and in their wake 
managers who brought style and flair to the English game, most notably Arsene Wenger. It 
was perhaps inevitable that foreign owners would follow the players and managers for a 
place in the Premiership. As the game itself revived and shifted its alignment to sit closer 
to commercial interests, and more and more money became involved, the status of club 
owners increased. In the 2000s owners came from overseas to acquire a stake in what was 
by now a multi-million pound global industry.  
 
There were a number of preludes to this. In 1981 the Lebanese businessman Sam Hammam 
took over Wimbledon for an outlay of £40,000.617  Sixteen years later, in May 1997, the 
Egyptian businessman Mohamed Al Fayed bought Fulham for £30 million and vowed to 
turn them into ‘the Manchester United of the South.’618 The money was to be spent on 
redevelopment and new players. There were grand plans to buy back the club’s Thames-
side ground, Craven Cottage, and turn it into a 25,000-seater stadium and a leisure complex, 
complete with cinemas, coffee shops and a Harrods food hall. Al Fayed already owned 
Harrods, the famous West London department store.619 Fulham had just been promoted 
from Division Three to Division Two, football’s third tier, and Al Fayed’s buying power 
put them in the same financial bracket as Premiership sides Blackburn Rovers, Liverpool, 
Manchester United and Newcastle United.620 In September Al Fayed appointed Kevin 
                                                          
617 Mihir Bose, ‘Inside Sport: Hammam Cast In Villain’s Role As Dons Seek Happy Ending’, Daily Telegraph, 
16 August 2001, www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/competition/championship/3010879 last accessed 22 
November 2015.  





Keegan as Chief Operating Officer and Ray Wilkins as Team Manager in what was a clear 
statement of intent.621 Keegan’s involvement was a clear sign that the club were aiming for 
the top. Indeed, Al Fayed outlined a five year plan to get Fulham into the Premiership. 
During 1997/1998, a lot of money was spent on building the team, but Wilkins departed at 
the end of the season, leaving Keegan in sole charge. In February 1999, Keegan succeeded 
Glenn Hoddle as England manager and the challenge of the two jobs proved too much for 
one person, so Keegan quit Fulham at the end of 1998/1999, having led Fulham to the 
Division Two title with a record number of points.622 Fulham made their way up the 
divisions to the Premiership, promoted as Division One champions at the end of 
2000/2001.623 Al Fayed had achieved his five year plan in four years. He did not turn them 
into ‘the Manchester United of the South’, but he did achieve sustainable Premier League 
status as Fulham enjoyed top flight football for thirteen successive seasons, not succumbing 
to relegation until the end of 2013/2014.  
 
The experience of two clubs in particular, namely Chelsea and Manchester City, shaped the 
unfolding of the early years of the twenty-first century. Other clubs also went through a 
process of acquisition by foreign owners, the exact details differing from club to club 
depending on the owner in question. Both the positive and the negative outcomes need to 
be considered, together with how the events of these years fit in to a broader picture both 
internally and externally to football. In order to examine the subject, let us consider the 
experience of a number of different clubs. We will do this in a broadly chronological order, 
commencing with that of Wimbledon.  
                                                          
621 www.fulhamfc.com/history last accessed 11 November 2015. 
622 Ibid.  
623 Eds. Rollin and Rollin, Sky Sports Football Yearbook 2008-2009, p.191. 
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Wimbledon, Milton Keynes Dons and AFC Wimbledon  
Wimbledon were elected to the League in 1977. Under Hammam’s ownership during the 
1980s they made their way up the divisions by use of the long ball game, an effective offside 
trap, and a hard physical approach. This won few friends among football’s purists but it 
was effective. They were promoted up to the old First Division for the 1986/1987 season. 
The club’s proudest moment came in 1988 when, as underdogs, they won the FA Cup, 
beating Liverpool 1-0 in the final at Wembley.624 In 1991, the club moved away from its 
home at Plough Lane and entered a groundshare with Crystal Palace at Selhurst Park. 
Founder members of the Premier League a year later, Wimbledon struggled on with low 
crowds, largely due to the groundshare and the continuing failure to return to London 
SW19. In 1997 club owner Sam Hammam sold his controlling interest to two Norwegian 
owners, Bjorn Rune Gjelsten and Kjell Inge Rokke.625 Then came the proposal to relocate, 
not back to their old ground Plough Lane, or anywhere else in the London Borough of 
Merton, but to Dublin! However, the Irish Football Association blocked the move. 
Wimbledon were relegated from the Premiership at the end of 1999/2000 and future 
prospects looked bleak. By this time Hammam had sold the remainder of his shares to the 
Norwegians and severed his links with the club.626 Without income from Premiership 
television deals, low crowds, and no progress towards finding a proper home, the future 
was gloomy.  
 
Milton Keynes is a new town more famous for its concrete cows and rock concerts at the 
Milton Keynes Bowl than for League football. A town that was created after the Second 
                                                          
624 Eds. Rollin and Rollin, Skysports Football Yearbook 2008-2009, p.608. 
625 news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sport/football/656552.stm, last accessed 4 October 2015. 
626 Ibid.  
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World War, it was unusual in that it was a large urban centre without a Football League 
club. In other words, there was a population in need of a League football club who were 
also an untapped source of revenue. Norman Miles, the leader of Milton Keynes Council, 
said, ‘it could be Southend or Blackpool I suppose, but as a city we would welcome a major 
football club.’627 Peter Winkelman, who, after an early career in pop music as a record 
company executive, became a property developer, strove to get permission for a 28,000 all-
seater stadium, and entice an existing League club to it. In February 2001, Luton Town had 
a proposed move to Milton Keynes blocked by the League.628 Six months later Wimbledon 
applied to relocate there. Winkelman unsurprisingly welcomed Wimbledon’s application, 
saying ‘Milton Keynes is currently the largest urban population in Europe without a 
professional football team and we can offer Wimbledon the home it has been looking for 
since 1991.’629 However, the League unanimously rejected Wimbledon’s plans to relocate. 
David Burns, the League’s chief executive, said: 
 
League rules clearly state that clubs should play in the conurbation from which they 
derive their name or are traditionally associated … to allow this move would have 
created a precedent at odds with the heritage of football in this country. Our football 
clubs are the heart and soul of their local communities and that is something that 
cannot be transferred from place to place.630 
 
Wimbledon fans campaigned vigorously against the proposed move but in January an FA 
arbitration panel ruled that the League re-examine the case.631 Charles Koppel, who had 
been appointed chairman by Rokke and Gjelsten, complained that the future of Wimbledon 
                                                          
627 Kris Stewart, ‘Merton, Not Milton’, When Saturday Comes, issue 169, March 2001, p.14.  
628 John Goodbody, ‘League Rejects Wimbledon’s Plan To Move’, The Times, 17 August 2001.  
629 Ibid.   
630 Ibid. 
631 Gary Jacob, ‘Wimbledon Plans Given Another Life’, The Times, 30 January 2002.  
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looked very bleak and the move was necessary to ensure the club’s survival.632 The FA 
appointed an independent commission to reconsider the issue. Remarkably, despite strong 
opposition from the League, supporters’ groups, and others within the game, permission for 
the move was granted. Wimbledon fans vowed to fight the decision and some suggested 
forming a new club and starting again in non-League football.633  
 
Matthew Breach, chairman of the Dons Trust, began watching Wimbledon in 1984. In an 
interview with the author he explained his feelings when the move was given approval: 
 
for me, the real thing was just disbelief of what was happening … it’s almost disbelief 
when the FA commission said, ‘yes, you can move.’ I remember looking and thinking, 
‘Oh, what do I do now?’ I really did think at the time, ‘is that the end of bothering to 
go and watch football? I might mess around looking at non-League clubs for a bit 
because you can’t go and support some-one else, it wouldn’t be right.’ And then, 
shortly after that I had the letter through from the Dons Trust saying, ‘we’re trying to 
start a new club. Rather [than] pay your season ticket there [Milton Keynes], would 
you put it in to us to see if we can start a new team.634 
 
The old club played their first game at the National Hockey Stadium, Milton Keynes, in 
September 2003. The following year the name was changed to Milton Keynes Dons. A new 
club was formed by Wimbledon fans unwilling to sanction the relocation. AFC Wimbledon 
formed in 2002 and entered the Combined Counties League straight away, making their 
way up the non-League football pyramid and entering the Football League in 2011, nine 
years after formation.  
 
                                                          
632 Ibid.  
633 Nick Szczepanik, ‘Wimbledon Fans Plan To Fight On Over Relocation’, The Times, 29 May 2002.  
634 Matthew Breach, interview with the author, phone, 14 September 2015.  
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The move to Milton Keynes was similar to the franchise system that operates in the United 
States with NFL teams, who move between cities, from one state to another, and even from 
one side of the United States to the other, without any voices being raised in opposition. 
But English football is culturally different in that its football clubs are seen as part of the 
fabric of a town, city, or local area. They ‘belong’ there, drawing affection from supporters 
and local people, and become a source of civic pride when they enjoy success, such as 
winning a trophy or gaining promotion. As sports economist Chris Gratton said when 
comparing British football to American team sports: ‘there is a stronger history of 
community attachment to clubs in Britain that makes it much more difficult for clubs to 
move cities.’635 The proposal for Wimbledon to relocate sixty miles away up the M1 ran 
counter to this.  
 
Football clubs had relocated before. Most famously, Arsenal moved a long distance within 
a large city - from Woolwich to Highbury - in 1913, and Millwall, after twenty-five years 
in which they had played at four different grounds, moved to a permanent home south of 
the River Thames at The Den in 1910.636 However, in both those cases the clubs simply 
moved to a different area within the same conurbation. The move from South-West London 
to Buckinghamshire was a vastly different proposition. The only comparable move had 
occurred in Scotland, when, in 1995, Meadowbank Thistle moved to Livingston and 
changed their name accordingly. Wimbledon fans simply had their club taken away from 
them, and responded by forming AFC Wimbledon. Initially, the broader implication of the 
move to Milton Keynes were that it could set a precedent, and that English football clubs 
                                                          
635 Chris Gratton, ‘The Peculiar Economics Of English Professional Football’, Soccer & Society, vol. 1, ch. 1, 
2000, p. 26.  
636 Eds. Rollins and Rollins, Football Yearbook 2008-2009, pp.60-61, pp. 266-267.  
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could in time end up like NFL franchises, but the Wimbledon experience proved two things. 
Firstly, there will be a lot of opposition to any club that tries to relocate from one area to 
another, and secondly, they could well lose their original fan base, which is a major business 
concern. The Wimbledon experience should prove a deterrent to the idea of permanent 
relocation being tried again.  
 
Since the relocation Milton Keynes Dons initially played at The National Hockey Stadium. 
The name change from Wimbledon to Milton Keynes Dons coincided with the club 
finishing bottom of the table. Relegated from the second tier to the third, they struggled in 
League One and were relegated again at the end of 2005/2006. In League Two they reached 
the play-offs in the first season. The following season was the most successful as the club 
finished top of League Two, equalling a League record with eighteen away wins, and 
winning the Johnstone’s Paint Trophy. The club then spent seven seasons in League One 
before getting promoted as runners-up at the end of 2014/2015. Their stay in the 
Championship, however, lasted only one season as they were relegated. Thus it can be seen 
that the fortunes of MK Dons have been mixed, but, most importantly, they have never 
come close to achieving what the old Wimbledon did.637 
 
Chelsea and Roman Abramovich  
On 2 July 2003 it was announced that Chelsea had been bought by a wealthy Russian buyer. 
The club had been saved from the brink of financial ruin, with just five days to repay a debt 
of £23 million when they had only £10 million in reserve, and the threat of administration 
                                                          
637 Eds. Rollin and Rollin, Football Yearbook 2008-2009, pp.270-271; Ed. John Anderson, Skysports Football 
Yearbook 2015-2016, London: Headline (2015), pp.236-237;  www.soccerbase.com last accessed 9 June 2016. 
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hung over it.638 The reaction to this as yet unknown buyer was mixed. Tony Banks, lifelong 
Chelsea fan and former Sports Minister, said to BBC Radio 5, ‘I want to know whether this 
individual is a fit and proper person to be taking over a club like Chelsea. I would have 
preferred that the takeover of Chelsea had been done after these questions were answered. 
A sale has been arranged to an individual we know nothing about.’639 However, a more 
positive response was also aired by Giles Smith in the Daily Telegraph: ‘why the long 
faces? … the fear is that Abramovich’s wallet may contain dodgy money … isn’t immediate 
and intense concern about the integrity of a Russian oil and aluminium magnate a little 
precious? … he appears at first sight to have pretty much everything one would hope for in 
an incoming owner. He has youth, money, energy, money, a committed interest in sport 
and lots and lots of money … and did I mention that he was a billionaire.’640  
 
Roman Arkadyevich Abramovich was born on 24 October 1966 in Saratov, a city on the 
Volga. His parents died while he was in infancy, with the result that he was adopted by an 
uncle who was a senior official in the Soviet oil industry. He grew up with his new family 
in an oil-bearing region of Siberia, and went on to study at the Gubkin Oil and Gas Institute 
in Moscow.641 He used his hometown contacts, and during the time of the transfer of power 
from President Mikhail Gorbachev to President Boris Yeltsin he learned how to exploit the 
changing laws enabling companies to trade on the huge difference between Soviet and 
Western prices for raw materials.642 He made his first money in the early 1990s with a tyre 
business in Moscow. Becoming skilled at forming companies and dealing with cross-border 
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trade, the number of his businesses grew and he started to operate at an international level. 
In the process, he teamed up with Boris Berezovsky, a trusted friend of Yeltsin.643 In 1995, 
Berezovsky persuaded Yeltsin to create a new company from some of the best parts of the 
old Soviet oil industry and sell it to him and Abramovich for $110 million. It was this deal 
that catapulted Abramovich from successful businessman to multi-billionaire. The 
company was in fact worth billions, and Abramovich’s hold on it grew at the expense of 
Berezovky. He continued to broaden his business interests by purchasing stakes in Russian 
television, in Aeroflot, and in the Russian aluminium industry.644 As another example of 
how he was able to make a lot of money in a very short space of time, one only has to look 
at the case of Sibneft. When dividing up the company’s $1.1 billion profit from 2002, the 
board debated as to how much should be paid to shareholders and how much ploughed back 
in to the business. It was decided that all but $100 million would go to shareholders. As 
owner of 44 per cent of the company Abramovich stood to receive $480 million in 
dividends, ‘from a company he did little to create.’645  
 
As a concluding remark James Meek, in The Guardian, comments:  
 
Londoners may be tempted to see Abramovich through the same distorted glass of 
their own preconceptions, as some street bruiser who muscled in on his billions. Yet 
the truth is probably more uncomfortable still; that despite page after page of 
unanswered questions about the origins and nature of his wealth, he cannot be pinned 
down as ever having done anything illegal, and that he has been able to take hundreds 
of millions of dollars out of Russia in full public view, with the blessing of his 
president.646 
                                                          






Why did Abramovich buy Chelsea? They were an attractive proposition for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, the club’s financial plight meant that they were willing to sell; secondly, 
they are located in affluent West London where Abramovich could buy a top property; 
thirdly, they had qualified for the Champions League. From his own point of view, to be 
the owner of a top English football club when Premiership football was rapidly becoming 
a global phenomenon gave him international prestige.  
 
When he bought Chelsea for £140 million, Abramovich was the second richest man in 
Russia and the forty-sixth richest in the world. It remained to be seen whether or not his 
ownership would be a good thing for Chelsea, but it soon became clear that he was prepared 
to invest money in improving the team. Having made the purchase of Chelsea complete, 
Abramovich spent lavishly on bringing in good players. The new arrivals included Glen 
Johnson (£6 million from West Ham United), Wayne Bridge (£7 million from 
Southampton), and larger signings in Damien Duff (£17 million from Blackburn Rovers) 
and Juan Sebastien Veron (£15 million from Manchester United). They also looked 
overseas to bring Geremi from Real Madrid (£7 million), and Joe Cole followed Johnson 
from West Ham (£6.6 million). In the first six weeks after Abramovich had taken over, the 
total amount spent on players neared £60 million.647 The spending continued. The 
Romanian Adrian Mutu (from Parma, £15.8 million), and the Russian Alexei Smertin (from 
Bordeaux, £3 million) were followed by Hernan Crespo, an Argentinian striker (from Inter 
Milan, £18 million) at which point Chelsea became the biggest spending club in world 
football history.648  
                                                          
647 Jon Brodkin and Michael Walker, ‘Big Spenders Hit £60 Million Mark’, The Guardian, 6 August 2003.  
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Table 8. Abramovich’s spending spree  
Date 
 
Player Selling club Amount  
 
July 2003 Glen Johnson West Ham United £6m 
July 2003 Geremi Real Madrid £7m 
July 2003 Wayne Bridge Southampton £7m 
July 2003 Damien Duff Blackburn Rovers £17m 
August 2003 Joe Cole West Ham United £6.6m 
August 2003 Juan Veron Manchester United £15m 
August 2003 Adrian Mutu Parma £15.8m 
August 2003 Alexei Smerten Bordeaux £3m 
August 2003 Hernan Crespo Inter Milan £18m 
August 2003 Claude Makelele Real Madrid £16.8m 
January 2004 Scott Parker Charlton Athletic £10m 
July 2004 Mateja Kezman PSV Eindhoven £5.5m 
July 2004 Alex Santos £5.7m 
July 2004 Tiago Benfica £10m 
July 2004 Petr Cech Rennes £9m 
July 2004 Arjen Robben PSV Eindhoven £12m 
July 2004 Paulo Ferreira Porto £13.2m 
July 2004 Didier Drogba Marseilles £24m 
July 2004 Ricardo Carvalho Porto £19.8m 
 Sources: Jon Brodkin and Michael Walker, ‘Big Spenders Hit £60 Million Mark’, The Guardian,  
6 August 2003; Darren Lewis, ‘£20 Million! Thank God For Roman’s Gravy Train’, Daily Mirror,  
28 July 2004; Danny Fullbrook, ‘Roman Clout Of His World’, Daily Star, 26 August 2003;  
 
When Abramovich took over, Chelsea had finished the previous season in fourth position. 
With their new talent they looked to improve on this and possibly even challenge for the 
title. The season 2003/2004 was when Arsenal won the Premiership without losing a single 
match, but finishing behind them in second place were Chelsea. Now serious contenders 
252 
 
for the title, Chelsea improved their chances further with another spending spree. In summer 
2004, Abramovich signed Didier Drogba (£24 million from Marseille), Arjen Robben (£12 
million from PSV Eindhoven), and Ricardo Carvalho and Paulo Ferreira (both from Porto, 
£19.8 million and £13.2 million respectively).649   
 
Darren Lewis, in the Daily Mirror, claimed that Chelsea were paying over the odds for 
players, but Henry Winter in the Daily Telegraph was more positive, saying ‘Chelsea can 
win the Premiership, pushing Arsenal into second and keeping United third.’650 This 
prediction proved right. Chelsea went on to win the 2004/2005 Premiership, the club’s first 
title success for fifty years. The feat was repeated the following season. In 2006/2007, 
Chelsea finished runners-up to Manchester United, but this disappointment was tempered 
by the fact that they won the FA Cup (1-0 v. Manchester United) and the Carling Cup (2-1 
v. Arsenal). The club would go on to win the FA Cup again in 2009, 2010 and 2012, beating 
Everton (2-1), Portsmouth (1-0) and Liverpool (2-1) respectively. In 2009/2010 they also 
won the Premier League title again, and therefore ‘the double’. 
 
 
Despite their immense success in domestic competition, European trophies eluded the club 
for a long time, although they came agonisingly close in the 2007/2008 Champions League 
final against Manchester United in Moscow. After a 1-1 draw and extra time, penalties 
loomed. Ronaldo missed United’s third, meaning that John Terry could win Chelsea the 
trophy if he scored his, but he missed and Chelsea lost in the sudden death series. Four 
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years later, in 2011/2012, Chelsea would win this elusive trophy, on penalties against 
Bayern Munich following a 1-1 draw in the final in Munich.651   
 
During the same period, however, Chelsea had nearly as many different managers as they 
won trophies. When Abramovich arrived with his cheque book, it was Claudio Ranieri in 
charge. After one season Abramovich wanted to make his own appointment and Jose 
Mourinho arrived. It was under Mourinho that Chelsea won the Premiership titles of 2005 
and 2006. Failure to repeat the feat in 2007 meant that Mourinho was replaced by Avram 
Grant, and from then up to 2013, when Mourinho returned to the club, Chelsea changed 
managers at an average rate of one a year. The replacement of Roberto di Matteo seemed 
particularly harsh. Di Matteo had been placed in temporary charge of the team following 
the departure of Andre Villas-Boas in March 2012. Chelsea’s League form had been poor, 
but within ten weeks di Matteo had led the team to win the FA Cup and the long-awaited 
Champions League, turning the confidence of the players around in the process. Yet the 
club refused to be drawn on giving di Matteo the job on a permanent basis.652 The following 
season di Matteo became the eighth manager to lose his job in ten seasons under 
Abramovich.653 
 
To some observers managers were being replaced too regularly and Chelsea were simply 
‘buying trophies’. Even so, one cannot argue with the record books regarding the number 
of trophies Chelsea won during this period, whatever the manner of their acquisition, and 
in this sense ownership by Roman Abramovich was of great benefit to the club. But when 
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looking at the Abramovich era in the broader context of the whole of English football, his 
effect was less positive. The unprecedented amount of signings he made, and in some 
instances for more than a player was actually worth, had the effect of continuing to drive 
up already inflated transfer fees. The constant sacking of managers meant that there was no 
continuity of plan and fed a wider perception of the team manager as an expendable 
commodity.  
 
Set into a broader context, the unregulated dealing in the transfer market, of which Chelsea 
were at the forefront, was reflective of the wider unfettered capitalism as pursued by large 
corporations in the City of London. By the early 2000s, major companies operated in an 
international market, as of course did large football clubs by this time. Therefore global 
financial institutions operated outside the control of the government of any one state, and 
likewise the international football transfer market functioned unregulated by the football 
authority of any one country. There is of course no world government, but there is a world 
governing body for football – FIFA – but it is too weak, and has its own problems regarding 
allegations of corruption, to regulate the market.  Thus it can be seen that when it comes to 
the worldwide market both state governments and national football associations have no 
power.  
 
Manchester United and Malcolm Glazer 
Manchester United’s flotation on the London stock market in 1991 turned out to be just in 
time for the Premier League windfall. The tremendous success that the club enjoyed in the 
1990s was at a time when football had learned how to make money, and this turned United 
into the world’s most profitable football club, and therefore a very attractive prospect for 
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potential owners. In the process the club was transformed into a global corporate brand, and 
in a financial league of its own among English football clubs.654 In 1996/1997 Manchester 
United PLC’s turnover amounted to nearly one-fifth of that of the whole Premier League.655 
Shortly afterwards, United announced that it planned to launch its own subscription 
television channel, chairman Martin Edwards declaring that he would be happy for the club 
to leave the Premier League’s satellite television deal when it expired.656  In 1998 BskyB 
began a bid to take it over.657 Their motives were obvious. They could acquire cheaply a 
club with vast wealth and a rapidly expanding global fan base.658 Unsurprisingly there was 
a broad range of opposition to the bid. It raised the possibility of the biggest football club 
in England being owned by the biggest broadcaster of live football, and therefore potential 
domination of coverage, and in turn sponsorship, at the expense of all the other Premiership 
clubs. Minister for Sport Tony Banks commented that ‘the implications for commercial 
policy are profound.’659 The £623 million bid was eventually rejected by the Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission as being ‘not in the public interest.’660 The club came into the 
ownership of the Irish racing duo J. P. McManus and John Magnier. It was the acquisition 
of their company Cubic Expression by Malcolm Glazer that gave him the necessary level 
of shareholding to take over the club quickly:  
 
[Glazer’s] annexation of Manchester United yesterday was remarkable for its speed 
and efficiency. Within four hours of announcing the deal to buy out United’s largest 
shareholders, Cubic Expression … Glazer had virtually secured the 75 per cent 
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shareholding his deal required. The old order, the plc that had run the club with 
increasing success for 14 years, were swept away without a fight. 661   
 
Malcolm Glazer was an American who had purchased the American Football team The 
Tampa Bay Buccaneers in 1995. The Buccaneers had been the laughing stock of all the 
NFL franchises due to their poor record of results, but Glazer turned things round and in 
2003 they became Super Bowl champions, beating the Oakland Raiders.662 Glazer had 
initially made his money by selling watch parts at his family’s store following the death of 
his father.663 He was not a lifelong sports fan and Richard Luscombe, in The Daily 
Telegraph, wrote that he was ‘one of America’s most ruthless and successful businessmen, 
a man for whom profit in the boardroom comes as a much higher priority than anything his 
players can achieve on the field.’664 This being the case, one can understand the validity of 
supporters’ concerns, not only Manchester United’s, but throughout the Premiership and 
the Football League. Henry Winter, in the same newspaper, commented: 
 
This man will damage our national game … those charged with protecting the well-
being of English football … will hide, shamefully, as an arch-profiteer plunges a 
famous sporting institution into debt, raising ticket prices, alienating fans, and 
ultimately threatening the stability of the Premiership by shredding the collectively 
negotiated television contract … He just wants to make money, and he has realised 
that United can divert many of football’s rich income streams into Old Trafford, and 
therefore his pockets, by doing their own television deal.665 
 
If Manchester United viewed having their own television channel as a serious possibility 
then other big clubs could follow suit. While this possibility might provide fans with good 
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round the clock coverage, which was especially important for clubs with a global fanbase, 
it also threatened the unity of the Premiership because there could be numerous different 
television deals rather than one collective one. There was a certain irony in that the 
Premiership could become threatened by the same broadcasting technology that had been 
its inseparable twin at its inception if its member clubs sought to go it alone.  
 
One adviser to Malcolm Glazer and his sons – Joel, Avi, and Bryan – tried to address 
concerns: ‘the fans have nothing to fear. There is no radical agenda for change. Joel is very 
passionate about the club and about football. The Glazers think that they have a lot to 
contribute. They are investing a lot of their own money directly … and they would be mad 
to go in and rip up the club.’666 However, the fans’ anger was justified when one considers 
the way in which money was raised. To make the bid the Glazers used the practice of 
‘financial leverage’, which meant that the club had to carry the cost of borrowing, to the 
tune of at least £300 million.667 Mick Hume, writing in The Times, commented, ‘Glazer 
looks like bad news, especially if he burdens United with as much debt as Arsenal (and 
without a new stadium to show for it) … United’s success since 1993 has come with the 
ability of the plc to exploit the commercial explosion of the Premiership. Those who live 
by the share price can perish by it.’668 Here we see concern, but with an acknowledgement 
that by floating on the stock market United had left themselves vulnerable to the possibility 
of such an outcome. A Times editorial continues in a similar vein: 
 
[Glazer] is, however, an unknown quantity and a hard-headed businessman, not a 
sports sentimentalist. The method by which he proposes to acquire the club involves 
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a huge increase in its debts and not a lavish subsidy by the owner. This is a legitimate 
cause for concern. He is not another Roman Abramovich, a youthful billionaire who 
purchased Chelsea with the desire and the money to turn it into the best team in 
Europe. Mr. Glazer is not even an old-fashioned football sugar-daddy. He has, 
nevertheless, won playing by the rules in a game that Manchester United volunteered 
for. Their performance has been driven by wealth derived from a stock market 
flotation and an ambition to recast themselves as the biggest sporting brand in the 
world. United have no more right to be immune from the laws of the market than 
Sainsbury’s or Marks & Spencer. Mr. Glazer’s initiative is not, as some insist, the 
financial equivalent of a tackle from behind. There was an open goal, created by poor 
defending, and he has scored.669  
 
Nick Towle, the chairman of Shareholders United, the group of fans who organised and co-
ordinated much of the anti-Glazer campaign, was reported as saying, ‘I believe as many as 
20,000 fans will leave Manchester United. All the hard-core supporters will refuse to go, 
and then what kind of atmosphere will there be?’670 There was also the threat of forming a 
breakaway club. Jules Spencer, the chairman of the Independent Manchester United 
Supporters’ Association, said, ‘we will do what we said, which is up sticks and form a new 
club which will continue the traditions and heritage and the legacy of 125 years of 
Manchester United. We don’t want Malcolm Glazer, we want a club run for the fans – and 
that is what we will do.’671 These fans were as good as their word. FC United of Manchester 
was formed and immediately entered the North West Counties Football League Division 
Two. Successive promotions found them in the Northern Premier League Premier Division. 
In 2010/2011 FC United won their way through all the qualifying rounds and reached the 
Second Round of the FA Cup, knocking out Rochdale on the way. Home games were 
played in a groundshare with Bury at Gigg Lane, while waiting for a new stadium at 
Broadhurst Park in North Manchester to be completed.672 
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The manifesto on the FC United website makes it clear where the founders felt Manchester 
United had gone wrong and how they aimed to run their new club. It states, ‘FC United of 
Manchester is a new football club founded by disaffected and disenfranchised Manchester 
United supporters. Our aim is to create a sustainable club for the long term which is owned 
and democratically run by its members, which is accessible to all the communities of 
Manchester, and one in which they can participate fully.’673 The manifesto goes on to list 
seven core principles. These include a Board democratically elected by the members and 
decisions taken on a one member, one vote basis, and pledges that the club will ‘endeavour 
to make admission prices as affordable as possible’, and will ‘strive wherever possible to 
avoid outright commercialism’ and ‘remain a non-profit organisation.’674 Board member 
Alison Watt said that the reasons behind FC United’s formation are ‘probably most easily 
described as being disillusioned with the aspects of “modern football” that have destroyed 
the match-going experience.’ Of the Glazer takeover, she said: ‘it was the last straw. For 
background, the idea of a breakaway club had been mooted during the campaign against 
the planned Murdoch takeover in 1999 – a breakaway obviously never happened at that 
point, because that takeover was defeated … the Glazer takeover has been described as the 
catalyst for FC United, not the sole reason.’675 
 
The takeover of Manchester United by Malcolm Glazer raised some new issues. Compared 
to Abramovich at Chelsea where, whatever the criticisms, he had invested a lot of his 
personal wealth into the club, Glazer took money out of Manchester United. He did so by 
loading the cost of his borrowing onto the club. Did this matter? It did if the cost of 
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borrowing meant that there was insufficient money to buy the players necessary to win 
trophies. A quick look at United’s achievements since the takeover do not reveal a sudden 
downturn – they won the Premiership title for three consecutive seasons from 2006/2007 
to 2008/2009, and also in 2010/2011 and again in 2012/2013. They also won the Champions 
League in 2007/2008, and finished runners-up in 2008/2009 and 2010/2011. It can, 
however, be argued that these successes were down to the ability of Sir Alex Ferguson as a 
manager rather than any investment by the board. Indeed, it is noticeable that United have 
fared less well since Ferguson’s retirement in 2013. One is left to wonder how much could 
have been achieved without money being drained from the club – to truly dominate in 
Europe, perhaps?  
 
Liverpool and Gillett and Hicks 
On 6 February 2007 George Gillett and Tom Hicks took over Liverpool, promising to make 
them ‘the most dominant club side in the world.’676 They had purchased a 51.6 per cent 
controlling interest from David Moores for £470 million, gazumping Sheik Muhammed 
and the royal government of Dubai. The club had also recently failed to do a deal with the 
prime minister of Thailand.677 The arrival of Hicks and Gillett is summed up by the 
journalist Brian Reade in the following terms: 
 
Nothing in the history of this ‘wonderful, storied club’ (copyright Thomas Ollis Hicks) 
seemed as foreign as the events of 6 February 2007. One snapshot which sums up this 
most bizarre of afternoons came when the new American owners caressed the This Is 
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Anfield sign, despite being the antithesis of everything it stood for, barely able to 
comprehend their luck or contain their glee.678 
 
Liverpool, according to captain Steven Gerrard, was and is ‘a compassionate club with roots 
that go deep in the community.’679 Of the Liverpool song ‘You’ll Never Walk Alone’, he 
says it is ‘more than a string of words and a great tune; it is a pact between people.’680 
Therefore, a sign proclaiming This Is Anfield stood for compassion throughout the 
surrounding community, with its togetherness and care and consideration for each other. 
Liverpool’s tradition of continuity in running the club can be seen by the length of tenure 
served by the managers that built and maintained a great team: Bill Shankly served for 
fifteen years (1959 -1974), then Bob Paisley for nine years (1974 – 1983). This loyalty 
extended to promoting from within. As an example of this, Kenny Dalglish was a great 
Liverpool player who went on to become manager for six years (1985-1991).681 How do 
the Liverpool traditions of community and continuity exist in a modern game where clubs 
see themselves as brands in a global marketplace? The political scientist Tiest Sondaal 
points to Liverpool’s strategy of reconciling the global with the local, quoting Liverpool 
Chief Executive Rick Parry’s statement that the club’s local roots are what makes the club 
distinctive: ‘the brand is the successful club that cares about its roots.’682  
 
The new owners said the things that the fans wanted to hear. Gillett commented, ‘this is 
truly the largest sport in the world and this is the most important club in the most important 
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sport in the world – and what a privilege we have to be associated with it.’683 They were 
skilled at ‘impression management’.684 They said that meetings with manager Rafael 
Benitez, Gerrard and player Jamie Carragher made the pair aware of the good Liverpool 
traditions of continuity and the need for funds to be spent on transfers. They also promised 
to make a start on the proposed new 61,000-seater stadium at Stanley Park ‘within the next 
60 days or so.’685 Like Malcolm Glazer, both Gillett and Hicks owned other sporting 
institutions. Gillett owned the Montreal Canadians ice hockey team and Hicks owned 
another ice hockey team, the Dallas Stars, and the Texas Rangers baseball team.686 The 
early signs were good as the owners signed the prolific goalscorer Fernando Torres from 
Athletico Madrid for £22 million in the next transfer window.687 
 
Things started to go wrong when it transpired that Gillett and Hicks were not true to their 
word over certain important issues. Despite their promises to the contrary, the two owners 
saddled the club with debt: 
 
When they bought Liverpool, Hicks and Gillett explained that they were very different 
from the Glazers at Manchester United, promising they would use their own money to 
finance the deal, and not borrow against the club. Depressingly, that promise has been 
broken, with the pair spending the last six months attempting to arrange finance that 
will ultimately put Liverpool in debt to the breathtaking tune of around £600 
million.688 
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Interest on a loan of this size would amount to about £35 - £40 million every year, and the 
loan itself would amount to twenty times Liverpool’s operating profits. This compared to 
Manchester United’s at eight times and Arsenal’s at four times. Most importantly, as far as 
the fans were concerned, such levels of interest would leave no money available to buy new 
players.689 
 
On top of the financial worries it also transpired that the owners had approached Jurgen 
Klinsmann about the role of team manager. Hicks insisted that this was done simply as 
‘insurance’ should existing team manager Rafael Benitez decide to leave,  but such a 
development could only undermine Benitez’s position and contribute to what was 
becoming a war of attrition between Liverpool’s owners and the team manager.690 It was 
Benitez who had masterminded Liverpool’s Champions League success in 2005, when 
against AC Milan in a thrilling final Liverpool had trailed 3-0 at half-time before coming 
back to draw 3-3 and win the trophy on penalties. He was popular with Liverpool fans and 
they had already marched through the city in support of him.691  
 
With interest in the club being shown again by Dubai International Capital (DIC), who 
Gillett and Hicks had gazumped to buy the club eleven months earlier, Liverpool fans called 
on the American owners to stand down so the Emiratis could take over. In the meantime, a 
refinancing deal with the Royal Bank of Scotland and US bank Wachovia was being 
negotiated which would involve a loan of £350 million. With DIC interested in buying the 
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club and fans protesting against the way the club was being run, Hicks adamantly refused 
to stand down.692  
 
As well as marching in support of the manager and displaying banners during home games, 
Liverpool fans formed an organisation, the Spirit of Shankly - a clear reference to Bill 
Shankly. On 31 January 2008 around 350 fans gathered at The Sandon, Anfield, for the 
initial meeting. The Sandon public house already had an important place in the history of 
football in the city – both Liverpool and Everton were formed there. The Spirit of Shankly 
is a community-based body of Liverpool supporters who organise such things as cheap 
travel to away games, but also sometimes act as a body of protest for wider community 
issues. Their ultimate aim was fan ownership of the football club, and the proud declaration 
on the website is that the Spirit of Shankly is ‘the first football supporters union.’ Regarding 
the mismanagement of the club by Gillett and Hicks it declared, ‘we had to act, we had to 
protest, we had to do something. Spirit of Shankly was born.’693 
 
Benitez had led Liverpool to another Champions League final in 2007, just months after 
the takeover by Gillett and Hicks. On this occasion they lost 2-1 to AC Milan in Athens.694 
His popularity continued all the while Liverpool did sufficiently well to qualify for the 
Champions League, which they did by finishing fourth in 2007/2008 and 2008/2009. 
However, the following season a disappointing seventh place meant no Champions League 
place and the end for Benitez. He left Liverpool on 3 June 2010. 
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The situation off the field was worsening. On 9 September the Royal Bank of Scotland 
placed Liverpool’s £237 million loan into its toxic assets division, making it likely that the 
figure would have to be repaid on expiry, which was coming up on 6 October, rather than 
renegotiated.695 As the deadline approached, two excellent financial offers were received, 
which would repay the debt and provide funds for the construction of the new stadium. 
Board members prepared to accept these offers which would have meant forcing the owners 
out. Gillett and Hicks responded by suspending two members – managing director Christian 
Purslow and commercial director Ian Ayre. A legal battle began as to whether or not under 
the Companies Act Gillett and Hicks had the right to remove Purslow and Ayre.696  
 
In the end Liverpool struck a deal with one of the two bidders. An American outfit, New 
England Sports Ventures, completed a takeover worth £300 million after Gillett and Hicks 
were defeated in their legal battle to prevent it.697 The principal owner of NESV was John 
W. Henry who also owned the baseball team Boston Red Sox. He had been remarkably 
successful with Red Sox, buying the club in 2002, winning the World Series in 2004, and 
making them title contenders on an annual basis.698 However, Liverpool fans, given their 
recent experiences, were understandably concerned about the new owner. Robin Scott-
Elliot, reporting in The Independent, said, ‘there was a markedly cautious reaction among 
Liverpool supporters yesterday as news of the deal broke, with one high-profile fan saying 
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he feared the club had jumped ‘out of the frying pan into the frying pan’.’699 Yet as the 
seasons progressed the worst fears proved unfounded. 
 
The takeover of Liverpool by Gillett and Hicks had a lot of similarities to that of Glazer at 
Manchester United. It is interesting to note their insistence that they were not like Malcolm 
Glazer, yet, as it turned out, they were. The principle of leveraged buyouts was bad news 
because it drained away money that could have been used to achieve success on the pitch. 
In Liverpool’s case the money could have been spent on the players necessary to win a 
long-awaited Premier League title, or bring back the days of dominance in Europe that the 
club had enjoyed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. That such poor ownership could happen 
to both Liverpool and Manchester United - two of the biggest and most successful clubs in 
the history of English football - underlines the powerlessness of the domestic game to 
protect itself when faced with predatory businessmen.  
 
We can draw a comparison with the ease with which the asset-stripping of MG Rover was 
carried out. Four directors of Phoenix Venture Holdings paid £10 in 2000 to buy the 
carmaker from BMW and four years later stood to make tens of millions through special 
loan deals, pensions, and dividends. Far from being criticised for doing this, Trade and 
Industry Secretary Patricia Hewitt praised them: ‘company directors who take big risks and 
achieve big success deserve big rewards.’700 
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Manchester City, Thaksin Shinawatra, and the Abu Dhabi United Group  
In June 2007, Manchester City were bought by the most controversial person ever to own 
an English football club. Thaksin Shinawatra, the former prime minister of Thailand, was 
in exile and faced a two year prison sentence if he returned to his native country, having 
received a conviction in his absence on a conflict of interest charge. There were also 
widespread allegations of corruption, which led to his conviction and the Thai Supreme 
Court stripping his family of the equivalent of £910 million.701 Shinawatra was born in 1949 
and made his money in telecommunications in the late 1980s. He formed a new political 
party, Thai Rak Thai, in 1998 and they swept to power in 2001. After more than five years 
in office Shinawatra was ousted in a coup in September 2006. More worrying than the 
convictions for corruption and conflict of interest was the allegation of human rights abuses. 
He was implicated in the deaths of 2,500 people in the so-called ‘War on Drugs’ in 2003.702   
 
His ownership raised important issues. Should a person with such a record own a football 
club? Would not the good name of that club in particular, and the game itself in general, be 
tarnished by the involvement of such an individual? One body of opinion suggested that no 
club should be owned by such a man, while the opposite view was that these matters were 
outside football and therefore had no relevance. This holds that Shinawatra, or any other 
owner, stands or falls purely on what happens at the club – managerial appointments, player 
signings, results on the pitch, and club finances.  
 
                                                          




On the pitch, it has to be said that his record was reasonable. He appointed the former 
England manager Sven Goran-Eriksson to manage the team, and a number of signings were 
made, including Martin Petrov (£4.7 million from Athletico Madrid), Vedran Corluka (£8 
million from Dynamo Zagreb), and Elano (£8 million from Shaktar Donetsk).703 City went 
on to finish the 2007/2008 season in ninth position, which was an improvement on the 
previous season’s fourteenth. Yet, during the same period the club’s losses nearly trebled 
to £32.6 million, and then they took out a £30 million loan against future television 
revenue.704 Still they continued to spend, bringing in the Brazilian Jo (£18 million from 
CSKA Moscow), Vincent Kompany (£6 million from Hamburg), and Shaun Wright-
Phillips (£9 million from Chelsea). It can be seen that, despite progress on the pitch, the 
club’s finances were in disarray. In the end, Shinawatra was forced to sell because the Thai 
authorities had frozen £800 million worth of his assets. He did so in September 2008 to a 
consortium that included the royal family of a rich Gulf state, whose investment would 
eclipse even that of Abramovich at Chelsea.705   
 
Since their heyday in the late 1960s, City had long been in the shadow of their successful 
neighbours and rivals Manchester United. Now the club seemed certain to address this 
situation. Nick Clark, in The Independent, reported it thus: 
 
The tiny Gulf state of Abu Dhabi launched an audacious raid on one of Britain’s top 
football clubs yesterday in a move that will transform the shape of global football. The 
£210m takeover of Manchester City threatens to dethrone their closest rivals 
Manchester United and establish City as the biggest team in the world. The club 
announced that it had signed a memo of understanding with the Abu Dhabi United 
                                                          
703 www.soccerbase.com last accessed 30 November 2015.  
704 Paul Kelso, Daily Telegraph, 10 April 2009 www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/teams/manchester-
city/5137361; www.redcafe.net/threads/man-city-take-out-£30m-loan-against-tv-revenue.214615  last accessed 
27 May 2016.  
705 www.theguardian.com/football/2008/oct/08/manchestercity.premierleague last accessed 25 November 2015.  
269 
 
Group (ADUG), a holding company set up by Middle East investors, backed by the 
country’s royal family.706 
 
The Group was fronted by Sulaiman al-Fahim, who promised to invest enough to break up 
the ‘Big Four’ of Manchester United, Chelsea, Liverpool and Arsenal. As a statement of 
intent, the new owners trumped Chelsea for the signature of Real Madrid striker Robinho 
for a record £32.6 million.707 But the task facing the new owners was a big one. Five years 
earlier Abramovich had started to turn Chelsea from a good team into a great one (Chelsea 
had just finished fourth), but City had just finished a massive twenty-one points behind 
Liverpool in fourth place and thirty-two behind champions Manchester United. As recently 
as 2002, City had not been in the Premiership and had played the 1998/1999 season in 
football’s third tier.708 Since regaining top division status, City had been a mid-table side 
and never seriously challenged for a place in the top four.  
 
During the first transfer window after the takeover, the new owners signed goalkeeper Shay 
Given (£8 million from Newcastle United), left-back Wayne Bridge (£12 million from 
Chelsea), striker Craig Bellamy (£14 million from West Ham United), and midfielder Nigel   
de Jong (£16 million, rising to £18.3 million, from SV Hamburg).709  However, the 
2008/2009 season saw another mid-table finish, so there was still much that needed to be 
done, and spent, to turn City into a successful side. During the summer the Abu Dhabi 
United Group set about investing more money in players to give manager Mark Hughes a 
chance of making a significant improvement the following season.  
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This spending spree began with the signing of Gareth Barry (£12 million from Aston Villa). 
It was followed by the purchase of Roque Santa Cruz (£17.5 million from Blackburn 
Rovers). Then City spent double the outlay thus far on Emmanuel Adebayor (£25 million 
from Arsenal) and Carlos Tevez (£30 million from Manchester United). These new players 
were then joined by Kolo Toure (£16 million from Arsenal) before the new season began.710 
With the 2009/2010 season under way and just before transfer deadline day, City bought 
Joleon Lescott (£24 million from Everton) to take the total spending within the previous 
year to over £200 million.711 
 
With so many new and varied players to bond and become a successful football team, City’s 
early season form was not good enough to justify the huge outlay, with the result that Mark 
Hughes was sacked in December, to be replaced by Roberto Mancini. City’s form improved 
and they mounted a challenge for a top four place, but finished fifth due to a poor game at 
home to Tottenham Hotspur.712 Now at least in a position where they could challenge for a 
Champions League place, the squad was strengthened further to boost their chances. The 
summer of 2010 saw more signings. This time they looked to overseas clubs and bought 
Yaya Toure (£30 million from Barcelona), David Silva (£25 million from Valencia), Mario 
Balotelli (£23 million from Inter Milan), Aleksandar Kolarov (£17 million from Lazio), and 
Jerome Boateng (£11 million from SV Hamburg). They rounded off the summer with the 
signing of James Milner (£26 million from Aston Villa).713 
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       Table 9. The Abu Dhabi United Group’s Spending Spree 
Date Player Selling club Amount  
January 2009 Shay Given Newcastle United £7m 
January 2009 Wayne Bridge Chelsea £12m 
January 2009 Craig Bellamy West Ham United £14m 
January 2009 Nigel de Jong SV Hamburg £17m 
June 2009 Gareth Barry Aston Villa £12m 
July 2009 Roque Santa  Cruz Blackburn Rovers £17.5m 
July 2009 Emmanuel Adebayor Arsenal £25m 
July 2009 Carlos Tevez Manchester United  £30m 
July 2009 Kolo Toure Arsenal £16m 
August 2009 Joleon Lescott Everton £24m 
June 2010 Yaya Toure Barcelona £30m 
July 2010 David Silva Valencia £25m 
August 2010 Mario Balotelli Inter Milan £25m 
August 2010 Aleksandar Kolarov Lazio £17m 
August 2010 Jerome Boateng SV Hamburg £11m 
August 2010 James Milner Aston Villa £26m  
January 2011 Edin Dzeko VfL Wolfsburg £27m  
July 2011 Sergio Aguero Athletico Madrid £38m  
            Sources:  Daily Telegraph, Sport, 3 February 2009; Conn, Richer Than God pp.59-60,  
            p.240; David Anderson, ‘Money Can Buy Me Love’, Daily Mirror, 31 July 2009; The  
           Independent, Premier League Supplement,14 August 2010; www.soccerbase.com  
           last accessed 22 November 2015.  
 
The 2010/2011 season saw City achieve the all-important Champions League place by 
finishing third. The expensive squad also put some silverware on the shelf by winning the 
FA Cup, beating Stoke City 1-0 in the final at Wembley. This was City’s first trophy since 
they won the League Cup in 1976, and the first FA Cup since the great team of the late 
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1960s won the trophy in 1969.714 Having secured a Champions League spot, the next aim 
was the Premiership title itself. To strengthen the squad yet further, Sergio Aguero was 
signed from Athletico Madrid for £38 million ready for the new season.715  
 
 
The last day of the 2011/2012 season saw the most thrilling climax to a title race since the 
start of the Premier League as City went neck and neck with neighbours and rivals 
Manchester United for the top spot. Before the start of play, City and United were level on 
points and City had a better goal difference, so a win would guarantee City the title, but 
anything less would mean the title going to United providing they bettered City’s result. 
United were away to Sunderland and City were at home to Queen’s Park Rangers. United’s 
match went according to form as they took a 1-0 lead and held on to it, but City’s fans went 
through a roller-coaster of an afternoon. QPR took a shock lead with 25 minutes remaining, 
which would mean the title going to United. The clock ran down and as the final whistle 
went at Sunderland, United fans celebrated in the knowledge that City faced a seemingly 
insurmountable task if they were to take the title from them. But City did just that, as Dzeko 
equalised and Aguero scored the winner, both goals coming deep into added time.716 One 
Manchester City fan described his feelings thus: ‘Surreal, winning the title was something 
I thought I would never see happen. Beating our neighbours from Trafford made it 
particularly special.’717 This was the most thrilling climax to a title race since 1989, when, 
in the old First Division, Arsenal had snatched the Championship from under the noses of 
Liverpool by scoring a second goal at Anfield in the last minute to make it 2-0 and take the 
trophy back to North London.  
                                                          
714 Eds. Rollin and Rollin, SkySports Football Yearbook 2008-2009, pp.250-251. 
715 www.soccerbase.com last accessed 22 November 2015.  
716 For Manchester City’s full record of achievements under the Abu Dhabi United Group, see Appendix B.  
717 Anonymous Manchester City fan, interview with the author, email, 22 March 2016.  
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The Manchester City fan gave an opinion on the era of the Abu Dhabi ownership, 
commenting first on the positive aspects: ‘advancement to a global brand, winning trophies 
I didn’t even dream of happening.’718 On the other hand, he had also experienced:  
 
loss of my local football club, loss of the football club’s soul, ran by professional 
marketers who know little about football or football fans, [they are] not football 
people. [The club has] lost local fans who have turned to non-League football, 
replaced by day trippers. Sometimes [the] direction of the club to create a world brand 
has deflected from the football, the club appears more interested in making money 
from ‘partners’ and creating a politically correct image than producing good football. 
The football appears to be just an afterthought.719 
 
He also makes the observation that: 
 
In a business world, with the substantial money invested since 2009, the return on 
trophies appears to have been a failure, 2013 FA Cup final a prime example, getting 
knocked out of domestic club competitions by lower League sides [City lost the 2013 
FA Cup final to Wigan Athletic]. The club seems to think I would want to buy ‘City 
Football Group’ Melbourne City and New York City merchandise, why would I want 
to do that? – I’m from Manchester!720 
 
Conclusion   
Having established that foreign ownership was probable following the arrival of foreign 
players and foreign managers, we have seen how the experience differed greatly from club 
to club. For some clubs, a new foreign owner marked the start of a very successful era in 
the club’s history, but others were saddled with debt that had been run up in the process of 
the new owner buying the club. Put simply, what was good news for Chelsea and 
                                                          
718 Ibid.  
719 Ibid.  
720 Ibid.  
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Manchester City, in that wealthy foreign owners could invest sufficient funds to bring 
success, was bad news for Manchester United and Liverpool, because the owners of those 
clubs loaded on debts producing charges that could divert money away from bringing 
greater success. It would be easy to liken the experiences of Chelsea and Manchester City 
to that of Blackburn Rovers in the 1990s, but there was a big difference in that Sir Jack 
Walker, although a tax exile for many years, was a Blackburn man with local connections 
who had supported Blackburn as a boy. Chelsea by contrast were cherry-picked by a 
wealthy Russian oligarch. Before settling on Chelsea, Abramovich had looked at 
Manchester United, Arsenal and Tottenham Hotspur.721 Such a man can hardly be described 
as a fan.   
 
Abramovich’s takeover of Chelsea had the effect of elevating the subject of foreign 
ownership from a sideshow to a major theme in its own right. Both Chelsea and Manchester 
City were bought by owners with enough financial clout to create a team good enough to 
dominate the Premier League and be serious contenders in Europe, which was positive for 
those clubs but criticised by some. There have been other consequences. Two new clubs, 
AFC Wimbledon and FC United of Manchester, and a new supporters group, Spirit of 
Shankly, came into being because of the actions of foreign owners who appeared not to 
have the best interests of their club at heart. It is also clear that some overseas owners either 
fail to understand or decide to disregard the culture and tradition that surrounds football 
clubs. The best examples of this are Cardiff City and Hull City. Cardiff’s Malaysian owners 
in 2012 took the decision to change the club’s colours from blue to red and introduce a new 
club crest.722 This gave rise to a bizarre situation because for more than two years a team 
                                                          
721 Mihir Bose, ‘Russian Faces £150m Bill To Get Ball Rolling’, Daily Telegraph, 3 July 2003.  
722 Daily Express, 7 June 2012.  
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nicknamed ‘The Bluebirds’ played in red. Tim Hartley, who is on the board of Supporters 
Direct, commented:  
 
Cardiff City Football Club is rebranded at the whim of an owner from its traditional 
blue colours to red. Now, a lot of people at the time said, ‘it’s his business, he can do 
what he likes with it’, and I liken football clubs to listed buildings. If you own Windsor 
Castle you can’t paint it red because its value is greater to society than its pure legal 
ownership entitlement, and that is how we see football clubs.723 
 
Cardiff reverted to their blue strip early in 2015. In Hull City’s case, Egyptian owner Assem 
Allam wanted to change the club name to Hull Tigers because he believed the name was 
more ‘marketable’. Fans protested and in April 2014 the proposed name change was 
rejected by the FA Council.724 
 
Hartley went on to state the position of Supporters Direct on these points: 
 
We believe that the football authorities should make it a condition of the club’s 
licence, that is, ‘you won’t be a football club in the Football League unless you adhere 
to these rules’. So in the licence it should be that all major change to a club’s traditions, 
and that would include changing the playing strip, it would include changing the club’s 
crest, it would include changing the club’s name, the stadium’s name, and the location 




In their research into the spillover effect of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the 
Premier League, the business economists Andrew Jones and Mark Cook conclude that there 
                                                          
723 Tim Hartley, interview with the author, phone, 21 May 2015.  
724 http://m.bbc.co.uk/sport/football//26960502 last accessed 5 October 2015.  
725 Tim Hartley, interview with the author, phone, 21 May 2015.  
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have been improvements, such as better stadia and player quality, but the overall 
competitive balance in the Premier League has been reduced.726  
 
To put the subject into a broader context, the foreign ownership of football clubs has 
occurred at the same time as greater international travel and the globalisation of markets. 
Some of the top Premiership clubs now market themselves overseas so it should be no 
surprise when a billionaire from overseas takes over an English football club. One can only 
conclude that their motives were to gain the prestige that comes with owning a top English 
club, which improves the prospects of any other business interests they may have, and not 
because they support or care about that club.  
 
It is unfair and inaccurate, however, to link poor ownership exclusively with foreign 
owners. There have been plenty of bad British owners. As two examples, poor ownership 
by Bill Archer and Ken Richardson, at Brighton and Hove Albion and Doncaster Rovers 
respectively, in the late 1990s, drove their respective clubs to the brink of extinction. The 
former sold the club’s ground without making adequate provision for a new one, while the 
latter was convicted of involvement in an arson attack on his club’s ground.727 Thus, it is 
not whether an owner is British or foreign that is the issue, but whether the owner is acting 
in the interests of the club or not. It was the scale of investment by Abramovich in 2003, as 
he spent enough to create a team capable of domestic domination, that moved the issue of 
foreign ownership from the margins to centre stage.  
                                                          
726 Andrew Jones and Mark Cook, ‘The Spillover Effect From FDI In The English Premier League’, Soccer & 
Society, vol. 16, no. 1, 2015, p.132.  





This thesis began with the theme of decline. Throughout the 1970s, across a number of 
indices, football was believed to be on a downwards trajectory that ran in tandem with a 
declining sense of national prestige. Crowds were falling, which in turn meant less revenue 
taken at the turnstiles. In an age when this revenue accounted for almost all of a football 
club’s income this was of obvious concern. The dwindling resources were stretched further 
by the increase in players’ wages that had followed the abolition of the maximum wage in 
1961. These two factors were the main causes of concern during the 1970s and early 1980s; 
they helped to generate a belief in the need for change. There was also concern about the 
international standing of the English game. Following the triumph of 1966, England, with 
an arguably better team, were eliminated from the World Cup by West Germany in 1970. 
This was followed by failure to qualify for the finals of 1974 and 1978. The style of English 
football was seen as isolationist, refusing to accommodate innovation in terms of style and 
training methods practiced elsewhere in the world. One detects in this a certain arrogance: 
England invented the game, so why should England adapt its methods to fall in line with 
other nations who had taken up the game more recently? The FA evinced an air of aloofness, 
and tended to regard anything new with suspicion. Also, England’s success of 1966 had a 
paradoxical effect in that it raised expectations, and in so doing, made failure harder to 
stomach.  
 
The sense of decline mirrored a national mood. Britain had ceased to be a great power and 
had decolonised, but it had yet to find its role in the new global picture, pulled in one 
direction towards the United States and in the other towards Europe. Also, the early 1970s 
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saw industrial strife including miners’ strikes, power cuts, a three-day week imposed on 
British industry, civil unrest in Northern Ireland, and terrorist attacks by the IRA. The sense 
of decline was widespread, ingrained in the national mood, and football’s downward path 
was part of this broad trend.   
 
Those in charge of football were aware of the difficulties facing them, as the decision to 
commission a succession of reports testifies. These reports in chronological order were the 
‘Pattern for Football’ (1963), the ‘Political and Economic Planning (PEP) Report (1966), 
the Chester Report (1968), the Commission on Industrial Relations Report (1974), the 
Secretaries, Coaches, and Managers Association Report (1980), and the Chester Report 
(1983). The main aim running through these was to try to win back crowds and raise 
commerce. However, no agreement could ever be reached. Suggestions for reducing the 
size of the top two divisions in order to make players less tired for international duties, and 
regionalising the third and fourth divisions in order to reduce costs, never got off the ground 
because club chairmen unsurprisingly considered the interests of their own club before that 
of the game as a whole. They could not possibly countenance any suggestion which might 
reduce the number of games, and therefore the amount of income, when they were already 
struggling. Moreover, any move for change was obstructed by the League’s constitution, 
which required a three-quarters majority, thus greatly reducing the chance of any progress.  
 
Football’s efforts to reverse decline were dogged at every step by the opposition there 
seemed to be to every suggested innovation, be it League restructuring, shirt sponsorship, 
stock market flotation, or the fear of the potential consequence of live television coverage.  
Viewed from the outside, English football seemed locked into a downward spiral from 
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which it was powerless to escape, due to the differing interests of those responsible for the 
game. As British families started to travel abroad on cheap package holidays, and Britain 
joined the European Economic Community in 1973, there was a sense in which the 
isolationist FA seemed more behind the times than ever.  
 
There were some small changes, however, such as the decision to award three points for a 
win, and the moving of a limited number of fixtures to a Friday evening or a Sunday 
afternoon. These steps were put in place for the 1981/1982 season following the Secretaries, 
Coaches, and Managers Association Report. Even so, these seemed merely cosmetic 
compared to the major overhaul that was needed if football was to revive itself. Having 
rejected most of the proposals made in successive reports, chairmen saw their crowds 
continue to fall. One solution proffered was the idea of shirt sponsorship as a means to 
bridge the gap in resources. But the subject of shirt sponsorship became problematic in its 
own right. There was the traditional view that commerce and sport should not mix, and that 
a club’s income should be exclusively from the paying spectator. There were also concerns 
that sponsorship money could influence the game in other ways. Sponsors would be bound 
to want to invest their money in the biggest clubs, for reasons of prestige, and, more 
importantly, because those were the clubs likely to be featured on television. Investment in 
this manner would increase the financial gulf between the top clubs and the rest and also 
threaten the League’s unity as an organisation. These concerns did not stop sponsorship 
catching on and being adopted in other areas of the game, such as in the competitions 
themselves. For example, the League Cup became the Milk Cup in the first of many name 




Looking for other ways of bridging the gap between gate money and the resources required 
to run a club, Irving Scholar, chairman of Tottenham Hotspur, had the idea of launching his 
club on the stock exchange. This fitted in with the trend towards the free market encouraged 
by the Thatcher government, with its promotion of business ideals. Tottenham Hotspur 
became a PLC in October 1983. Short-term it was a success – Spurs’ debts were wiped out 
– but it brought long-term problems as some shareholders brought with them non-
footballing ideas on how to maximise the club’s profits. To some, this mattered more than 
results on the pitch, and was a major step in football’s evolution from a sport to a business. 
It was also Tottenham who, in the same month, hosted the first game to be broadcast live 
on television. The BBC and ITV by their own admission operated what amounted to a cartel 
to keep the amount they paid to football low. After long negotiations, live football was 
agreed on, despite concerns that it would further reduce attendances. When it came to 
renewal, a deal could not be reached with the result that football was off television 
completely during the autumn of 1985.  
 
It can be seen that the main driver of change was the need to bridge the gap in financial 
resources, but addressing this was difficult to achieve because of the conflicting interests 
of those involved in the game and a general reluctance to embrace new ideas. It was 
hooliganism that added a sense of desperation. The problem had blighted the game for 
nearly two decades, with occasional serious outbreaks on the way. Early in 1985 it reached 
a crisis point due to major disturbances at games between Chelsea and Sunderland, Luton 
Town and Millwall, and Birmingham City and Leeds United. Also, a fire at Bradford during 
a game between Bradford City and Lincoln City, killed fifty-six and injured hundreds more, 
underlining the poor condition of many football grounds. The crisis took on international 
proportions due to the disaster at the Heysel Stadium in Brussels, where violence between 
281 
 
rival fans led to the collapse of a wall and the deaths of thirty-nine people with many more 
injured. Therefore, within the space of three months, from the beginning of March to the 
end of May 1985, there had been three major riots and two disasters, raising the problem of 
hooliganism to one of international crisis, and highlighting the dilapidated state of many 
football grounds.  
 
The Heysel disaster brought a ban from Europe which deprived the top clubs of much 
needed revenue, and it was in this context that they sought to acquire a larger proportion of 
any television deal. Thus the European ban drove the growing assertiveness of a handful of 
big clubs over the rest in a development that would one day lead to the formation of the 
Premier League.  In the meantime, in the immediate post-Heysel context, the television 
companies drove a hard bargain on any future broadcasting deal – did they really want to 
be associated with a game whose reputation was so blackened? Eventually, when a deal 
was reached to come into effect in January 1986, it was for a fraction of the original asking 
price. At the same time, crowds reached an all-time low.  
 
Yet soon the seeds of revival started to appear. The unpopularity of the Thatcher 
government’s proposed identity card scheme had the effect of politicising supporters, and 
it was in this context that the Football Supporters’ Association was formed. Technological 
advances led to the publication of supporters’ magazines, known as ‘fanzines’. Known for 
their direct humour and outspoken comment, fanzines also became important in the 
campaign against the common enemy in the shape of the identity card scheme. There was 
also wider cultural change taking place. The ‘acid house’ movement of 1988 led to the rave 
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culture with its ‘baggy’ fashions and the use of ecstasy and communal ethos. The result was 
that fighting and violence simply became unfashionable.  
 
Attendances were rising again and it appeared that there was a revival under way. It was at 
this point that the Hillsborough disaster happened. The narrative of the disaster need not be 
repeated. Suffice to say that much of what has emerged in the reports and enquiries since 
has revealed certain attitudes and prejudices about football supporters that were held by the 
police and some sections of the media. The mindset of the police in charge was that of 
control, of preventing a possible outbreak of hooliganism, rather than that of ensuring 
public safety at a major sports event. Much of the time since has been spent trying to pin 
the blame on Liverpool supporters when the biggest single factor among the causes of the 
disaster was police error in terms of organisation and the lack of any clear directions given 
to fans entering the ground.  
 
The legacy of Hillsborough proved crucial. The disaster led to the Taylor Report, which 
turned out to be the most far-reaching and insightful of any assessment of the national game. 
It was published in two parts, the Interim Report in August 1989, and the Final Report in 
January 1990. The former detailed exactly what happened at the disaster, the latter called 
for major changes: ‘Grounds should be upgraded. Attitudes should be more welcoming. 
The aim should be to provide more modern and comfortable accommodation, better and 
more varied facilities’, said Taylor.728 Most importantly, he called for football grounds to 
be all-seater. This led to the wholesale rebuilding of stadia, with some clubs opting to 
relocate to a new site and start again. Often this was a response to the cost of land in urban 
                                                          
728 HMSO, Taylor Final Report, p.12.  
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areas, and the increased use of the motor car. As other amenities, such as leisure parks, 
shopping centres, and multiplex cinemas, found new homes on the outskirts of towns, so 
did some of the new football grounds. In these instances, clubs had to lay on special bus 
services to ferry fans between the town or city centre and the ground.   
 
All of this raised the issue of funding. Taylor had suggested that the costs of rebuilding 
should be met by cutting tax on the pools levy, but he underestimated the amount involved. 
As ticket prices soared in the 1990s, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that much of the cost 
was passed on to fans. The new grounds were safer and more comfortable, but much of the 
atmosphere of the old grounds was lost as stadia became noticeably quieter. The increase 
in ticket prices, and attempts by clubs to attract more women and families, the growth in 
the number of executive boxes, and the cost of merchandising – especially replica shirts, 
which would become a ‘must have’ item in the 1990s - all point to the game undergoing a 
kind of embourgeoisement during the course of the decade. Replica shirts matched the shift 
in fashion towards logoed t-shirts, and the increasing popularity of football was part of the 
growth in consumer culture as football changed in parallel with other areas of the leisure 
industry. 
 
Despite Hillsborough, the revival in football’s fortunes continued. This was due in no small 
part to the performance of the England team in the 1990 World Cup finals. Little over a 
year after Hillsborough half the country tuned in to watch England in the semi-finals, which 
was the team’s best showing since 1966. ‘Gazza’ became a household name, and the sound 
of Pavarotti’s Nessum Dorma as the accompanying record confirmed that football was 
aiming to broaden its appeal to a middle-class audience. This trend was assisted by the 
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growth in football literature. Leading the way, and following on from fanzines, was Nick 
Hornby’s Fever Pitch, in which he detailed his experience of supporting Arsenal. In the 
book Hornby relates wider experiences than simply his obsession with his team. It is about 
the pains of growing up, finding comfort in following eleven players after a family break-
up, experiences at school, dating girls, going away to university, and starting a career.  The 
stages of his life are punctuated with references to wider fashion, culture, and national news 
events. It is written with wit, clarity, and honesty, and anyone can relate to it and enjoy it, 
football fan or not. This may explain the book’s immense success. It also paved the way for 
many more books on football.  
 
Simultaneous to the Taylor Report being implemented, football underwent restructuring. 
The formation of the Premier League had its roots in the strife that had beset the game for 
at least a decade. Discord had developed between a handful of big clubs, who were now in 
the ownership of directors motivated by business, in keeping with the growing importance 
of profitability during the Thatcher era. They saw themselves as the main ambassadors of 
the sport and therefore demanded a greater share of revenue from television broadcasting 
deals. In their view, the smaller clubs were dragging them down, but those clubs in turn 
sought to protect their own interests and the sharing ethos of the Football League assisted 
them in this. During the course of the 1980s the big clubs, based around the nucleus of the 
‘Big Five’ – Arsenal, Everton, Liverpool, Manchester United, and Tottenham Hotspur – 
had sought, and gained, a bigger say in the decision-making process and a larger share of 
television revenue. They became more closely linked with television deals and when 
satellite television broadcasting emerged on the scene it brought the prospect of greatly 
increased income. Running parallel to this was the rivalry between football’s governing 
bodies. When the Football League produced its document One Game One Team One Voice 
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in 1990, with its call for there to be one governing body for football, this was interpreted 
by the Football Association as a grab for power, so it responded with its own Blueprint For 
The Future Of Football. This was the document that called for there to be a new top division 
of eighteen clubs under the jurisdiction of the FA, and in turn this set the process in motion 
for the formation of the Premier League. 
 
Thus the creation of the Premier League was driven by the desire of the big clubs to secure 
a greater amount of revenue from television, in a context of rivalry between football’s two 
governing bodies. When it started in 1992 it seemed like the old First Division under a new 
name, but it was vastly different in that it had broken away from the Football League and 
therefore did not have to share with the clubs in the other divisions. Because of a new 
television deal this revenue was huge in comparison to any previous agreement, and was 
with a satellite television broadcaster. The Premier League’s formation has been interpreted 
in different ways. There is the Conn view that it was motivated by greed, and that the FA 
betrayed its own ethos as custodians of the game by backing it.729 On the other hand, King 
argues that football was simply responding to changing times in terms of the drift to a free-
market economy throughout the leisure industry, and in this context the establishment of 
the Premier League was necessary.730 In a sense, they are both right. The breakaway was 
motivated by the desire of the big clubs to acquire a greater share of revenue, but this 
paralleled the broader trend as society shifted from being community-based to business-
orientated.  
 
                                                          
729 Conn, Football Business, pp.151-152.  
730 King, End Of The Terraces, pp.67-68.  
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The Premier League’s impact increased over the years, influencing popular culture. 
Presented by Sky in a way that was new and exciting, it played a major part in reviving 
football’s fortunes as the decade progressed. Its popularity grew and replica shirts became 
a fashion accessory. Pub licensing hours had been increased to cover all-day opening from 
1988, extended to include Sundays from 1995, and thereafter it became commonplace to 
gather in the pub to watch live televised football. It proved to be a winning formula, 
benefitting both football and Sky television. The television deal, which initially had seemed 
vast, would increase greatly with every new deal that was subsequently made.  
 
English football enjoyed massive financial expansion. The combined financial turnover of 
clubs in the Premier League in 1992/1993 was £170 million. In 2006/2007 this figure was 
£1530 million, an increase of 900%.731 There is, however, a word of caution. Astonishing 
as it seems, clubs still made a loss. The pre-tax losses at Premiership clubs in 2006/2007 
reached £285 million.732 Clubs relied on the willingness of wealthy owners to write off 
losses and underwrite debt. So where is the money going? In inflated transfer fees and 
wages to elite players. This is what Sir Alan Sugar termed ‘the prune juice effect.’ Just like 
a laxative, no sooner do clubs receive vast amounts of money in satellite television deals, 
than it goes out again in transfer fees and wages.733 It may be a crude analogy, but it 
illustrates the point perfectly.  
 
                                                          
731 Sean Hamil and Geoff Walters, ‘Financial Performance In English Football: ‘an inconvenient truth’’, Soccer 
& Society, vol. 11 No. 4, July 2010, p.354.  
732 Ibid., p.359.  
733 Ibid., p.361.  
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During the 1990s there were two teams whose achievements ran parallel to, and were 
indicative of, a new age. Firstly, Manchester United came to dominate domestic 
competition under manager Alex Ferguson. United had been building towards success, and 
were only just pipped to the title in the last season before the breakaway. With a 
combination of shrewd signings, young talent, and a siege mentality nurtured by Ferguson, 
the club’s achievements over the next two decades would eclipse even those of Liverpool 
in the previous age. What made United’s success different was the club’s acknowledgement 
of, and keenness to exploit, those fans who do not regularly attend games. They marketed 
their merchandise to those who only followed the team on Sky television. Secondly, 
Blackburn Rovers enjoyed great success for a short period under the chairmanship of Sir 
Jack Walker. With his wealth from the sale of Walkersteel, Walker invested his millions in 
rebuilding Blackburn’s ground and building a team capable of winning the Premiership 
title, which they did in 1995 under Kenny Dalglish, the former Liverpool manager. In the 
mid-1990s Manchester United with their armchair audience, and Blackburn Rovers with 
their rebuilt ground and manufactured team, were a clear indication that football was 
changing into something that was culturally different from that which had existed before.  
 
In 1996 England hosted the European Championships. At a time when the amount of money 
coming into the Premiership was making football in England an attractive proposition for 
any young continental player, English football had the opportunity to present itself in a 
positive light as the competition’s games were played on the new or rebuilt grounds which 
were both safe and clean. Six months earlier the Bosman Ruling had decreed that any player 
out of contract was not tied to his club and this fundamentally changed the transfer market. 
Players, once out of contract, were free to move between clubs. In addition to this, European 
Union rules gave them the freedom to move from club to club between its member states. 
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The result was an influx of overseas players into the Premiership in what was effectively 
an internationalisation of the game. Team line-ups included names that sounded unfamiliar 
to the English tongue as the proportion of overseas players playing in the Premiership grew 
substantially.  
 
Continental managers soon followed, and Arsene Wenger’s appointment at Arsenal in 
September 1996 marked a watershed. He introduced methods of training and dietary 
regimes that had not been seen in England, filling his side with overseas players and  outfit 
that displayed European styles and were aesthetically attractive to watch. Wenger’s strategy 
paid off and Arsenal mounted a serious challenge to Manchester United’s dominance. 
Around the turn of the millennium the two clubs enjoyed a duopoly which no other club 
could challenge.  
 
The football historian Neil Carter has argued that the team manager was central to the 
transformation in football’s image. He acquired a higher profile due to the increased level 
of media attention now focussed on the game, and became a central figure in the ‘soap 
opera’ that football had become. Yet paradoxically, his powers were reduced and his role 
narrowed. Whereas once he was involved in contracts and paperwork, a more continental 
style of management developed whereby he would simply be responsible for coaching the 
first team.734 
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As football enjoyed a new level of popularity the one player who typified the age was David 
Beckham. The Manchester United and England player became an icon at a time when the 
traditional roles of masculinity were being challenged, and he fitted easily into the part. His 
marriage to Victoria Adams, one of the Spice Girls, served to widen his appeal, and his 
modelling of certain products helped earn him a lucrative additional income. Like George 
Best in the 1960s, David Beckham in the late 1990s incorporated the worlds of sport, 
fashion, pop music, and popular culture. His fame occurred simultaneously within the wider 
trend of a growing interest in celebrity culture. The fascination for well-known people, 
whether they be elite footballers, pop stars, or film and television personalities was fed by 
celebrity magazines, such as Hello! and OK! Of particular relevance to football was the rise 
of so-called ‘lads’ magazines, such as FHM and Loaded, with their promotion of sport, 
cars, and girls.  
 
The process of internationalisation continued to include foreign ownership of the clubs 
themselves. This was not altogether a new phenomenon. Already, Sam Hamman and 
Mohammed Al-Fayed, at Wimbledon and Fulham respectively, had come from overseas 
and owned an English football club. Under Al-Fayed’s ownership Fulham enjoyed thirteen 
successive seasons of Premiership football. However, these two examples were merely a 
sideshow compared to what would come later. In 2003 it was announced that a Russian 
billionaire, Roman Abramovich, had bought Chelsea. This was a buyout on a completely 
different scale. The £140 million he paid for Chelsea was relatively small change among 
his billions, but it was enough to rescue Chelsea from impending bankruptcy and transform 
them from a good side into a great one. At last, there was a club that could challenge the 
dominance of Arsenal and Manchester United. Within two years Chelsea had won the 
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Premiership and would repeat the feat the following season. For the first time an overseas 
owner had invested sufficient income to enable one team to dominate domestic competition.  
 
Soon there would be further buyouts of other top clubs, but with less positive results. The 
American Malcolm Glazer bought Manchester United, but in a practice known as 
leveraging, he loaded the cost of his purchase on to the club, thus massively increasing its 
debts. Some fans were so angry they formed a breakaway club, FC United of Manchester. 
Liverpool had a similar experience when two Americans, George Gillett Jnr. and Tom 
Hicks, took over. Despite their assurances to the contrary, the experience was similar to that 
of Glazer at Manchester United as the club was loaded with debt from the cost of the buyout. 
It was another American, John Henry, who rescued Liverpool from the pair.  
 
The next large takeover would be more positive. In 2008, the purchase of Manchester City 
by the Abu Dhabi United Group seemed set to eclipse even that of Abramovich at Chelsea. 
The story followed a similar path of buying up some of the best players and gradually 
finishing higher up the table until the title was won. The difference was that City had been 
taken over while at a lower status than Chelsea had been. A mid-table club, seemingly 
forever in the shadow of their neighbours and rivals Manchester United, sufficient funds 
were invested to take City to the title within four years. As with Chelsea, there was enough 
financial clout to build a team that could dominate domestic competition.  
 
The arrival of players, managers, and owners from foreign countries of course paralleled 
the wider process of globalisation. Instant communication, globalised markets, and greater 
foreign travel all made the world seem smaller in the first decade of the twenty-first century. 
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The European Union expanded significantly: the increase in the number of its member 
states, the relaxation of cross-border tariffs, and the introduction of the single currency have 
all assisted the sense that Europe had drawn closer together. British families travel on cheap 
flights to European destinations. Thus as business, communications and travel have taken 
on international proportions, so too has player movement in football, and the increased 
cross-border movement by players that has taken place can be seen within this broader 
context. They have been attracted both by the lucrative earnings that can be made and the 
fact that the Premiership is promoted to a global audience.  
 
Why do wealthy foreign owners become involved? One can only conclude that it is because 
of the desire to become associated with something as prestigious as an English Premiership 
football club. The latter has become a status symbol, the ownership of which can only serve 
to enhance the standing of any owner in their own country. It may assist with other business 
interests that owner may have. It certainly does not make money in itself. In fact, to acquire 
a club and bring it success requires an investment of hundreds of millions. Therefore, the 
desire among overseas billionaires to own an English football club displays the game’s 
transformation in image, and indicates that its prestige now operates on a global scale.  
 
We have seen through these broad and overlapping themes, the transformation of elite-level 
football in England. Over the years, historians of British industrialisation have engaged in 
an ‘evolution or revolution’ debate. Such a discussion can also be applied to football. The 
roots of change can be traced back as far as 1961 with the abolition of the players’ maximum 
wage. This contributed to the circumstances which would drive further change. If we are to 
argue that change was an evolutionary process, it took several decades to evolve into the 
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modern game we enjoy today. The extent of the changes that have taken place in English 
football, however, have been great and have also reached outside the game. What has 
happened is nothing short of a revolution, the epicentre of which surely occurred in the first 
half of the 1990s. It was during this five year period that the construction of all-seater 
stadiums got under way following the Taylor Report, the Premier League was formed and 
secured its associated satellite television deal, and the European Cup started to develop into 
the Champions League. These developments paved the way for greater internationalisation 
as the Premier League grew to occupy a global stage. As far as the fan experience is 
concerned, the description by Colin Ward of football in Utopia, quoted just before the first 
chapter, seemed absurd in the late 1980s when he wrote it, otherwise there would have been 
no point in saying it, but one has to conclude that by the mid-2010s, much of it rings true.735  
 
A survey was conducted by Jo Welford, Borja Garcia, and Brett Smith at the School of 
Sport, Exercise and Health Sciences, Loughborough University, into the opinions of 
football fans. Using a sample of twenty-one fans (seventeen male and four female to 
accurately reflect the gender imbalance that still exists) of clubs from across all four 
divisions, including one non-League and one from Scotland, they found that fans were not 
happy about certain aspects of the way that the game has developed. The main areas of 
dissatisfaction were financial concerns and the power held over football by the media. Sky 
Sports in particular was taken as a ‘symbol of a disliked modernisation of the game.’736 
 
                                                          
735 Ward, Steaming In, p.6. 
736 Jo Welford, Borja Garcia, and Brett Smith, ‘A ‘Healthy’ Future? Supporters’ Perception s Of The Current 
State Of English Football’, Soccer & Society, vol. 16, Nos. 2-3, 2015, p.329.  
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In trying to identify the biggest single factor for change, opinions differ according to 
context. When considering the fan experience of attending games in the modern age, the 
biggest single influence was the Hillsborough disaster; regarding the organisational format 
of the domestic game, the most important development was the foundation of the 
Premiership. If we are to focus on the English game in an international setting, the Bosman 
Ruling becomes most important; charting the game’s revival to a position that is ‘cool’ and 
fashionable leads us to conclude that its promotion by satellite television played a central 
role. All of these developments were inter-related and often simultaneous as they impacted 
on each other to a greater or lesser degree. Rogan Taylor, the academic and former chairman 
of the FSA, gives a simple equation: ‘if you want the equation for modern football, i.e. post-
modern football, 1992 onwards, it’s Heysel plus Hillsborough over satellite t.v. equals 
modern football.’737 
 
Yet while there has been great change, there has been continuity too. Bar the odd miniscule 
change in the laws of the game, such as the introduction of ‘the backpass rule’ and the 
number of substitutions a team is allowed to make, it is still essentially the same game.738 
The pitch markings are the same, and there are still two goals, one at each end of the pitch. 
There are still two teams, each with eleven players, still organised into defence, midfield, 
and attack, the number of players in each depending on the style the manager wishes to 
implement or how he aims to cope with the opposing team. Therefore the changes that have 
taken place in football have been in its organisation and structure, and in the area of 
                                                          
737 Rogan Taylor, interview with the author, phone, 5 October 2014.  
738 The ‘backpass rule’ means that if a player kicks the ball back to the goalkeeper, the goalkeeper cannot 
handle the ball. The rule does not apply if he heads or chests the ball back to the goalkeeper. It was introduced 
in an attempt to prevent timewasting tactics and make games less boring. Regarding substitutions, for decades 
a team could only make one substitution, but now they can make up to three, which can be chosen from a 
pool of up to seven players.  
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consumption - how the game is experienced, witnessed, and enjoyed – and these have been 
seismic.  
 
In football’s revolution the old game died on the terraces at Hillsborough, to be replaced by 
one which, once past its fledgling stage, would be safer, enjoy wide popularity, and embrace 
big business to become a billion-pound global brand. But this has been achieved at a price. 
As the author Ian Ridley commented, ‘the fan experience is so much better in many ways, 
but it’s so much more expensive. The sad thing is, young kids are priced out of the game.’739 
The cost has been to the ordinary supporter. In addition to the massively inflated ticket 
prices, today’s fan has to endure numerous changes in kick-off times away from the 
traditional 3pm Saturday kick-off. His, or increasingly her, team can now kick off from 
Friday evening, through the weekend to Monday night, at a variety of times. This is at the 
insistence of satellite television companies. In welcoming these broadcasters and accepting 







                                                          




APPENDIX A  
Chelsea’s record under Abramovich   
Season Manager Premier 
League 




2003/04 Ranieri 2nd 5th round 5th round semi-final 
2004/05 Mourinho Winners 5th round Winners semi-final 
2005/06 Mourinho Winners semi-final 3rd round last 16 
2006/07 Mourinho 2nd Winners Winners semi-final 
2007/08 Mourinho, 
Grant 
2nd 6th round runners-up runners-up 
2008/09 Scolari,  
Hiddink 
3rd Winners 4th round semi-final 
2009/10 Ancelotti Winners Winners 5th round last 16 




6th Winners 5th round Winners 
2012/13 di Matteo,        
Benitez 
3rd semi-final semi-final didn’t 
qualify* 
2013/14 Mourinho 3rd 5th round 5th round semi-final 
2014/15 Mourinho Winners 4th round Winners last 16 
2015/16 Mourinho, 
Hiddink 
10th 6th round 4th round last 16 
                           
  Source: www.soccerbase.com last accessed 13 June 2016.  






APPENDIX B  
Manchester City’s record under the Abu Dhabi United Group 











Season Manager Premier 
League 




2008/09 Hughes 10th  3rd round 2nd round didn’t qualify 
2009/10 Hughes, 
Mancini 
5th  5th round semi-finals didn’t qualify 
2010/11 Mancini 3rd Winners 3rd round didn’t qualify 
2011/12 Mancini Winners 3rd round semi-finals Group Stage 
2012/13 Mancini 2nd runners up 3rd round Group Stage 
2013/14 Pellegrini Winners 6th round Winners last 16 
2014/15 Pellegrini 2nd 4th round 4th round last 16 
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Other printed Ephemera  
 
A Kick Up The Rs – Queen’s Park Rangers fanzine 
And Smith Must Score – Brighton and Hove Albion fanzine 
Holy Bible 
Melody Maker 
Mission Impossible – Darlington fanzine  
Soccer & Society 
Sport In History 
Sport In Society 
The Citizen – Norwich City fanzine 
The Economist 
The International Journal Of The History Of Sport  
The Peterborough Effect – Peterborough United fanzine 
The Wheelbarrow – Notts County fanzine 
There’s Only One F In Fulham – Fulham fanzine  
Through The Wind And Rain – Liverpool fanzine 
Voice Of The Valley – Charlton Athletic fanzine  
What A Load Of Cobblers – Northampton Town fanzine  
When Saturday Comes – general fanzine  
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